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A Functional and Relational Perspective on Morality 
In order to understand moral judgment and moral behavior from a psychological 
standpoint, we should carefully consider the function of morality, and that, as a phenomenon, 
morality is fundamentally relational. This statement is not trivial as may appear to be, and 
here I insist on some main implications of it. In what follows, I first give a few coordinates to 
delimit the ‘essence’ of morality. Second, I briefly review some recent evidence in 
developmental and evolutionary psychology suggesting that both prosocial and aggressive 
tendencies reflect important aspects of our socio-moral lives. Third, I argue that morality has 
evolved in humans’ groups to serve the function of maintaining prosocial tendencies and 
constraining aggressive ones, and moral ideals represent the actual balance between different 
forces and individuals who are necessarily in a specific relationship. Within this view, the 
obedience to authority and the acceptance of the hierarchical structure of society, along with 
the internalization of basic principles of conduct, represent core aspects of morality. Finally, I 
discuss the distinction between ‘autonomy’ and ‘heteronomy’ in moral development (Piaget, 
1932; Kohlberg, 1969). Two main stages, levels or forms of morality will then be dissociated, 
one that consists in the simple obedience to rules or authority’s mandates, and the other one 
that consists in the internal motivation to comply either with the authority or with a set of 
principles according to which we aim to live a morally good life. I argue that some aspects of 
heteronomy (that is, the compliance with authority’s orders) remain, also in adulthood, an 
important part of our morality. 
The aim of this introduction is to discuss some core aspects of morality, also by 
identifying the selective pressures that likely affected their evolution. This is done in order to 
lay a basis for the understanding of the content of the present dissertation, that mainly 
addresses questions regarding the development of core aspects of morality during infancy and 
childhood, namely (a) the ability to represent social power asymmetries and authority, and (b) 
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the ability to weigh agents’ intentions in producing a moral judgment. The latter ability is 
linked with the child’s capacity to evaluate not only whether the actions outcomes represent a 
violation of some rule or authority’s mandate, but also whether the individual possess a 
mindset that will likely produce desirable or undesirable outcomes in the future. 
 
1. The Relational Approach to the Definition of Morality 
 
When studying the developmental aspects of humans’ morality, one may feel the need 
to possess at least a rough or working definition of the phenomenon under consideration. 
Here, I do not offer a clear-cut definition of morality. Instead, I insist on some core aspects 
that would hopefully clarify the concept of morality and, as a result, it would help us to 
understand which psychological aspects we should necessarily consider when we engage in 
the endeavor of studying morality. 
As suggested by the relational models theory (Fiske, 1991, 1992; but see also the 
chapter on Ethics in Hegel, 1807/1977) and its recent extension (Rai & Fiske, 2011), ethics is 
necessarily defined by the particular relationship that is in place between a certain set of 
individuals who share a specific spatiotemporal context. For example, the morality within a 
family setting can be dissociated from the morality within a group of pairs playing cards 
together, and the latter is again different from the morality of a citizen of a democratic 
European society. An individual who is a father could be also a card player, and could live in 
a democratic society; however, when he is parenting his children he would likely endorse a 
particular role and specific values that he does not necessarily endorse or prioritize in other 
social situations. He would act more authoritatively with his children than with his cards 
mates.  
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Of course, we do not need to posit as many moral faculties as the possible roles people 
may have in the society. Though, it is important to acknowledge that the ‘moral faculty’ is 
necessarily inserted in a specific social context, and it likely works to serve specific functions 
within that context. Depending on how the relevant social relation is construed, actions that 
we would typically judge as morally bad (like, for example, harming or killing an innocent 
victim) could be perceived as morally worth, for example when such an action is 
accomplished because of an authority’s mandate or because the majority of people wants so 
(Fiske & Rai, 2014; Rai & Fiske, 2011). 
 
1.1. Conformity and Obedience to Authority as Pillars of Morality 
Social relationships are often part of a broader social context, where power 
asymmetries exist and hierarchies are formed to handle and minimize conflicts among group 
members, and, possibly, to manage between-group competitions. Within this frame, two main 
elements are essential for every possible morality in a certain context. A first pillar is the 
acceptance and the conformity to a minimum set of rules; as Piaget wrote in his 1932 
influential book “all morality consists in a system of rules, and the essence of all morality is 
to be sought for in the respect which the individual acquires for these rules.” A second pillar 
is the obedience to the established authority and the acceptance of the hierarchies. 
It might seem somewhat ‘Tory’ to posit that the obedience to authority’s rules and the 
acceptance of power asymmetries are the basics of morality, and I hypothesize that this 
feeling is related to our Western and democratic culture—citizens being educated (both 
formally and informally) to think accordingly to an individualistic view. Especially after the 
Cold War, but soon after the rise of modern state, people tended to resize the power of the 
state by putting the individual (with its own set of rights) before the community. However, 
we do not have to forget that each society, political system or morality de facto implies that a 
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number of individuals with different forces and subsequent positions within the system try to 
live together as a group, seeking the best balance between everyone force and needs. 
Traditionally, Western developmental psychologists have generally agreed upon the 
view that morality evolves from an initial stage or phase where the child identifies the good 
with the obedience to an authority that remains external to his or her conscience, to an adult-
like phase where morality is now internalized, and the respect for the rules is strictly related 
to the mutual respect and the cooperation between individuals with equal rights. The 
individual understands what are the reasons why society introduced the rule, and she or he 
understands that rules and authorities (should) protect some abstract and generally valid 
principles of justice and right (Kohlberg, 1969; Piaget, 1932). 
Moreover, ‘domain theorist’ insisted in dissociating moral norms from social ones 
(Turiel, 1978; Nucci, 1981; Killen & Smetana, 2015). According to their view, moral rules 
reflect abstract and universally valid principles, and therefore do not depend upon any 
authority’s mandate. By contrast, the prescriptive force of conventional norms depends 
entirely on the social context or the authority. A host of studies reported that, by at least the 
age of three, children can distinguish between moral and conventional rules, and 
consequently they judge moral violations—harming an innocent victim—more harshly than 
conventional transgressions, like wearing pajamas at school (e.g., Nucci, 1985; Smetana & 
Braeges, 1990). Moreover, conventional but not moral rules are judged to be authority-
dependent. 
 
1.2. Reacting to Classical Views 
A solid reaction to the ‘classical’ views we mentioned has mainly come from studies 
that analyzed the moral judgment and reasoning of non-Western populations. Overall, these 
studies showed that some non-Western populations (e.g., Indian Brahmans and 
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‘Untouchable’, who live in a society where the moral code of “community” prevails over the 
Western-like moral code of “autonomy”; see Shweder, Much, Mahapatra, & Park, 1997) 
judge some conventional transgressions as they were moral (Haidt, Koller, & Dias, 1993; 
Nichols, 2004; Nisan, 1987; Shweder, Mahapatra, & Miller, 1987; but see also Astuti & 
Bloch, 2015). For example, participants were asked to judge violations of cultural norms like 
“The day after his father’s death, the eldest son had a haircut and ate chicken”. Indians judged 
those actions wrong, serious, unalterable and universally binding. That is, violations that do 
not imply harm were judged as they were moral violations. Moreover, there is evidence that 
some moral transgressions are judged also by Western adults as they were conventional 
violations (Kelly, Stich, Haley, Eng, & Fessler, 2007). Both these results undermine the view 
that the moral-conventional distinction is universal. 
Furthermore, the universal validity of the stage-like model of moral development has 
also been criticized. For example, a recent study reported that adults living in small-scale 
societies, ranging from hunter-gatherer to pastoralist to horticulturalist, compared to Western 
individuals, when presented with a moral judgment task, take less into account the agents’ 
intentions and more the actions outcomes (Barrett et al., 2016). This finding is important 
because it raises the suspect that at least some core aspects of morality (as developmental 
psychologists have traditionally conceived morality) may be indeed the product of our culture 
instead of the product of our phylogeny. Therefore, the emphasis that now researchers give to 
individual rights—e.g., see the Smetana (2006)’s definition of moral transgressions as acts 
that are “wrong because they have intrinsic effects for others’ right and welfare”, p. 121—
may actually sway the current understanding of the phenomenon. Community-like values, 
such as the respect for authority and social hierarchies, or the respect for the common goods, 
may have been central aspects of our morality and likely still play an essential but somewhat 
undetected role in shaping our current morality (e.g., Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2009). 
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2. The Functional Approach to the Definition of Morality 
 
Now, not all rules are moral. To give an example, we can differentiate between 
grammatical rules and moral rules. Both have normative power, but only the transgressions of 
the latter elicit in us what we are used to call a moral condemnation. How then do we 
distinguish between moral and amoral rules? The approach I follow here could be named 
functional. Moral rules do not have a special nature or reality. However, they serve particular 
functions, and by specifying those functions, we should be able to define morality.  
 
2.1. The Concept of ‘Balance’ in the Moral Domain 
Overall, morality can be conceptualized as the attainment of the right balance between 
the forces in the field. If we consider that each individual in a society exerts some power over 
others (e.g., he claims the right to work, in a modern society, or he aims to achieve a higher 
reproductive status, in a ancient society and perhaps still today etc.), we also see that a 
specific balance between forces would be in place in each context, and morality is either the 
acceptance of this balance or the ideal balance towards which our actions and society 
structures should approximate. As Stoic philosophers already suggested, morality is the 
acceptance of the right or logical order between individuals in a relationship. Following this 
line of reasoning, then, there is no morality outside a specific context or relationship, and 
morality could be always defined by the best balance between individual forces. 
Take for a moment the well-known distinction in philosophy and in moral psychology 
between utilitarianism and deontology. According to utilitarianism, the morality of an action 
depends on its outcomes; an action is good when it maximizes the common good. By 
contrast, according to deontology, the morality of an action depends on whether the action is 
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consistent with some abstract moral principles or norms. A question central to moral 
philosophy is which view has to be preferred, while a question central to moral psychology is 
whether people reason accordingly to utilitarian or deontological principles, or both. 
However, what is clear to me is that both views may act in our society as distinct forces. 
Different individuals will hold different moral principles, and the same individual may be 
willing to switch his or her view depending on the particular context. According to our 
definition of morality, we should consider that a compromise between the two positions will 
likely occurs, as a results of a conflict between different interests, preferences and attitudes. 
Ultimately, there should be a right balance between different forces, those who favor 
utilitarianism and those who favor deontology, and this balance, that is the product of both 
moral factors and factors external to the moral domain, is what we need to recognize as our 
morality. 
 
2.2. Hierarchy and Morality 
However, I have not yet specified which criteria we should use to address the question 
“best balance to pursue what aims?” This question is simply another way to ask which 
functions morality serves. Overall, morality is functional to the enhancement of prosocial 
tendencies and the constraining of egoistic and aggressive tendencies. From an evolutionary 
standpoint, moral tendencies may have been selected for ensuring long-term social-
cooperative relationships between group members (Darwin, 1859/1982; Fiske, 1991; Joyce, 
2006). 
Human nature is neither intrinsically good nor bad. First, because it would be childlike 
to judge nature with the vocabulary of morality. Second, and more relevantly here, because 
humans show both a ‘bright’ and a ‘dark’ side, in the sense that we may claim that human 
nature typically goes both in the direction of some goals that we evaluate or interpret as 
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morally good and in the direction of some other goals that instead we consider morally bad. 
On the one hand, we may advocate that in the natural condition of mankind the individual 
tends to dominate aggressively and to prevail over others without any concern for their 
rights―the idea of individual right being actually absent in such an original state. By 
contrast, we may claim that human nature is fundamentally good, but it is actually corrupted 
by  our ‘evil’ cultural, social or political systems. These two opposing claims are of course 
reported as clear and extreme views. However, evolutionary literature and, more recently, 
infants’ cognition and developmental literature suggest that both tendencies are constitutive 
of the human nature and are displayed from a very young age. It has also been proposed that 
some core morally good and evil tendencies are indeed innate―being the product of our 
phylogeny (Bloom, 2013; Wynn, 2008). 
Human beings have been evolved as a social and cooperative animal species (Cosmides 
& Tooby, 2013; Tomasello, 2014; Wilson, 2012). Already during early infancy, humans 
possess a whole set of abilities to represent the complex social world around them 
(Baillargeon, Scott, He, Sloane, Setoh, Jin, Wu, & Bian, 2015; Banaji & Gelman, 2013). In 
the first year of life, infants possess the ability to distinguish between prosocial and antisocial 
agents, they prefer helping agents over hindering or mean agents and also expect others to 
hold the same preferences (Choi & Luo, 2015; Hamlin, Wynn, & Bloom, 2007; Lee, Yun, 
Kim, & Song, 2015; Meristo & Surian, 2014). Moreover, infants show an early sense of 
fairness. They prefer agents that distribute the resources in a fairly way rather than in an 
unfairly way, and expect others to have the same preferences they hold (e.g., Geraci & 
Surian, 2011; Schmidt & Sommerville, 2011; Sloane, Baillargeon, & Premack, 2012). 
Further studies show that infants represent dominance hierarchies and conflicts over 
resources (Mascaro & Csibra, 2012; Pun, Birch, & Baron, 2016; Thomsen, Frankenhuis, 
Ingold-Smith, & Carey, 2011), and that they expect subordinates to obey to a leader or an 
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authority but not to a bully that simply hits the subordinates in order to gain their respect 
(Margoni, Baillargeon, & Surian, 2016).  
A number of studies also reported that infants and toddlers spontaneously help others 
that are in need and often share valuable resources with them (e.g., Brownell, Iesue, Nichols, 
& Svetlova, 2013; Svetlova, Nichols, & Brownell, 2010; Warneken & Tomasello, 2006). 
Overall, these results suggest that, very early in life, humans are able to represent prosocial 
and antisocial actions; they prefer morally good and fair agents to mean and unfair agents; 
and they show altruistic tendencies. These mental abilities and action tendencies might have 
been functional in supporting the group cohesion and in maintaining the cooperation between 
group members across the evolutionary trajectory of our species. 
However, along with a ‘bright side’, humans also possess a resolute will to conflict and 
compete for resources and often tend to dominate each other (Aureli & de Waal, 2000; 
Darwin, 1859/1982; Lasker, 1907). The desires to overcome others and to possess more 
resources than others characterize our psychology (Bloom, 2013). Samuel Johnson famously 
stated, “[…] no two people can be half an hour together, but one shall acquire an evident 
superiority over the other”. Both these egoistic and aggressive tendencies can be controlled 
and constrained, and they have been, by establishing hierarchical social structures (Fiske, 
1991; Heinrich & Gil-White, 2001, Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). At least after the introduction 
of the agriculture and the increase of the population size, a hierarchical structuring became 
the rule in humans’ societies (Boehm, 1999; Knauft, 1991; Nye, 2008). 
Hierarchical social structures with leader-followers relationships, then, may have been 
evolved to constrain egoistic and aggressive tendencies. At the same time, a rigid social 
structure and a leader facilitate and maintain cooperation within the group. A current 
hypothesis is that leaders may solve the problem of free-riders (King, Johnson, & Van Vugt, 
2009). It is well-known that the presence of free-riders (individuals who benefit from others’ 
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effort without contributing) can undermine cooperation. A proposed solution to free-riders 
was punishment. However, it is not clear how the punishment mechanism may have been 
evolved, considering that punishment is a costly act (e.g., can represent a danger for the 
punisher). A clever evolutionary solution may then be leadership. Leaders are often the 
individuals who bear the cost of punishment. They may be willing to do that in return for 
those privileges accorded to them. Further evidence from experimental psychology supports 
this line of reasoning by showing that high level of cooperation is indeed achieved in the 
situation in which only one individual is in charge of punishment (O’Gorman, Henrich, & 
Van Vugt, 2009). 
To sum up, then, morality may have been evolved to support and maintain cohesion 
and collaboration between members of the same group, and to constrain aggressive and 
egoistic tendencies into coordinated actions that will pursue shared goals or maximize the 
group benefits in term of resources and capacity to defend the group against rival groups. 
Morality dictates the right balance between individual forces engaging in specific 
relationships, keeps in-group members together by enhancing fairness and collaboration, and 
helps in maintaining the order within the group―that again is functional to the cooperation 
maintenance―by constraining individuals to obey to current rules and to respect the 
authority’s power and the social hierarchy. 
 
3. Two Levels of Morality 
 
The Kant (1788/2002)’s distinction between ‘heteronomy of the power of choice’ and 
‘autonomy of the will’ was taken up again by Piaget (1932)’s work on the development of 
children’s moral reasoning. According to Piaget―and, later on, Kohlberg―not only these 
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concepts are distinct and identify two opposing ways to approach morality, but they also 
characterize different stages in the development of moral reasoning. 
In a first stage of the consciousness of the rules, the child submits completely in 
intention to the rules given by an adult authority, but these moral rules remain external to her 
or his conscience. This explains why the child considers the rules as sacred and, at the same 
time, rules do not really guide or transform her or his moral practice. The child is still in a 
stage characterized by a ‘heteronomous’ respect for the rules and a ‘moral realism’ or an 
‘objective’ conception of responsibility, in which the child observes the letter more than the 
spirit of the law. With regard to the moral judgment, when asked to choose which character is 
the naughtiest and deserves to be punished―between a supposedly well-intentioned character 
that accidentally caused serious material damage and a bad-intentioned one that accidentally 
caused a less serious damage―children attend to outcomes and subsequently condemn the 
well-intentioned character more than the bad-intentioned one. This is because they focus on 
the moral violation and the letter of the law, regardless of the spirit of the moral rules and the 
true intentions behind the agent’ action. 
In a second stage of the consciousness of the rules, children develop the ‘autonomy’ of 
the conscience. Moral rules and adults’ instructions are interiorized and generalized. The 
child now understands why the rules exist in the first place, that is, because of maintaining 
cooperation and order within the group. Children no longer consider rules as sacred. Instead, 
they consider rules as based on a general agreement between individuals. Now is the spirit of 
the law that matters, not the letter. Children’s conception of responsibility shifts from 
‘objective’ to ‘subjective’, and they judge the morality of an action or an agent attending to 
intentions rather than external outcomes. 
According to recent evidence, the ‘realist’ outcome-based reasoning is typical in 
younger preschool children (e.g., Cushman et al., 2013; Margoni & Surian, 2017), but, as we 
DEVELOPMENTAL ASPECTS OF MORAL EVALUATION      
 
13 
already discussed, to some extent both the autonomous and the heteronomous ‘levels’ are part 
of the adults’ moral experience. Kant (1788/2002) argued that heteronomy of the power of 
choice “not only is no basis for any obligation at all but is, rather, opposed to the principle of 
obligation and to the morality of the will” (p. 48). However, the obedience to authority and, 
for example, the acceptance of the current laws of a State are de facto essential parts of 
everyone’s morality―as it was clear to Descartes (1637/1970) when he presented his 
rudimentary morality. 
It is often argued that conformity and obedience to authority are not per se part of the 
morality, also because these aspects of the human nature hide some dangerous pitfalls. At this 
point, everyone immediately visualizes the appalling events occurred to Jews during the Nazi 
regime. When the evilness of the actions is so clear, to condemn the Nazi hierarchs and the 
soldiers who obeyed to the commands become a very easy task. However, no society or large 
group of humans could survive or live in (relative) peace without conformity, respect for the 
rules (either internal or external), and obedience to authority. That is why we sometimes 
confront ourselves with the dilemma whether to obey an authority’s mandate that we deem 
unfair or wrong. For example, should the soldier obey when his superiors order him to kill 
innocent people because this is the only means to hit a strategic target?  
Milgram (1974) conducted a number of experiments and overall reported that people 
were willing to obey authority or experimenter’s instructions also when they were asked to 
administer electric shocks that made helpless victims clearly suffering. Milgram and his 
collaborators remained puzzled by the findings. They ended up interpreting the participants’ 
actions as determined by a conflict between external and constraining factors (“you should 
obey to authority”) and participants’ internal values (“you should not harm innocent others”). 
However, following our arguments, here we should rather claim that what occurred in 
Milgram’s participants was a conflict between values—a conflict between the value of 
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preserving others’ rights and the value, perhaps less available to consciousness but still 
working in the participants’ mind, of obedience to authority. Then it should be very simple to 
address the question why morality, that wins over everything, does not win over 
authority―that is, because complying with the authority and respecting the rules are at the 
very core of our morality, whether we like it or we do not. 
 
4. The Content of the Present Dissertation 
 
The present dissertation collects several works that are either published or submitted to 
relevant journals in the field of developmental or experimental psychology. In the first 
chapter, I report three experiments overall suggesting that 21-month-old infants are already 
able to distinguish between social dominance (an asymmetry in which a dominant individual 
prevails over subordinates in competitive situations, typically by exert force or coercion) and 
authority or leadership (a social asymmetry in which the power of an authority over 
subordinates is deemed rightful by the parties involved). Infants saw geometric-shaped 
computer animations showing either a bully hitting a group of subordinates or a leader that 
respected the subordinates. Both dominant figures gave orders to the subordinates, and 
subordinates complied or violated their instructions. By using the violation-of-expectation 
(VOE) paradigm, we found that infants expect subordinates to comply with a leader’s 
instruction but not with a bully’s instruction, unless the bully closely controlled the 
subordinates. These findings suggest that even 21-month-olds possess an understanding of 
these complex dynamics of power, authority and obedience.  I argue that this is an important 
building block in the acquisition of moral knowledge. 
In the second chapter, I present two experiments conducted on children between ages 
four and eight. For the first time, we reported that during preschool years a shift occurs in 
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children’s moral judgment of helping actions. Between ages 4 and 6, a crucial developmental 
change from an outcome-based to an intent-based goodness judgment occurs. The verbal 
judgments of children undergoes a shift from an ‘objective’ to a ‘subjective’ conception of 
responsibility. To rely on the agents’ intentions rather than on actions outcomes is part of a 
mature way to produce a moral judgment. In chapter six, indeed, I report evidence suggesting 
that the variable of the agent’s intention explains most of the variability of adults’ moral 
judgments of cases of both help and harm. 
A related research question, also partially addressed in chapter two, is whether the 
crucial outcome-to-intent shift occurring during preschool years reflects a conceptual change 
within the moral domain or ancillary changes occurring outside the moral domain, for 
example in executive functioning skills or in theory of mind. The data I present here 
tentatively support a ‘continuous account’, that is, the hypothesis that changes in moral 
judgment reflects changes occurring outside the moral domain, and that the (intent-based) 
moral concepts remain unchanged during the lifespan. I took up again this issue in chapter 
four, where I argue that changes in executive function are likely the best candidate to explain 
the current finding regarding the outcome-to-intent shift in moral judgment. Indeed, studies 
on infants’ socio-moral evaluations, which used spontaneous-response tasks rather than 
elicited-response tasks, thus reducing the processing demands, show that, very early in life, 
humans evaluate others’ actions taking into account the agents’ intentions (e.g., Dunfield & 
Kuhlmeier, 2010; Hamlin, 2013; Lee et al., 2015). Therefore, it can be argued that 
developmental differences result from changes in executive functioning skills (or theory of 
mind skills, which however rely on executive function), and that the concept of moral 
goodness or badness remains unchanged throughout our life. 
A continuity hypothesis is further supported by the finding presented in the seventh and 
last chapter. There I report a study on the difference between younger (age range: 21―39) 
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and older adults (age range: 63―90) in the use of intention and outcome during the 
production of a moral judgment. Participants rated the moral goodness or badness of helping 
and harming actions. Results show that older adults’ moral evaluations rely less on agents’ 
intentions and more on actions outcomes compared to the moral evaluations on the younger 
adults. Further analyses confirmed that this ‘intention-to-outcome shift’ taking place late in 
life can be explained by ancillary changes occurring outside the moral domain. 
Then, in chapter three, two types of intention are dissociated, a biocentric intention (i.e., 
the agent preserves nature because of nature intrinsic value) and an anthropocentric intention 
(i.e., the agent preserves nature because it helps human’s interests). The study aimed to 
investigate whether preschool children, who start judging the morality of actions based on an 
intention assessment, use this distinction between intention types in their moral evaluation 
and, as a result, judge agents that acted with a biocentric intention more bad (when causing an 
harm) or good (when helping others) than agents with anthropocentric intentions. The results 
show only an emerging preference for biocentrism. Therefore, intentions that are associated 
with different moral views (biocentrism and anthropocentrism) only partially affect the 
emerging intent-based judgment of preschool children. 
Finally, in chapter five, I present a brief review of studies on mental state reasoning in 
the moral judgment of children and adults with autism spectrum disorder (ASD). This clinical 
population is known for having theory of mind impairments, thus it proves useful in 
understanding the role of factors external to the moral domain in determining the typical 
developmental trajectory of moral judgment. The aim of the review was to clarify whether 
ASD children develop the ability to judge the morality of an action or an agent by relying on 
the agent’s intentions. Current evidence suggests that the impairment in theory of mind 
hinders the development of a moral judgment based on the agents’ mental states in children 
with ASD. This clinical population shows a preserved capacity to produce a basic moral 
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judgment when evaluating those cases where, for example, an intention to violate a moral 
rule is followed by a negative consequence for the victim. However, this preserved capacity 
is explained by the fact that ASD children mostly evaluate the outcome or other irrelevant 
external factors such as the victim’s emotional reaction. Indeed, when presented with 
ambiguous cases that require the analysis of the agent’s mental states (e.g., the case of a 
failed attempt to harm), ASD individuals encounter some difficulties in producing an intent-
based moral judgment. 
In conclusion, in the present dissertation, I report new findings on some developmental 
aspects regarding both a first and core level of morality, i.e., the respect for rules and 
authority figures, and a second level of morality, i.e., the understanding of the importance of 
the spirit of the law and the use of the agents’ mental states during the production of a moral 
judgment. I conclude that infants are already able to understand that individuals obey to 
instructions given by authorities, but not by bullies. Moreover, I conclude that the crucial 
period for children to show an intent-based judgment when presented with verbal tasks is 
about ages 5-6. However, I argue that this development in moral judgment reflects changes 
occurring outside the moral domain, so that changes in executive functioning skills determine 
the emergence of a capacity to evaluate based on an intention assessment that is likely to be 
already present during the early infancy. One future direction would be to collect evidence in 
order to investigate whether both levels of morality are based on domain-specific, innate 
mechanisms and indeed develop early in human life. 
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PART 1 
INFANCY: EXPECTATIONS OF OBEDIENCE 
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CHAPTER 1 
Infants Distinguish Between Dominance and Leadership 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This chapter is based on the following original article: 
Margoni, F., Baillargeon, R., & Surian, L. (2016). Infants distinguish between leaders and 
bullies. Manuscript submitted. 
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Abstract 
Across three experiments, we investigated whether 21-month-olds distinguish between social 
dominance and leadership. In the former, the dominant prevails over the subordinates in 
competitive situations, whereas in the latter the power of the leader is deemed rightful by the 
parties involved. Infants were presented with computer animations and were familiarized 
with a bully that hit the subordinates or with a leader that did not hit subordinates. Both the 
bully and the leader then gave orders to the subordinates. During the test phase, infants saw 
the subordinates complying or violating the orders. In the absence of the dominant agent, 
infants expected subordinates to obey to the leader, but not to the bully. However, they 
expected the subordinates to obey when the bully did not leave the scene. These results 
suggest that the ability to represent different forms of social power asymmetries develops 
early in life. 
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Infants Distinguish Between Dominance and Leadership 
Human beings are among the most social and cooperative animal species (Tomasello, 
2014; Wilson, 2012). Our particular evolutionary trajectory has provided us with early-
emerging mechanisms for representing others intentions, desires, beliefs and behaviors, along 
with an early-developing ability to infer complex social relations among in-group members 
(Fiske, 1991; Richerson & Boyd, 2006). Evidence of these early-emerging mental 
representational mechanisms come from a number of recent studies on infants’ cognition 
(e.g., Baillargeon, Scott, He, Sloane, Setoh, Jin, Wu, & Bian, 2015; Bloom, 2013; Hamlin, 
Wynn, & Bloom, 2007; Surian, Caldi, & Sperber, 2007; Wynn, 2008). 
Already in the first year of life, infants’ social expectations rely on others intentions and 
they understand both successful and failed actions (Brandone & Wellman, 2009; Dunfield & 
Kuhlmeier, 2010; Gergely & Csibra, 2003; Hamlin, 2013; Lee, Yun, Kim, & Song, 2015; 
Margoni & Surian, 2016a; Woodward, 1998). In the second year of life, infants understand 
that others may hold false beliefs, suggesting that they already possess a theory of mind 
(Baillargeon, Scott, & He, 2010; Onishi & Baillargeon, 2005; Surian et al., 2007; Wellman, 
2014). 
Infants’ theory of mind skills inform also their socio-moral expectations and evaluations. 
Within the first year of life, infants develop the ability to distinguish between prosocial and 
antisocial agents, show to prefer helping agents to hindering agents, and expect that others 
would hold these same moral preferences (Hamlin & Wynn, 2011; Hamlin et al., 2007; 
Hamlin, Wynn, & Bloom, 2010; Lee et al., 2015; Meristo & Surian, 2014). Infants also 
possess an early-emerging understanding of fairness, and prefer agents that distribute the 
resources fairly rather than unfairly (e.g., Geraci & Surian, 2011; Schmidt & Sommerville, 
2011; Sloane, Baillargeon, & Premack, 2012). 
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Furthermore, studies on infants and toddlers’ behaviors reported that very early in life 
humans show a spontaneous tendency to altruistically help others (Hepach, Haberl, Lambert, 
& Tomasello, 2016; Over & Carpenter, 2009; Svetlova, Nichols, & Brownell, 2010; 
Warneken & Tomasello, 2006) and to share resources with them (Brownell, Iesue, Nichols, 
& Svetlova, 2013). An evolutionary account of these early-emerging mental abilities and 
socio-moral behavioral tendencies would insist on their functional role in supporting group 
cohesion and maintaining the collaboration among in-group members (e.g., Baumard, André, 
& Sperber, 2013; Bloom, 2013; Greene, 2013; Tomasello, Melis, Tennie, Wyman, & 
Herrmann, 2012). Within this standpoint, social bonds and morality itself can be explained as 
functional to the pursuing of in-group interests, so that, as a result, today we still possess 
moralities and religions that tended to systematically exclude out-group members (Bloom, 
2012; Greene, 2013; see also Andrighetto, Baldissarri, Lattanzio, Loughnan, & Volpato, 
2014). 
Together with the prosocial tendencies related to the function of maintaining social 
cohesion, human nature consists also in a fierce will to compete for resources within the 
group and, as a result, humans show to be characterized by a tendency to dominate each other 
(Aureli & de Waal, 2000; Darwin, 1859/1982; Hobbes, 1651/1982; Lasker, 1907; von 
Clausewitz, 1832/1984). Egoistic motives and aggressive behaviors are widely spread in 
social and non-social species, especially when individuals or groups compete for scarce 
resources. 
However, egoistic and aggressive tendencies had been usually controlled and constrained 
by the development of hierarchical social structures (Berger, Rosenholtz, & Zelditch, 1980; 
Fiske, 1991; Heinrich & Gil-White, 2001; Maslow, 1936; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999; Silk, 
2007). In humans, this may have happened after the increase of population size and the 
following possibility for large-group society to compete with each other (Tomasello, 2014). 
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A hierarchical social structure helps coordination and cooperation among in-group members 
in fundamental activities such as foraging, resource distribution and warfare (Axelrod & 
Hamilton, 1981; Fiske, 2010; Overbeck, 2010; Tooby & Cosmides, 1992). Therefore, 
subordinates’ obedience to dominants, leaders or legitimate authorities plays a crucial role in 
generating and maintaining social relationships within the group, and determined the exit 
from the Hobbesian ‘pure state of nature’ (Hobbes, 1651/1982). 
Infants’ Representation of Social Dominance 
A number of studies have been conducted on infants’ representations of dominance 
relations. Ten-month-olds already rely on the agents’ relative size to predict the outcome of a 
conflicting situation (Thomsen, Frankenhuis, Ingold-Smith, & Carey, 2011). When presented 
with events in which two agents, a bigger and a smaller one, block each other’s path of 
motion, infants expect that the smaller agent will clear the path for the bigger agent. A further 
study revealed that by 6 months infants understand social dominance relationships and, in 
particular, they are able to rely on numerical group size to predict the outcome of a 
dominance relation (Pun, Birch, & Baron, 2016; see also Lourenco, Bonny, & Schwartz, 
2016; Pietraszewski & Shaw, 2015). Six-month-olds expect that an agent from a numerically 
larger group will prevail over an agent from a numerical smaller group. 
Further studies reported that infants possess a sophisticated understanding of social 
dominance relations, where dominance has been defined “the tendency to prevail when one’s 
goals conflict with those of another agent” (Mascaro & Csibra, 2012; see also Dahl, 1957; 
Hand, 1986; Russell, 1938; Weber, 1946). Fifteen-month-olds expect that an asymmetric 
relation between a dominant agent and a subordinate will generalize to different time and 
situations. However, they do not expect an agent that have been shown to be dominant over a 
certain subordinate to be also dominant over a new agent, whose relation with the dominant is 
unclear. Therefore, already in the second year of life, infants represent social dominance as a 
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relation rather than a stable individual property (Mascaro & Csibra, 2012). Moreover, 15-
month-olds have been shown to be able to represent also social dominance hierarchies with 
more than two individuals by combining incrementally representations of several dyadic 
relations (Mascaro & Csibra, 2014), and they can infer dominance hierarchies by using a 
transitive inference (Gazes, Hampton, & Lourenco, 2015). Overall, these results show that 
humans develop very early in life the ability to represent important hierarchical aspects of our 
social world. 
Social Dominance vs. Leadership 
In the evolutionary and adult literature, we find an important distinction between two 
forms of dominance (Cheng, Tracy, Foulsham, Kingstone, & Henrich, 2013; Fiske, 1992; 
Henrich & Gil-White, 2001; Hogan, Curphy, & Hogan, 1994; Milgram, 1974; Van Vugt, 
2006; von Rueden, Gurven, & Kaplan, 2011). A simpler one, often referred as dominance, is 
the capacity to prevail in competitive contexts. A more complex one, referred as leadership 
or prestige, is a social asymmetry in which the leader’s position and powers are deemed 
rightful or legitimate by the parties involved. Dominance relations are then handled by the 
direct use of force or by intimidation. As we have seen, infants in the first year of life already 
understand this simpler form of social asymmetry (Mascaro & Csibra, 2012; Pun et al., 2016; 
Thomsen et al., 2011). 
However, evidence showed that in some cases adults use both dominant and prestige or 
leadership strategies to gain influence over others and attain social rank (Cheng et al., 2013), 
though they prefer to compete for status not by bullying but by increasing the group 
perception that they are competent, generous and committed to shared values and aims 
(Anderson & Kilduff, 2009). Indeed, groups often punish aggressive members that use force 
in order to gain influence over others, and conferred a higher status to competent individuals 
(Ridgeway & Diekeman, 1989).  
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Leadership or prestige relationships may have even evolved to serve a different function 
than aggressive or dominant behaviors. Prestige or leadership may have evolved from 
selection pressures to facilitate the imitation and cultural learning processes that permit group 
members to acquire knowledge from the most skilled or competent individuals (Boyd & 
Richerson, 1985; Laland & Galef, 2009). Leaders need to show a higher intelligence, 
competence, group commitment and prosociality, and they are followed because they are 
respected since they represent a value for the entire group (see Gebert, Heinitz, & Buengeler, 
2016) and because subordinates can learn from them (Aidar, 1989; Berger, Cohen, & 
Zelditch, 1972). By contrast, pure dominant individuals are simply able to win physical 
conflicts, and when subordinates comply with their instructions is because of fear. Moreover, 
a study of a small-scale Amerindian society revealed that individuals that have a community-
wide influence gain also more and different fitness payoffs compared to individuals that 
simply show to be able to win physical conflicts (von Rueden et al., 2011). 
Further studies argued that the leader-follower relation is fundamental to human 
societies, but is different from the dominant-subordinate relation (King, Johnson, & Van 
Vugt, 2009; Van Vugt, 2006; von Rueden & Van Vugt, 2015; see also Gülgöz & Gelman, in 
press). No past or present human society is without leader-followers relations (Bass, 1990; 
Boehm, 1999; Brown, 1991; Diamond, 1998; Lewis, 1974). This is because leaders serve the 
fundamental function of generating and maintaining coordination between individuals to 
achieve shared goals such as the group defense or resources distribution (Guinote & Vescio, 
2010; Van Vugt, 2006), and they help the culture transmission by allowing others to imitate 
their behaviors (Berger et al., 1972; Henrich & Gil-White, 2001). Consistently, Fiske (1992) 
posits that all cultures rely on an ‘authority ranking’ model, that is, people attend to their and 
others relative positions in some existing hierarchical social dimension and are motivated by 
hierarchy rather than fear of coercive power to comply with leaders’ instructions. Moreover, 
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leaders have both privileges and a duty to protect and care for subordinates (Fiske & Haslam, 
2005; Rai & Fiske, 2011). 
The Present Research 
By relying on the distinction between social dominance and leadership, for the first time 
our study assessed whether infants expect subordinates to comply with a leader’s instruction 
but not a bully’s instruction. Previous work showed that infants are able to represent social 
dominance relations (Mascaro & Csibra, 2012; Pun et al., 2016; Thomsen et al., 2011), but to 
the best of our knowledge no studies assessed whether they are also able to represent leader-
followers relations. We designed a violation-of-expectation task, presenting 21-month-olds 
with a bully or a leader agent, and we asked whether infants expect subordinates to obey to 
the dominant’s order even after she left. 
Specifically, in Experiment 1 infants were familiarized either with a bullying agent (that 
hit with a stick the subordinates and stole their ball) or, in a different condition, with a leader 
(here the subordinates bowed to her and spontaneously offered her the ball). In the test events 
of both conditions, the dominant agent ordered the subordinates, and they either obeyed or 
disobeyed after she left. If infants understand the difference between a bully and a leader, 
they should expect subordinates to comply with the leader’s instructions but should hold no 
expectation about the subordinates’ behaviors in the bully condition. Indeed, we reasoned that 
people feel no obligation to act as a bully says, and if they do, it is because of fear, but people 
spontaneously feel the obligation to act as a leader or a legitimate authority commands them 
to do. In Experiment 2, infants saw identical events to those showed in the bully condition 
except that now the bully did not leave when subordinates obeyed or disobeyed. We 
predicted that infants would now expect subordinates to obey since they fear the presence of 
the bully.  
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Lastly, in Experiment 3 infants were familiarized with an agent that acted friendly 
towards the three subordinates without, however, being characterized as a leader. With this 
experiment, we wanted to exclude the alternative hypothesis that infants in Leader condition 
of Experiment 1 expected subordinates to comply because of a general positive interaction 
between the figures, and not because of the dominant being characterized as a leader. We 
predicted that infants would hold no expectations or that they would expect subordinates to 
disobey because no power asymmetry was shown. 
Finding that infants expect subordinates to comply with leader’s instructions in her 
absence and with bully’s instructions only when the dominant is present may constrain the 
current understanding of infants’ socio-moral expectations, showing that an early-developing 
‘naïve sociology’ (see Hirschfeld, 1999) includes the ability to understand the different ways 
in which individuals may exercise power and comply with it. 
Experiment 1 
Design. Infants were assigned to a leader or a bully condition. In the leader condition of 
Experiment 1, we investigated whether 21-month-olds expect that subordinates would 
comply with an order given by an authority. Infants watched computer animations of 
interacting geometrical figures, a yellow leader with a stick and a hat, and three red 
subordinates. In the character-familiarization event, infants watched three subordinates 
playing with a ball until the leader arrived; the subordinates bowed to her and she bowed in 
response saying “ohhh”, the subordinates offered her the ball, and the leader left the scene. In 
the following instruction-familiarization event, infants watched the leader ordering the 
subordinates to go to bed by saying “time for bed” and pointing to their house with her stick. 
The infants received two character-familiarization trials and two more instruction-
familiarization trials. In each character-familiarization trial, infants watched a repetition of a 
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maximum of four familiarization events. In each instruction-familiarization trial, infants 
watched a repetition of a maximum of six events.  
In the test events, infants were presented with the leader that ordered subordinates to go 
to bed. In the disobedience event (D), the subordinates complied with the leader’s order and 
entered in their small house while the leader watched, but disobeyed after she left. In the 
obedience event (O), the subordinates continued to comply also after the leader left; they 
entered in their house and they close their eyes. The infants received four test trials; half 
group received a D-O-D-O test order, while the other half received an O-D-O-D order. In 
each test trial, infants watched a repetition of a maximum of four events. 
In the bully condition, infants were presented with identical events except that the leader 
was replaced by a yellow oval agent carrying a stick. In the character-familiarization event, 
the bully hit the subordinates with the stick and they said “auch, auch”, then she stole their 
ball and left the scene. By adding the bully condition, we investigated whether 21-month-olds 
expect that subordinates would comply with a bully’s order in her absence. 
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Figure 1. Schematic depiction of the events showed in the familiarization trials (character- 
and instruction-familiarizations) in leader (left side) and bully (right side) condition in 
Experiment 1. Each infant saw two character-familiarization trials and two instruction-
familiarization trials. 
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Figure 2. Schematic depiction of the events showed in the test trials (disobedience and 
obedience) in leader condition in Experiment 1. In bully condition, infants saw identical 
events except that a bully ordered to go to bed. Each infant saw four test trials. 
 
Method. 
Participants. Participants were 32 healthy full-term infants, 16 male (20 months, 1 day to 
23 months, 22 days, M = 21 months, 15 days). An additional 12 infants were excluded due to 
fussiness (3), because they looked the maximum time allowed in all the test trials (7), or 
because they had a test looking time over 3 standard deviations from the mean (2). Equal 
numbers of infants were assigned to each condition (leader, bully). Infants’ parents provided 
written informed consent, and the protocol was approved by the local Ethics Committee. 
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Materials and procedure. Infants sat individually on a parent’s lap centered in front of 
an apparatus consisted of a display booth (201 cm high × 102 cm wide × 57 cm deep) with a 
large opening (46 cm × 95 cm) in its front wall where a projection screen (x cm × x cm) were 
inserted. Videos were projected onto the screen at eye-level to infants. Between trials, a 
supervisor lowered a curtain in front of this opening. Two cameras captured both the image 
of the events and the infants’ looking behavior. Parents were instructed to remain silent and 
close their eyes during the test trial. 
Each infant’s looking behavior was monitored on-line by two naïve observers hidden on 
either side of the apparatus. The primary observer’s responses were used in the analysis. 
Interobserver agreement was measured for 31/32 infants (only one observer was present for 
the other infant) and averaged 96% per trial per infants. Observers were blind to test events’ 
order, and they guessed the right order at chance level (.47). In the Leader condition, 
interobserver agreement was measured for 16 infants, and averaged 96%; observers guessed 
the right order at chance level (.41). In the Bully condition, interobserver agreement was 
measured for 15/16 infants and averaged 96%; observers guessed the right order at chance 
level (.58).   
Each trial began with an attention-getting still and smiling baby face. Each trial ended 
when the infant (a) looked away for 2 consecutive seconds after having looked for at least 25 
(first two familiarization trials) or 7 (third and fourth familiarization trials) or 15 (test) 
cumulative seconds or (b) looked for a maximum of 75 (first two familiarization) or 35 (last 
two familiarization) or 60 (test) cumulative seconds. 
Preliminary analyses revealed no significant interactions of condition and trial with 
infants’ sex or number of siblings, all Fs < 1; the data were therefore collapsed across these 
factors in subsequent analyses. 
Results. 
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Infants’ looking times during test trials were analyzed performing a 2 × 2 mixed design 
ANOVA with trial (disobedience, obedience) as within-subjects factor and condition (bully, 
leader) as between-subjects factor (Fig. 3). We found only a significant Trial × Condition 
interaction, F(1, 30) = 8.52, p = .007. In the condition in which the leader was absent during 
the test phase (leader condition), infants looked reliably longer at the disobedience event (M 
= 44.6, SD = 11.4) than at the obedience event (M = 34.9, SD = 11.8), t(15) = 3.77, p = .002, 
d = 1.01 (two-tailed); in the bully condition, instead, infants looked equally longer at the two 
events, p = .34. The effect we found in the leader condition was due to a significant 
difference in the second pair of test events, t(12) = 2.76, p = .016 (two-tailed), since in the 
first pair infants looked equally long at the two test events, p = .29.  
Non-parametric Wilcoxon signed ranks tests confirmed the results of the leader condition 
(Z = 2.74, p = .006) and bully condition (Z = .98, p = .37). Moreover, performing an 
ANCOVA using as covariate the infants’ looking times during the first two familiarization 
trials revealed again a significant Trial × Condition interaction, F(1, 28) = 7.19, p = .012. 
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Figure 3. Results from Experiment 1-3. Mean looking time of the test events as a function of 
condition (Leader, Bully, Bully-present or Leader-control) and trial (Disobedience or 
Obedience). Error bars show the magnitude of the standard errors. * denotes a significant 
difference between trials within a condition, p < .05. 
 
Discussion. 
In the leader condition, infants looked reliably longer when subordinates did not comply 
with the instruction than when subordinates obeyed. This result suggests that infants expect 
subordinates to obey to the leader also in her absence. In the bully condition, infants looked 
equally at the obedience and disobedience events. This null result suggests that infants have 
no expectations when a dominant that use force to be followed commands to the subordinates 
and leaves them alone. Together, the results of Experiment 1 suggest that 21-month-olds 
distinguish from a simple form of dominance based of force (social dominance) and a more 
complex form of dominance (leadership), and predict that subordinates will obey a leader but 
not a bully in the absence of the dominant individual.  
However, dominant individuals, which use force or intimidation, often succeed in 
constraining others to comply with their instructions. In Experiment 2, we then asked whether 
infants expect that subordinates will obey a bully that does not leave the scene. We predicted 
that infants would expect subordinates to comply (possibly because of the fear to be beaten 
again). 
Experiment 2 
Design. We asked whether 21-month-olds expect subordinates to comply with an order 
given by a bully in her presence. Infants watched identical computer animations to those used 
in bully condition of Experiment 1, except that the bully did not leave in test events. Test 
events (obedience, disobedience) order was counterbalanced between participants. 
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Method. 
Participants. Participants were 16 healthy full-term infants, 7 male (20 months, 1 day to 
24 months, 1 day, M = 21 months, 19 days). An additional 6 infants were excluded due to 
fussiness (3) or because they looked at the test events for the maximum time allowed (3). 
Materials and procedure. The materials and procedure were identical to those used in 
Experiment 1. Interobserver agreement averaged 95% per trial per infants, and observers 
guessed the right order at chance level (.44). No significant interactions between trial and 
infants’ sex or number of siblings were found, all Fs < 1. 
Results. 
As predicted, infants looked reliable longer at the disobedience event (M = 44.1, SD = 
15.7) than at the obedience event (M = 36.3, SD = 9.6), t(15) = 2.71, p = .016, d = .72 (two-
tailed). As in leader condition of Experiment 1, the result was due to the difference between 
looking time in the second pair of test events, t(13) = 3.93, p = .002, since no significant 
difference was found in the first pair of test events, p = .95. A non-parametric Wilcoxon 
signed ranks test confirmed the result, Z = 2.17, p = .03. 
Discussion. 
In Experiment 2, we found that infants looked reliably longer when subordinates disobey 
to the bully’s order in her presence than when they obey. Infants expected that subordinates 
would comply with the bully’s instructions if she remained into the scene to watch and 
control them. Together with the results from Experiment 1, these findings suggest that 21-
month-olds expect that subordinates will obey to the leader, also in her absence, but expect 
that subordinates will comply with a bully’s instructions only in the case in which she is 
present and watching. 
However, an alternative hypothesis could be put forward to explain our results from 
Experiment 1. Leader familiarization events involved a general positive interaction between 
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figures followed by a giving action from subordinates, but Bully familiarization involved a 
negative interaction followed by a bully’s taking action (see Tatone, Geraci, & Csibra, 2015). 
Therefore, infants’ expectations of obedience in Leader condition could have been formed 
because of the positive interaction between characters and the giving action and not because 
of the dominant agent being characterized as a leader. Experiment 3 aimed to address this 
criticism by asking whether infants expect that subordinates will obey a friendly figure that 
receive the ball but however is not a leader. We predicted that infants either would hold no 
expectations or would expect disobedience. 
Experiment 3 
Design. We asked whether 21-month-old infants expect characters to comply with an 
order given by a friendly agent that however was not characterized as a leader. Infants saw 
identical computer animations to those used in bully condition of Experiment 1, except that, 
in the character-familiarization event, the main agent came into the scene and said “hi” by 
waving a little, and the three red ovals responded by saying “hi” waving in turn; subordinates 
still gave the main character the ball and she left. Test events order was counterbalanced 
between participants. 
Method. 
Participants. Participants were 16 healthy full-term infants, 6 male (20 months to 23 
months, 5 days, M = 20 months, 28 days). An additional 4 infants were excluded due to 
fussiness (2) or because they looked at the test events for the maximum time allowed (2). 
Materials and procedure. Materials and procedure were identical to those used in 
Experiment 1. Interobserver agreement averaged 96% per trial per infants, and observers 
guessed the right order at chance level (.47). No significant interactions between trial and 
infants’ sex or number of siblings were found, all Fs < 2.39. 
Results. 
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Infants tended to look longer at the obedience event (M = 43.1, SD = 15.6) than at the 
disobedience event (M = 38.3, SD = 12.8), t(15) = 2.02, p = .061, d = .54 (two-tailed). The 
result was due to the significant difference between looking time in the second pair of test 
events, t(14) = 2.33, p = .035, since no significant difference was found in the first pair, p = 
.87. A non-parametric Wilcoxon signed ranks test confirmed the result, Z = 1.89, p = .059. 
Discussion. 
In Experiment 3, we found that infants tended to look longer when subordinates obey to 
the main character’s instructions. Infants tended to expect that subordinates would not 
comply with the instructions of a main character who was not a leader although she was 
friendly and received the ball from the subordinates. 
Previous studies on infant cognition show that early in life humans are able to represent 
positive and negative social interactions (e.g., Choi & Luo, 2015) and they interpret giving 
but not taking actions as inherently social (Tatone et al., 2015). Because Leader condition 
familiarization events in Experiment 1 differed from Bully condition familiarization events 
by involving a positive social interaction and giving actions, it was possible to hypothesize 
that infants’ expectations were indeed a product of these different features of the events rather 
than being related to the leadership. However, in Experiment 3 we did not find that infants 
expected subordinates to comply with the main character’s instructions. Therefore, a positive 
social interaction between figures and giving actions are not sufficient to generate infants’ 
expectations of obedience. 
General discussion 
Across three experiments, we provided the first evidence suggesting that infants in the 
second year of life are able to distinguish leadership from a different type of social 
dominance based on force. We found that infants expect subordinates to comply with a 
leader’s instruction, that is, they expect subordinates to obey to someone they bowed down to 
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and who bowed down in response (leader condition of Experiment 1). The null result in the 
bully condition of Experiment 1 helps us constraining our interpretation by showing that 
infants do not expect subordinates to comply with anyone’s directives. Indeed, infants hold 
no expectations when the bully commanded to go to bed (bully condition of Experiment 1). 
Moreover, we assessed that an exception is made when the bully remained to watch the 
subordinates complying with her instructions. Infants now expect again subordinates to 
comply, possibly because they expected that the subordinates would act out of fear of the 
bully (Experiment 2). Lastly, with Experiment 3 we rejected an alternative hypothesis that 
explained infants’ expectations of obedience in Experiment 1 relying on contextual factors 
rather than leadership. Together, these results provide evidence of an early-emerging capacity 
to distinguish between two different forms of dominance, that is, social dominance by brute 
force, or bullying, and leadership, and show this distinction in their expectations regarding 
the obedient behavior of the subordinates. 
Infants’ representation of dominance structures and their behavior.  
Recently, a growing interest in how infants’ represent social dominance has lead 
researchers to report evidence of a human early-emerging capacity to rely on both agents’ 
relative size and numerical group size to predict the outcome of a dominance relation. Infants 
expect bigger individuals (Thomsen et al., 2011), and individuals associated with larger 
groups (Pun et al., 2016), to prevail. Moreover, infants in their second year of life understand 
dominance as a relation between at least two individuals and expect such relation to be stable 
across different situations (Mascaro & Csibra, 2012). 
Mascaro & Csibra (2012) showed that infants infer social dominance by witnessing the 
outcomes of conflicts (i.e., subordinates’ deference) over the possession of an object or the 
occupation of a place. In a sense, we did a step back, since in our study we asked whether 
infants expect that deference and compliance would actually follow from a relation that was 
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characterized either as physical coercive (bullying) or as respectful (leadership). Our findings 
are consistent with previous results in suggesting an early-emerging capacity to represent 
social dominance relations, but also add to previous studies by showing that infants can 
understand a complex form of dominance such as leadership, and that they do not expect 
subordinates’ obedience to an absent bully. By contrast, they expect that subordinates would 
obey an absent leader. 
Our results that 21-month-olds distinguished between a bullying strategy and a 
leadership-followers relation can also be related to the studies on infants and toddlers’ actual 
interactions with peers. In the second year of life, children’s conflicts are shown to be over 
tangible resources such as toys (Bronson, 1975; Hay, 1984; Shantz, 1987), but nonetheless 
these conflicts have a clear social nature and they are not simply instrumental (Caplan, 
Vespo, Pedersen, & Hay, 1991; Cummins, 2006; Eckerman, Davis, & Didow, 1989; Hay & 
Ross, 1982). At this age, children both cooperate during play and conflict over toys. 
However, from the first to the second year of life, a developmental decrease in using force 
during conflicts and an increase in resolving disputes in a prosocial way have been reported 
(Caplan et al., 1991; see also Holmberg, 1980; Sackin & Thelen, 1984). Among the changes 
that could explain the development in conflicts resolution and social coordination (e.g., see 
Diamond, 2013, pp. 141-142; Onishi & Baillargeon, 2005), we can include toddlers’ 
increasing imitation of others’ actions, as, for example, in the ‘follow-the-leader’ game, in 
which children imitate in turns others’ new play actions (Eckerman et al., 1989).  
Given the rich and complex social life of children in their second year of life, where 
children do not limit themselves to dominate with force one another, to find an early-
developing set of mental mechanisms responsible of representing simple as well as complex 
forms of social dominance relations do not entirely surprise us. Moreover, these mechanisms 
and this understanding may also constitute a basis for later changes in social interactions 
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occurring during childhood. Preschoolers’ and older children’ social behavior in conflicting 
situations is characterized by multi-dimensionality, but a standard result is that during 
childhood children’s behaviors become less aggressive and coercive and more ‘artful’ and 
prosocial – from bullies to leaders (Coie & Dodge, 1983; Hawley, 1999, 2002; Killen & 
Turiel, 1991; LaFraniere & Charlesworth 1983; Parten, 1933; Strayer & Strayer, 1976; 
Wright, Zakriski, & Fisher, 1996). 
Could the early interactions with peers affect infants’ expectations about people’s 
deference to dominant individuals? To explore this possibility, we performed an ANOVA on 
infants’ looking time of Experiment 1, with trial (disobedience, obedience) as a within-
subjects factor, condition (leader, bully) and child’s attendance of a daycare institution (yes, 
no) as between-subjects factors. We found that Trial × Daycare attendance interaction tended 
to reach statistical significance, F(1, 27) = 3.84, p = .06. Further comparisons revealed that 
infants attending a daycare institution looked longer at the obedience event (M = 48.2, SD = 
12.5) than at the disobedience event (M = 38.3, SD = 11.5), t(8) = 2.31, p = .05 (two-tailed); 
by contrast, infants that did not attend a daycare institution looked equally long at the two 
events, p = .55. These results suggest that infants who had the possibility to interact with 
peers because of their daycare institution attendance were more likely to expect subordinates 
to disobey to an absent bully. Social experiences may then facilitate the understanding that 
people imposing themselves by physical coercion not only are usually not followed by 
subordinates, but subordinates may even decide to oppose to them when they are absent. By 
contrast, leaders are followed and, as a result, they are likely to generate and maintain a stable 
social dominance hierarchy within a group. 
However, the extent to which social exposure contributes to the understanding of the 
difference between a leader and a bully remains unclear.  Future research should be devoted 
to the investigation of the eventual relationship between infants’ expectations or mental 
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representations and their actual behavior, both when they interact with peers and adults. That 
is, more research is needed to elucidate whether a complex understanding such as the one we 
found in this group of 21-month-olds is reflected by the child’s social interactions or play 
with peers or is merely the basis of a later development of a set of behavioral tendencies and 
mental understanding.   
Social dominance and leadership—phylogenic and ontogenetic aspects. 
Adults often distinguish between different forms of social asymmetries, and they use 
different strategies to attain the desired social rank (Cheng et al., 2013). A more long-term 
unstable strategy is to constrain others to deference by using physical force and intimidation. 
However, our evolutionary history has brought to our current societies also by selecting 
forms of dominance that facilitate the imitation process and skills acquiring and, as a result, 
the cultural learning process. Moreover, leadership or prestige permitted to increase the group 
cohesion and the in-group collaboration to reach shared and fundamental goals such as 
defending the group, managing the resource distribution and ensure the respect of cultural 
norms (Fiske, 1992; Henrich & Gil-White, 2001; Van Vugt, 2006). 
Given the fundamental role of leadership in generating and maintaining our entire social 
life, we asked whether very early in life humans already possess the ability to represent 
leader-followers relations as distinct from social dominance relations. In particular, we found 
that obedience in the absence of the dominant figure is expected to a leader’s instructions but 
not to a physically dominant’s instructions. These results suggest that the basis for 
understanding the complex dynamics of power and deference to authority are already in play 
from an early age, and these implicit representations will likely inform and shape our rational 
and mature thinking about the correct ways to manage the society organization and, perhaps, 
will inform adult behaviors.  
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Here we provided an evolutionary account of children’s early ability to distinguish 
between leaders and bullies. However, we also note that it cannot be excluded that an 
interaction between innate tendencies and cultural influences occurs to determine the 
expectations revealed for the first time by the current study. In fact, children at the end of 
their second year of life already have had several opportunities to interact with peers, if they 
attend a daycare institution, or to interact with others. Moreover, they have had the 
opportunity to learn from the social exchanges they witnessed. It is therefore a likely 
possibility that alongside an innate capacity to distinguish different forms of dominance, 
cultural environment represents the spark without which no real social understanding is 
possible. 
Our findings are certainly only a first step towards the study of infants’ competencies in 
representing different kinds of social power interactions. Future studies should for example 
investigate whether leadership is represented by infants as a relation between at least two 
individuals or as a stable individual property such as height or skin color. A further question 
would be whether infants have similar expectations to those who we reported also in the case 
of a leader-follower dyadic interaction, which may resemble the mother-child relation. 
Furthermore, an entire research project could be develop in order to reveal the mutual 
relationship between infants’ implicit naïve sociology reasoning and their emerging 
adherence to social norms and adults’ instructions on how to behave and to resolve conflicts 
with others. Lastly, a host of studies could be conducted in order to investigate dimensions of 
power asymmetries different to giving and complying with orders; for example, we should 
study infants’ expectations and deontic implicit reasoning about the subordinates’ willingness 
to imitate leaders, the leaders’ power to set new norms, or the dominants’ capacity to grant or 
deny permission. 
Conclusion. 
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For the first time, here we reported that 21-month-old infants hold different expectations 
on the deference to bullying dominants and proper leaders. While they expected subordinates 
to comply with the leader’s orders, they did not expect subordinates to obey to a bully’s 
instruction, unless the bully forced subordinates to obey with her intimidating presence. 
These results suggest that infants possess an incipient understanding of the dynamics of 
power and social asymmetries that guide them in successfully navigate the social world. 
While being a first step, this study promises to have important implications for both 
educational programs in early infancy and future scientific inquiry on the early-emerging 
representational mechanisms underlying humans’ reasoning in the socio-moral and 
sociological domains. 
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PART 2 
CHILDHOOD: INTENT-BASED MORAL REASONING 
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CHAPTER 2 
Children's Intention-based Moral Judgments of Helping Agents 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This chapter is based on the following original article: 
Margoni, F., & Surian, L. (2017). Children’s intention-based moral judgments of helping 
agents. Cognitive Development, 41, 46-64. 
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Abstract 
During preschool years, children’s disapprovals of harming actions increasingly rely on 
intention rather than outcome. Here we studied for the first time whether a similar outcome-
to-intent shift occurs in their judgments of helping actions. Children aged four-to-eight (N = 
404) were asked to evaluate the goodness and the deserved reward of attempted and 
accidental help (Experiment 1), and the badness and the punishability of attempted and 
accidental harm (Experiment 2). We found an outcome-to-intent shift both in goodness and 
badness evaluations. In judging attempts, children’s intent-based goodness develops prior to 
the intent-based badness judgment. Contrary to previous results, we did not find any evidence 
that the intent-based judgment of goodness or badness constrains the development of the 
deserved reward or punishment judgment. These findings challenge recent theoretical 
proposals concerning the conceptual change and cognitive architecture underlying the 
development of moral judgment. 
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Children’ Intention-based Moral Judgments of Helping Agents 
In judging the morality of an action, people typically consider both its underlying 
intention and its external consequences. We may follow an intentionalist ethics and focus 
primarily on the intention, rather than the consequences (Abelard, 1971; Kant, 1785/1959). 
Consequences can be caused by luck, and luck is not a moral factor (Nagel, 1979; Williams, 
1981). Or we may adopt a consequentialist ethics, e.g. the ethics of responsibility, which 
focuses primarily on the consequences of the action (Weber, 1919/1994). Whether it is right 
to clone humans does not seem to depend on scientists’ intentions, but rather on the 
foreseeable practical consequences. By claiming that actions have moral value only with 
respect to the consequences they bring about, consequentialists are opposed to deontologists.  
A major concern for deontologists is that valuing only consequences will result in 
justifying awful actions because they will bring about a greater good for some people. Unlike 
consequentialists, deontologists claim that some choices or actions are morally forbidden no 
matter what the consequences of these choices or actions will be. Thus, the role of intention 
and consequences in judging other’s actions is at the core of the main theories in moral 
philosophy. A growing body of evidence shows that people’s moral judgment is typically 
based on intentions, but it also relies on outcomes, especially when it is concerned with 
whether and how much to punish in cases of culpability (e.g., Berg-Cross, 1975; Cushman, 
2008; Young, Cushman, Hauser, & Saxe, 2007; Gino, Shu, & Bazerman, 2010; Killen & 
Smetana, 2008; Kohlberg, 1969; Piaget, 1932). 
The emergence of an intent-based moral judgment during childhood has been a core 
aspect of developmental theories since Piaget’s (1932) seminal work. Piaget presented 
children with stories involving two characters: one who acted in a good-intentioned way but 
caused serious material damage, and one who acted in a bad-intentioned way but caused less 
serious damage. Piaget then asked children which character was naughtier and should be 
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punished. He reported a developmental change between ages 6 and 10 from a propensity to 
offer evaluations based on outcome to a propensity to offer evaluations based on intention.  
This outcome-to-intent developmental shift has generally been found in a rich set of 
subsequent studies showing that younger children’s moral judgments are more heavily 
influenced by outcomes than are older children’s moral judgments (Armsby, 1971; Baird & 
Astington, 2004; Costanzo, Coie, Grumet, & Farnill, 1973; Helwig, Hildebrandt, & Turiel, 
1995; Imamoglu, 1975; Killen, Mulvey, Richardson, Jampol, & Woodward, 2011; Moran & 
O’Brien, 1983; Nobes, Panagiotaki, & Pawson, 2009; Surber, 1977; Yuill, 1984; Yuill & 
Perner, 1988; Zelazo, Helwig & Lau, 1996; Wainryb, Brehl, & Matwin, 2005). Ambiguous 
cases such as failed attempts to harm and accidental harm, where intentions and outcomes 
lead to conflicting responses, were particularly useful in revealing the outcome-to-intent shift. 
Research using these cases showed either younger preschoolers relying mostly on outcome 
(Helwig et al., 1995) or equally on intention and outcome (Cushman, Sheketoff, Wharton, & 
Carey, 2013; Killen et al., 2011). 
Nevertheless, after the methodological limitations of Piaget’s initial studies were 
overcome (Farnill, 1974; King, 1971; Nelson, 1980; see Karniol, 1978, for review), it became 
also clear that even preschoolers can use intent information to evaluate moral agents and 
actions, although it remains true that older children show greater sensitivity to mental states. 
In fact, Piaget’s original tasks were not always suitable for assessing the use of intent cues by 
younger children, since they sometimes confounded intention and outcome, the agents’ 
intentions were not stated explicitly, and the relevant information was difficult to remember 
(Turiel, 1983). Moreover, during some interviews, Piaget focused on what children thought 
or expected an adult (i.e., the father, the mother, or the schoolteacher) would do, not on what 
the child herself would do (e.g., punish or not). These shortcomings lead Piaget to 
underestimate preschoolers’ ability to rely on intention when producing a moral judgment.  
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According to a recent dual-process model, children’ and adults’ moral judgments are best 
accounted for by assuming two distinct underlying processes, rather than a developmental 
replacement of a fully outcome-based moral reasoning by a fully intent-based moral 
reasoning (Cushman, 2008; Cushman et al., 2013). The intent-based process relies on the 
assessment of agents’ mental states and on the automatic assignment of negative values to 
harmful actions to evaluate agents’ moral character; the outcome-based process analyzes 
actions’ outcomes to assess agents’ causal responsibility. While badness judgments1 are 
generated mostly by the intent-based process, punishability judgments are generated by both 
the intent-based process and the outcome-based process. In fact, by asking participants to 
evaluate the wrongness and the punishability of attempted but failed or accidental harming 
actions, Cushman (2008) found that wrongness (or badness) judgments rely mostly on mental 
states information, and punishment judgments rely on both mental states and consequences 
factors.  
Evidence for this dual-process model comes also from neuroimaging studies showing 
activation of brain regions associated with cognitive conflict and top-down control when 
individuals judge ambiguous cases of accidental harm compared to cases of intentional harm 
(Young et al., 2007). Moreover, developmental research showed that the intent-based process 
does not develop simultaneously for attribution of badness and punishability; rather, it was 
suggested that it is the emergence of an intent-based badness judgment that constraints the 
development of an intent-based punishability judgment (Cushman et al., 2013). 
Judging Harming and Helping Agents 
Moral competence encompasses the evaluation of what is morally bad and wrong as well 
as what is morally good and just. However, the vast majority of studies have focused 
                                                          
1
 Judgments of 'badness' are not necessarily always moral judgments in a strict sense, as a toothache can be seen 
as bad, but not morally bad. In the scenarios used in the studies discussed and presented here, however, the 
context makes it likely a moral interpretation of 'bad' and experimenters avoided to specify 'moral' in their test 
questions. 
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selectively on evaluations of moral violations, neglecting to investigate how people produce 
evaluations of actions that are usually morally approved, or even admired, and how moral 
approvals develop during childhood. A recent and clear example of this bias in adult 
literature is the claim that the fundamental template unifying moral judgment is interpersonal 
harm (Gray, Young, & Waytz, 2012). One reason for this neglect in the current literature 
might be that people are more likely to produce a moral judgment when facing moral 
violations, rather than praiseworthy behaviors (Rosmini, 1840/1989).  
Moving from adult to developmental literature, we found that moral competence is often 
conceptualized as the capacity to recognize moral transgressions as some acts that are “wrong 
because they have intrinsic effects for others’ right and welfare” (Smetana, 2006, p. 121). 
Social domain theory maintains that morality is about the respect of fairness (Turiel, 2014). 
This view implies that moral violations involve a victim and are not contingent on a specific 
group consensus or authority mandate (unlike the social-conventional violations). This 
conceptualization has oriented researchers towards a rich set of novel and important research 
goals and led to a widespread consensus within the field of developmental moral psychology 
(Killen & Smetana, 2015). However, by building on this rich body of research findings, an 
extensive work remains to be done in order to reach an understanding of the child’s judgment 
of moral approvals of helping actions that would be comparable to our understanding of the 
child’s moral disapprovals of harming actions. 
Helping and harming behaviors are sometimes conceptualized as two sides of the same 
coin (McGinley & Carlo, 2007), but there are important differences between them. Positive 
duties or duties of commission, such as ‘be benevolent’ or ‘be charitable’, appear to be less 
narrow, strict, and rigorous than negative duties, or prohibitions, such as ‘do not murder’ 
(Kant, 1785/1959). While positive duties do not usually prescribe any particular action and 
do not specify how much we ought to do, negative duties have less leeway with respect to 
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their violation. The command ‘do not lie’ is more precise and restrictive than the command 
‘tell the truth’, despite the fact that they appear to be logical opposites. In certain occasions, 
we are free not to tell the truth by omission and out of prudence, but, according to Kant, we 
are never allowed to lie. We are freer in the ways we can fulfill our positive duties than we 
are in violating the constraints of our negative duties. Children, by second grade, appear to 
reason consistently with this distinction. They judge that refraining from harming is 
obligatory, and morally required, whereas helping is discretionary, and thus morally laudable 
(Kahn, 1992). Turning to judicial systems, in many countries there is no general duty to come 
to rescue a person in need, such as a victim of a car accident (Rosenbaum, 2004). 
Numerous studies found noteworthy asymmetries in tasks requiring the processing of 
helpful and harmful actions (e.g., Bostyn & Roets, 2016; Knobe, 2003; Young, Scholz & 
Saxe, 2011). For example, harmful side effects are judged as produced intentionally more 
often than are helpful side effects (Knobe, 2003; Leslie, Knobe, & Cohen, 2006; Pellizzoni, 
Siegal & Surian, 2009). Negative cues appear to have a greater weight than positive ones 
(Rozin & Royzman, 2001), even for young children and preverbal babies (see Vaish, 
Grossman, & Woodward, 2008, for a review), and negative outcomes are much stronger cues 
to agency than are positive outcomes (Morewedge, 2009). These studies suggest that 
judgments of praiseworthiness and blameworthiness might follow different developmental 
pathways. If children consider negative duties as more restrictive than positive duties (Kahn, 
1992), then they should judge harming actions more punishable than they deemed helping 
actions praiseworthy. However, the extent to which preschoolers and older children focus on 
consequences in evaluating prosocial actions as opposed to harmful actions remains unclear. 
Here, we investigated the outcome-to-intent shift in judgments of moral goodness and 
deserved reward for helping behaviors. Our method was modeled closely on Cushman et al. 
(2013) in order to investigate whether their claims about judgments of harming behaviors 
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could be generalized to the development of judgments of helping behaviors. In Cushman et 
al. (2013), children ages 4 to 8 were asked to evaluate both the badness and the punishability 
of agents who attempted but failed to harm, and agents who accidentally caused some harm. 
Failed attempt cases (intention, no outcome) and accidental cases (no intention, outcome) are 
the most useful cases to investigate the interactions between the intent-based and outcome-
based processes. These cases are instances where a dual-process model of moral judgment 
predicts a conflict between the two routes posited, one that attributes value to intentions and 
the other that attributes value to causal responsibility for outcomes. These two different 
processes generate opposite evaluations when some harm is causally determined, but not 
intended by the agent, and when no harm occurs, but the agent intended to produce it. 
Cushman et al. (2013) reported four main results:  
1. Four-year-olds’ judgments of agents’ badness and punishability were more based on 
action outcome compared to older children’s judgments; by age 5, most judgments of badness 
relied on intention. This change was particularly evident in the evaluations of accidents; the 
condemnation of accidental harm decreased with age, suggesting an increased sensitivity to 
the absence of any negative intention. 
2. By age 5, the criteria to assess badness and punishability started to dissociate; an agent 
causing accidental harm was judged more punishable than bad, suggesting that badness 
judgment became intent-based, while punishment judgment remained more outcome-based 
than badness judgment. 
3. The intent-based attribution of badness mediated the effect of age on punishability: 
children first started to produce intent-based badness judgments and only later, as a 
consequence, produced intent-based punishment judgments. 
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4. In accidental harm scenarios, from age 5, badness judgments affected the subsequent 
punishability judgments, facilitating intent-based responses, but not vice versa (i.e., 
evaluating the punishability of an action had no effect on the subsequent badness attribution). 
According to the authors, the evidence in (3) and (4) provides support for their 
developmental constraint model: intent-based badness judgments increasingly constrain 
punishability judgments to rely on intent as well. According to the authors, these results are 
due to a developmental change in the concept of what is morally bad rather than solely to 
changes in children’s theory of mind (Chandler, Sokol, & Hallett, 2001; Killen et al., 2011; 
Smetana, Jambon, Conry-Murray, & Sturge-Apple, 2012) or executive function (Richardson, 
Mulvey, & Killen, 2012; Zelazo et al., 1996). This conceptual change involves a shift from a 
‘consequentialist’ concept of wrong (an action is wrong if it causes negative outcomes) to a 
different, intent-based concept (an action is wrong if it was motivated by negative intentions). 
Conversely, a continuity hypothesis posits that changes external to the moral domain 
explain the occurrence of the shift and that those changes reveal a latent conceptual repertoire 
and a capacity for intent-based moral judgment. An important set of changes may take place 
in executive functioning skills. Improvements in the ability to integrate different information, 
to select correct responses, and to inhibit wrong ones, could be fundamental in causing the 
shift (Margoni & Surian, 2016a). A second possible causal factor could be the development 
of theory of mind. Neuroimaging evidence in adults showed an association between moral 
judgment and theory of mind (Chakroff & Young, 2015). Blame of accidental harms is 
inversely associated with the activation of right temporoparietal junction (TPJ), a brain area 
selectively involved in mental state reasoning (Young & Saxe, 2009) and the inhibition of 
TPJ disrupts mental state reasoning during a moral judgment task (Young, Camprodon, 
Hauser, Pascual-Leone, & Saxe, 2010). Further evidence came from studies of individuals 
with autism who did not judge accidental and attempted cases as morally different, 
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suggesting that they fail to take into account the mental state information (Moran, Young, 
Saxe, Lee, O’Young, Mavros, & Gabrieli, 2011). Moreover, since the theory of mind skills 
are linked with the development of executive functions, the two explanations may be 
functionally related (Leslie & Polizzi, 1998). 
This Study 
Do similar changes take place in judging helping and harming agents? The present 
research explored this question by examining children’s evaluations of helping and harming 
agents. In Experiment 1, we presented children with scenarios involving failed attempts to 
help and accidental help. In Experiment 2, children were asked to judge examples of failed 
attempts to harm and accidental harm. 
The primary aim of our study was to describe the occurrence of an outcome-to-intent 
shift in children’s goodness judgment and to replicate previous results on judgments of 
harming actions. Such a shift should be revealed by an age-related increase in attributing 
goodness to cases of attempted but failed help and a decrease in attributing goodness to cases 
of accidental help. The differences between positive and negative duties discussed above 
motivate a detailed investigation of possible differences in the outcome-to-intent shift for 
goodness and badness attributions, in scenarios involving helping and harming actions, 
respectively. We wished to assess whether the intent-based goodness judgment develops 
approximately at the same time, before or later than the intent-based badness judgment. 
The second aim concerns the explanation of the shift. Since we assessed the extent to 
which the pattern of results previously reported in the case of evaluation of harmful agents 
mirrors the results on children’s evaluation of helping agents, here we provide further 
evidence to decide between the view positing a conceptual change (the ‘constraint 
hypothesis’) and the view positing conceptual continuity (the ‘continuity hypothesis’). These 
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hypotheses posit different mechanisms explaining the development of the well-known 
connection between moral judgment and intentionality (Bloom & Wynn, 2016).   
Extending the constraint hypothesis and the dual-process cognitive model to the 
evaluation of helping cases, if an outcome-to-intent shift occurs in the development of moral 
approvals similarly to moral disapprovals, the emergence of intent-based goodness judgment 
should constrain the emergence of intent-based deserved reward judgment, and the effect of 
age on reward judgments should be mediated by intent-based goodness judgment. This 
hypothesis maintains that theory of mind and executive functioning skills are prerequisite for 
the acquisition of a mature moral reasoning. However, it claims that the preschoolers’ 
concept of badness (or goodness) is not the same concept older children have. The emerging 
intent-based concept would drive the development of punishability or deserved reward 
attributions. Younger children would judge both goodness and deserved reward relying on 
outcomes, but older children would develop an intent-based goodness judgment and, 
gradually, what deserves a reward would follow, in part, from what is good. 
By contrast, the continuity hypothesis claims that the concept of badness (or goodness) 
remains the same throughout the development, and changes occurring outside the moral 
cognition allow the children to express a latent conceptual repertoire. If this is the case, 
following Cushman et al. (2013), one should expect similar, concurrent, but independent, 
developmental changes in goodness and deserved reward judgment, since domain general 
changes should affect similarly the two kinds of judgments. An explanation based on 
developing working memory, executive control and mental state reasoning skills would not 
predict any specific constraint of one type of judgment on the other judgment, but rather 
would be more consistent with a correlated and simultaneous shift of both kinds of 
judgments, resulting from domain general changes in the cognitive system. 
Experiment 1 
58          DEVELOPMENTAL ASPECTS OF MORAL EVALUATION  
 
 
 
Method. Participants were 404 children ranging in age from four to eight years (age 4 n 
= 86; age 5 n = 84; age 6 n = 84; age 7 n = 78; age 8 n = 72), 187 female. The sample size 
was determined by running a-priori sample size calculation. Participants were recruited in 
several different nursery schools and elementary schools nearby Trento, in Italy. All children 
were Italian native speakers and no one was affected by sensory or cognitive impairments. 
Children attended schools serving a middle-income population and almost all of them were 
Caucasian. The parents gave their written informed consent. The Human Research Ethics 
Committee of the University of Trento approved the experimental procedure. 
We also interviewed 15 four-year-olds and 19 five-year-olds in a pilot study. An 
additional adult sample (n = 24, all female) participated. Adults were students from an 
introductory psychology course at the University of Trento (mean age = 21.83 years, SD = 
2.1), and all of them were Caucasian. 
Materials and procedure: main study. The experimental sessions started with a ‘warm-
up’ story involving a non-moral event in which a character wants to get a fish out of the 
aquarium tank but ends with getting another fish. This story had a similar structure to the 
following moral stories. The story was read aloud by the experimenter. Children were then 
asked two comprehension probes, one about the character’s intention and the other about the 
outcome, presented in a counterbalanced order. 
Children were then presented individually with two stories, one involving a failed 
attempt to help (i.e., good intention but no consequence), and one involving an accidental 
help (i.e., good consequence without relevant intention). We focused on helping actions 
because they are typically approved, and because help is conceptually the opposite of harm. 
Recent evidence suggests that even preverbal infants attribute a positive value to helping 
actions and a negative value to harming actions (Hamlin, Wynn, & Bloom, 2007; Hamlin & 
Wynn, 2011; Hamlin, 2013).  
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Stories were read aloud to the children by the experimenter and with the help of four 
vignettes illustrating the main phases of the stories. Pictures were used to reduce working 
memory demands, while the verbal text made relevant information explicit and salient. The 
vignettes were placed in front of the child, one at a time, at the appropriate point of the story 
as the experimenter read. The last vignette remained in front of the child when children were 
asked the test questions. Stories were drawn from two story contexts. Each context had two 
versions: a failed attempted helping action or an accidental helping action. Below we report 
the synopses of the stories used. 
‘Tree stories’. Attempted help: one boy wants to retrieve his little brother’s lost ball that is 
on a tree by hitting it with his favorite ball, but the boy sneezes while trying to retrieve the 
ball and fails. Accidental help: one boy is playing with his favorite ball when he sneezes and 
accidentally hits and retrieves the lost ball of his brother. 
‘Door stories’. Attempted help: one boy wants to open a heavy door for his little brother, 
but the boy stumbles and fails. Accidental help: one boy is running around the room when he 
stumbles and accidentally opens a heavy door for his little brother. 
Each child received one ‘tree’ and one ‘door story’, which varied in terms of whether they 
describe an accidental or a failed attempted helping action. After each story, children were 
asked two comprehension questions whose aim was also to drive children’s attention on 
features relevant to our study. One question was on whether the character wanted to produce 
the outcome, and the other one was on whether he actually produced the outcome. To 
children who failed at least one of the probes, the experimenter offered the opportunity to 
listen to the story again, and the same probe questions were asked. Subsequently, children 
were asked two test questions: “According to you, in the story I just told you, is [character 
name] a good boy or not?”, and “According to you, in the story I just told you, does 
[character name] deserve a reward or to be thanked, or not?” After both stories, children were 
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asked to say which character they think was ‘più buono’ (literally, ‘more good’): “According 
to you, in the two stories I told you, who is ‘more good’ between [the characters]?” The order 
of presentation of stories (attempted help vs. accidental help story), comprehension probes, 
and test questions (goodness vs. deserved reward) were counterbalanced.  
Stimuli and procedure were modeled on Cushman et al. (2013). However, we introduced 
some changes. We stated explicitly how the character who was helped (or not helped) felt in 
response to the event. We did so to improve the comprehension of the stories (Grueneich, 
1982; Stein & Glenn, 1979), and to illustrate how the consequences were related to agents’ 
wellbeing (Arsenio, 1988; Smetana, 2006). To gain further insight on the weight the child 
attributes to intentions and outcomes, we added a choice task by asking which of the two 
characters was ‘more good’. To avoid problems related to judging two very similar stories, 
with the risk of unwanted comparisons along dimensions that are irrelevant for the aim of the 
present study, we read two stories drawn from two different contexts. 
Preliminary study. To check whether younger children understand the main elements of 
the stories, we administered to 15 four-year-olds and 19 five-year-olds two morally 
unambiguous versions of the ‘tree story’. One story involved an event of attempted and 
succeeded help (one boy wants to retrieve the ball of his brother and he succeeds). Another 
story involved an event in which the character has no intention to help and does not help (one 
boy does not see his brother and just wants to play with his ball; meanwhile he is playing, his 
brother tries to retrieve the lost ball). The procedure remained the one followed in the main 
study. Order of stories presentation and order of comprehension probes were 
counterbalanced. 
Adult study. Adults’ judgments were assessed with the same stories and questions used 
with children. The students were tested in small groups and they were asked to read the 
stories and express their evaluations on a sheet. The students were informed that the materials 
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were used in a study on children, in order to justify the childish aspects of the stories. Stories 
and questions were presented in a counterbalanced order. 
Results. 
We present the results following closely Cushman et al. (2013)’s article that inspired the 
present research. In a first part, we focus on the analyses to test the occurrence of an 
outcome-to-intent shift in moral reasoning. In a second part, we focus on the analyses 
relevant to test the constraint hypothesis. In the results sections of Experiment 1 and 2, when 
performing multiple comparisons, we adjusted the alpha level applying the Bonferroni 
correction. 
Preliminary study. In a preliminary study, we tested children’s comprehension of the 
main task by asking to a separate group of younger children (aged 4 and 5) to evaluate two 
morally unambiguous stories. One 4-year-old failed one of the two control questions of one 
story and no child failed both. Children always judged the character who intentionally helped 
to be good and almost never judged the character who did not help to be good (97% and 9%, 
respectively), McNemar χ2(1, N = 31) = 25.04, p < .001. In addition, they judged that the 
character who intentionally helped was worthy of a reward (94%), but the character who did 
not help was not (6%), McNemar χ2(1, N = 31) = 23.31, p < .001. 
Main study. We excluded the responses to the stories for which a child did not pass both 
control questions (age 4 = 15% of responses; age 5 = 2%). 
Preliminary analyses on story order effects.  
Before proceeding, we tested whether children’s responses were affected by story order, 
conducting two factorial logistic regression analyses that showed that the effect of age on 
approval judgments of accidental help or attempted help does not interact with the order in 
which the stories were presented (all ps for interactions > .11). Since children’s approvals 
were not affected by story order, we will consider children’s responses to both stories for the 
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following analyses. The term ‘approval judgment’ refers to a response obtained by collapsing 
between goodness and deserved reward judgments: the child approved the character when she 
attributed goodness or deserved reward, and did not approve when she did not attribute 
neither goodness nor deserved reward. The two judgments were collapsed to facilitate the 
comparison with previous work in which badness and punishability judgments were initially 
collapsed in a single dependent measure, and story order effects were tested using that 
measure. 
Adults’ approvals of accidental help were instead affected by the order of story 
presentation; 67% of adults judged the accidental help approvable in the case they had to 
judge it first, but only 8% judged it approvable in the case they had to judge it second, 
following the attempted help, χ2(1, N = 24) = 8.71, p = .003. 
Testing the occurrence of an outcome-to-intent shift.  
We focused our analyses on each child’s first response in order to eliminate test 
questions order effects (see also 2.2.2.3. session below). 
The choice measure (‘more good question’). A first piece of evidence for an outcome-to-
intent developmental shift in goodness attribution can be easily observed on Figure 1a, 
reporting children’s answers to the question about which of the two stories characters is 
‘more good’. A logistic regression analysis on children’s responses, with age group as 
predictor, revealed an age-related increase in pointing to the character who attempted to help, 
β = .65, 95% CI [.47, .84], z = 6.81, p < .001. 
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Figure 1. (a) Proportion of children who chose the character who attempted, but failed to 
help or the character who accidentally helped, when asked to choose which one was ‘more 
good’ (Experiment 1). (b) Proportion of children who chose the character who attempted, but 
failed to harm or the character who accidentally harmed, when asked to choose which one 
was ‘more bad’ (Experiment 2). 
  
Development of goodness and reward judgments. Children’s first responses on both 
types of stories are illustrated in Figure 2a. Performing a series of logistic regression analyses 
on both goodness and deserved reward judgments, using age group as predictor, we found an 
age-related increase in goodness attribution to attempted help, β = .59, 95% CI [.17, 1.01], z = 
2.76, p = .006, and a decrease in goodness attribution to accidental help, β = .36, 95% CI [.12, 
.60], z = 2.89, p = .004. By contrast, age-related changes in deserved reward judgments were 
not significant. We further noticed that goodness judgment did not decrease between 4 and 6 
years (p = .229), and 4-year-olds attributed goodness to the character who attempted to help 
more often than expected by chance (74%, p from binomial test = .005), but they did not 
attribute goodness to the accidental story character less often than expected by chance (43%). 
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Figure 2. Proportion of participants who judged the character good or worthy of a reward (a), 
or bad or punishable (b), including data from each child’s first response. Error bars show the 
magnitude of the standard error. 
 
Attempted vs. accidental help. In each age group, children judged attempted help to be 
more good than accidental help, age 4: p from binomial test = .003; age 5: McNemar χ2(1, N 
= 41) = 21.33; age 6: McNemar χ2(1, N = 40) = 24.04; age 7: McNemar χ2(1, N = 39) = 
27.27; age 8: McNemar χ2(1, N = 36) = 26.04; all ps < .003. This difference increased with 
age, from 31% of difference at 4 to 78% at 8 years (see Table 1 showing proportion of ‘yes’ 
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answers to test questions, including data from each child’s first response). A regression 
analysis examined the effect of age on the difference scores between goodness judgments of 
attempts and goodness judgments of accidents, revealing a significant effect of age, β = .11, 
95% CI [.06, .16], z = 4.23, p < .001. Conversely, in each age group, children did not judge 
attempted help to be less worthy of a reward than accidental help. Adults’ attributions of 
goodness in attempted help stories were significantly more frequent than in accidental help 
stories (100% vs. 17%, p from binomial test = .002), whereas attributions of deserved reward 
did not differ significantly (67% vs. 33%, p = .289). 
 
Table 1 
Proportion of children who judged the character good or worthy of a reward (Experiment 1), 
or bad and punishable (Experiment 2). 
 
Experiment 1 
(Helping Agent)  
Experiment 2 
(Harming Agent) 
Goodness 
 
Reward 
 
Badness 
 
Punishment 
Age 
(years) Attempted Accidental 
 
Attempted Accidental 
 
Attempted Accidental 
 
Attempted Accidental 
4 .74 .43 
 
.39 .60 
 
.39 .32 
 
.43 .64 
5 .95 .33 
 
.45 .65 
 
.72 .12 
 
.61 .69 
6 .95 .30 
 
.41 .77 
 
.60 .12 
 
.48 .52 
7 .92 .13 
 
.44 .67 
 
.87 .3 
 
.49 .56 
8 .97 .19 
 
.50 .61 
 
.89 .0 
 
.67 .58 
 
Attributions of goodness vs. deserved reward. If evaluations of helping actions follow the 
same pattern reported previously for harming actions, then the criteria to assess goodness and 
deserved reward should start to dissociate roughly by age 5. We should find that attempted 
help (good intention) is judged more good than worthy of a reward, since goodness 
judgments become predominantly intent-based, and accidental help (good outcome) is judged 
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more worthy of a reward than good, since reward judgments rely both on intent and outcome. 
We found the predicted dissociation in attempted help by age 4, and in accidental help by age 
5 (see Figure 2a). In attempted help, goodness attributions were significantly more frequent 
than deserved reward attributions in each age group, age 4: χ2(1, N = 74) = 9.12; age 5: χ2(1, 
N = 84) = 25.12; age 6: χ2(1, N = 84) = 27.59; age 7: χ2(1, N = 78) = 21.25; age 8: χ2(1, N = 
72) = 20.66; all ps < .003. In accidental help, by 5 years children’s goodness attributions 
were less frequent than reward attributions, age 5: χ2(1, N = 82) = 8.22; age 6: χ2(1, N = 84) = 
18.90; age 7: χ2(1, N = 78) = 23.61; age 8: χ2(1, N = 72) = 12.99; all ps < .004. Adults judged 
attempted help more good than worthy of a reward, χ2(1, N = 24) = 4.8, p = .028, whereas 
they judged accidental help as good as worthy of a reward. 
Testing the constraint hypothesis. 
According to Cushman et al. (2013), the continuity hypothesis predicts that a) test 
questions order should have similar effects of one type of judgment (goodness or reward) on 
the other type of judgment and that b) the age effect on one type of judgment should not be 
mediated by the development of the other type of judgment. In other words, the continuity 
hypothesis runs against the expectation that children’s responses will become more intent-
based on one type of judgment and, as a result of that, will become more intent-based on the 
other type of judgment.  
Finding that test questions order effects are significant, regardless of which test question 
is asked first, and that the effect of age on reward judgments is not mediated by intent-based 
goodness judgment, would run against the constraint hypothesis, which predicts the opposite 
results. Such pattern of findings would be more consistent with an alternative view based on 
conceptual continuity, but it will not be supporting, in the absence of any independent 
measure of executive functions or theory of mind skills, any particular version of it. 
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Analysis of mediation effects. We tested whether the intent-based goodness judgment 
mediated the effect of age on deserved reward judgment, as predicted by the constraint 
hypothesis. In children’s responses, we found only two significant correlations, both between 
age and goodness judgment, one in the attempted help stories r = .21, p < .001, and the other 
in the accidental help stories r = -.29, p < .001. Since we did not find any correlation between 
age and deserved reward, we failed to find any support for the constraint hypothesis, which 
predicts that the effect of age on deserved reward attributions is mediated by the intent-based 
goodness attributions. 
Test question order effects. Competing accounts of the developmental shift were further 
tested by examining the effect of test questions order on attributions of goodness and 
deserved reward. While the continuity hypothesis is consistent with a bidirectional influence 
between judgments of goodness and deserved reward, the constraint hypothesis is consistent 
with a unidirectional influence between judgments. We report only the effects on accidental 
help evaluations, since we found no test questions order effect on attempted help evaluations. 
The analyses we report compare three age groups (4, 5 and 6-8 years old), to facilitate the 
comparison with previous results from Cushman et al. (2013). 
In younger children, the order of questions affected goodness judgments of accidental 
help, but not deserved reward judgments (Figure 3a). Four- and five-year-olds who made 
judgment of deserved reward first were more likely to judge the character who helped 
accidentally to be good compared with those who made goodness judgment first; 4 years: 
71% vs. 43%, χ2(1, N = 72) = 5.83, p = .016; 5 years: 68% vs. 34%, χ2(1, N = 81) = 9.01, p = 
.003. By contrast, the order of questions did not affect younger children’s judgments of 
deserved reward.  
In older children, the order of questions affected both goodness and deserved reward 
judgments. Deserved reward judgments affected goodness judgments, χ2(1, N = 234) = 8.07, 
68          DEVELOPMENTAL ASPECTS OF MORAL EVALUATION  
 
 
 
p = .004, and goodness judgments affected deserved reward judgments, χ2(1, N = 234) = 9.88, 
p = .002. That is, children who made deserved reward judgment first were more likely to 
judge the character to be good compared with those who made goodness judgment first, and 
children who made judgment of goodness first were less likely to judge the character to be 
worthy of reward compared with those who made deserved reward judgment first. The order 
of questions did not affect adults’ judgments. 
 
 
Figure 3. Accidental help and harm trials. (a) Proportion of participants who judged the 
character to be good and to be worthy of a reward at 4, 5, and 6-8 years as a function of the 
questions order (Experiment 1). (b) Proportion of participants who judged the character to be 
bad and to be punishable at 4, 5, and 6-8 years as a function of the questions order 
(Experiment 2). Error bars show the standard error. * p < .05. 
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Discussion. 
We found evidence of an outcome-to-intent shift in goodness judgments of both failed 
attempts to help and accidental helps. First, when asked to choose which character was ‘more 
good’, older children pointed to the character who attempted to help (good intention, no 
outcome) more often than younger children did, revealing a growing sensitivity and reliance 
on intention. Second, goodness attribution to attempted helps increased with age, mostly due 
to the developmental change occurring between the age of 4 and 5. Third, goodness 
attribution to accidental helps decreased, showing a developmental change occurring at 6-8 
years (see Figure 2a). 
Younger children’s sensitivity to intention. 
With increasing age, moral goodness judgment relies more on intention and less on 
outcome. Note that even 4-year-olds judged attempted help (good intention) more good than 
accidental help (good outcome). This difference increased with age, revealing a growing 
intent-based judgment. While this is evidence of an outcome-to-intent shift, it does not imply 
that younger children do not take into account mental state information in their judgments. In 
fact, one can also easily notice that in judging attempted help, 74% of the 4-year-olds 
attributed goodness to the story character. This is consistent with previous research 
suggesting that even younger preschoolers are sensitive and can use intention information in 
their moral evaluations when adequately assessed (Imamoglu, 1975; Karniol, 1978; Nelson, 
1980; see also Armsby, 1971; Farnill, 1974; Nobes et al. 2009; Yuill & Perner, 1988). 
In younger children, the sensitivity to intention was found in evaluating attempted help, 
i.e., where the intention cue was particularly salient, and was not found in evaluating 
accidental help, where the good outcome was presumably a more salient cue than the agent’s 
intention. The likelihood to attribute goodness to the character who attempted to help 
increased during preschool years, and was already above chance level at 4 years, but the 
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likelihood to attribute goodness to the character who helped accidentally decreased during 
primary school years. Until 5-6 years, the outcome information maintains some relevant 
influence on moral reasoning, when children are asked to evaluate accidental helping actions. 
Consistently, while in the case of accidental help, 4-year-olds did not yet judged the character 
less good than worthy of a reward, in the case of attempted help even 4-year-olds judged the 
character more good than worthy of a reward. 
Differences with previous results on the evaluation of harming actions. 
Although our main results concerning the description of the outcome-to-intent shift 
mirror, on several respects, previous results on harming actions evaluations, the pattern of 
results from Experiment 1 differs from Cushman et al. (2013)’s in a number of interesting 
ways. While we found both an age-related increase in goodness attribution to attempted help 
and a decrease in goodness attribution to accidental help, they only reported a decrease in 
badness and punishability attributions to accidental harm. In the responses to accidents, 
similarly to the case of harming evaluations, we found that goodness attributions start to 
decrease at 5-6 years. The criteria to attribute goodness and deserved reward to accidents start 
to dissociate at 5 years, that is, the same age when badness and punishability star to 
dissociate. Moreover, in line with previous results on punishability and badness attributions, 
showing attribution of badness to be mainly intent-based and attribution of punishability to be 
both intent- and outcome-based (Cushman, 2008; Cushman et al., 2013), here we found that 
children’s deserved reward judgment was more outcome-based than goodness judgment. 
However, unlike previous studies showing that punishability judgments change with age, we 
found that deserved reward judgment does not change with age. In sum, we found two main 
differences concerning the outcome-to-intent shift between our study and the previous study 
on harm evaluations: a) a developmental change was found in both evaluations of accidental 
and attempted help; b) we found no change in deserved reward attributions. 
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Before discussing the implications of these differences with previous results (see 
discussion session of Exp. 2), we want to assess whether we find a similar pattern of results 
for punishability judgments (that is, no developmental changes in punishability judgments) 
by using the same procedure we used in Experiment 1. If this will be the case, then it will be 
easier to interpret the differences between our findings and previous work also by pointing 
out some relevant procedural aspects (see section 3.3.2). 
 
Table 2 
A comparison of the main results found in the present study and by Cushman et al. (2013). 
 
Outcome-to-intent shift 
 
Constraint hypothesis 
 
1. 2. 
 
3. 4. 
Experiment 
Decreasing 
disapprovals of 
accidents and 
increasing 
disapprovals of 
attempts 
Increasing 
dissociation 
between badness 
and punishability 
judgments  
Intent-based badness 
judgment mediates 
the relationship 
between age and 
punishability 
After the shift 
occurred, intent-
based badness 
judgments constrain 
punishability 
judgments, but not 
vice versa 
Cushman et al. 
(2013)    
  
Present study 
(Exp. 2)
*    
  
Note. , the effect was found; , the effect was not found.  
*
In the present study, the pattern of results supporting the outcome-to-intent shift but 
not the constraint hypothesis was also found in approval judgments (Exp. 1). 
 
Questions order and mediation effects. 
In analyzing our data, we focused on each child’s first responses. This was done to 
eliminate possible order effects. In fact, beginning with younger children’s results, we 
showed that at 4-5 years, deserved reward judgment constrained the subsequent goodness 
judgment of accidental helping action, and children appeared to endorse the ‘realist’ criterion 
“the agent deserved a reward, therefore she must be good” (Kohlberg, 1969; Piaget, 1932). 
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While deserved reward attribution constrained goodness attribution, the reverse was not true.  
This pattern is consistent with the tendency of younger children to rely also on outcome, 
particularly when they evaluate the morality of accidental helping actions. Older children’s 
judgments of accidental help were affected also by the opposite order effect (i.e., goodness 
judgments affected deserved reward judgments), suggesting a growing flexibility and 
context-sensitivity in judging moral scenarios (Turiel, 1983; Jambon & Smetana, 2013). 
Further evidence for context-sensitivity was found analyzing stories order effects on adults’ 
responses. Adults who judged attempted help first were much less likely to approve 
accidental help compared with those adults who judged accidental help first, probably 
because they focused on the absence of any good intention, which was highlighted by the 
previous judgment of attempted help.  
Alongside these order effects results, we also failed to find that the intent-based goodness 
judgment mediated the effect of age on reward judgments, since we did not find any age-
related change regarding deserved reward attributions. 
Do the results from Experiment 1 support the constraint hypothesis and a view based on 
conceptual changes? The core prediction of the constraint model of moral judgment 
development (Cushman et al., 2013) is that the new emerging intent-based badness judgment 
should constrain the punishability judgment, but not vice versa. Consistently, analyzing 
questions order effects, one should find that the intent-based judgment of goodness (here) 
would affect the subsequent judgment of deserved reward, but not vice versa.  
The results of Experiment 1 do not support the constraint hypothesis, because a) we did 
not find the mediation effects predicted by such hypothesis, and b) in older children, once the 
shift occurred (i.e., when the model predicts that a new concept of goodness should be 
developed), we found a bidirectional influence between judgments of goodness and deserved 
reward, where the constraint hypothesis predicts instead a unidirectional influence. Then, 
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these results appear to be more consistent with the alternative hypothesis based on conceptual 
continuity (e.g., Chandler et al., 2001; Killen et al., 2011; Richardson et al., 2012; Smetana et 
al., 2012). In fact, no constraining effect or, if any, a bidirectional constraining effect between 
judgments of goodness and judgments of deserved reward are predicted by the hypothesis 
that ancillary changes occurring outside the moral domain do not affect selectively the moral 
concept of goodness or deserved reward. A bidirectional constraining effect may indicate that 
there is not a judgment that prevails selectively over the other and determines its 
development, and at the same time may simply indicate that our task was more permeable to 
priming effects. The evidence from Experiment 1 runs against the constraint hypothesis, but 
does not point out what factors, in a continuity view, are responsible for the observed 
changes. Future studies should investigate directly the continuity hypothesis by testing which 
changes in social and cognitive abilities are associated with changes in moral judgment of 
helping agents. 
The constraint hypothesis predicts that, after the shift has occurred, the intent-based 
goodness judgment would constrain the deserved reward judgment to be also intent-based. 
Then, one should also expect that such a constraining effect is not present in younger 
children’s responses, before the occurrence of the shift. In this respect, the unidirectional 
order effect we found in younger children may still be consistent with the constraint 
hypothesis, since it was not the goodness judgment to influence the subsequent reward 
judgment. Finding that deserved reward judgment constrained goodness judgment can indeed 
be accommodated by a theory of development that poses two independent cognitive 
processes (intent- and outcome-based), and that predicts that younger children’s responses 
rely also on outcome. If younger children’s judgments are more outcome-based than older 
children’s judgments, then it is not surprising to find that outcome-based deserved reward 
judgments constrain goodness judgments. However, finding that older children’s judgments 
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of goodness and deserved reward constrained each other, along with finding no mediation 
effects, provides evidence against the idea that the acquisition of an intent-based goodness 
judgment selectively constrains the emergence of an intent-based reward judgment. Then, the 
comparison of the results of Experiment 1 with the results from Cushman et al. (2013) might 
suggest that judgments of positive and negative cases follow different developmental 
pathways. 
One result in the present study appears at odds with the claim that the shift is due to 
changes external to the moral domain: we found developmental change in goodness 
attributions, but not in deserved reward attributions. This result may be seen as consistent 
with a shift that reflects a selective change in the concept of goodness, that is, from an initial 
outcome-based concept of morally good to a later intent-based concept. One may ask why 
changes in domain general executive functioning skills, or in theory of mind, would bring 
about a developmental change in goodness attributions, but not in deserved reward 
attributions. However, we doubt that the answer to this question will provide support for the 
constraint model of moral judgment development. In fact, this model, in the case of 
approvals, does not simply predict a selective change in goodness judgment, but predicts that 
goodness judgment becomes intent-based before deserved reward judgment and constrains 
the latter to become also intent-based. Since we found that the frequency of children’s intent-
based deserved reward judgments never changed with age and that reward judgments 
constrained goodness judgments (in older children), the constraint model needs to be revised 
in order to account for the present findings. In sum, this pattern of findings suggests that a 
simple generalization of the view put forward by Cushman et al. (2013) to the positive cases 
does not work. 
Conclusions. 
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In Experiment 1, we reported evidence of an outcome-to-intent shift in goodness 
judgments of helping actions. Moreover, we suggest that processing changes occurring 
outside the moral domain, such as in theory of mind and executive control, not only help to 
explain the outcome-to-intent shift in approval judgments, but an explanation based on these 
processing factors can accommodate a large part of our results. These results do not mirror 
the pattern of previous results on children’s disapprovals that supported the constraint 
hypothesis (from Cushman et al., 2013). However, because we introduced some procedural 
changes with respect to such previous work on disapprovals, it is desirable to provide a more 
stringent comparison between positive and negative cases evaluations by employing the same 
procedure.  
Experiment 2 
In Experiment 2, the same procedure followed in Experiment 1 was used to elicit 
evaluations of harming actions.  
Method. All children who participated in Experiment 1, participated in Experiment 2 (N 
= 404); 214 children were firstly interviewed about the goodness and the deserved reward of 
helping behaviors, and roughly after three weeks were interviewed about the badness and the 
punishability of harming behaviors, while 190 were interviewed in reverse order. 
Materials and procedure. We used materials and procedure very similar to Cushman et 
al. (2013), but the following changes were introduced. Stories of attempted and accidental 
harm were read to the children with the help of four vignettes, and not three as in the previous 
study. We used a fourth picture because we added to the stories a description of how the 
harmed (or not harmed) character felt in response to the event. We did so to help younger 
children to comprehend stories in their moral relevance (Arsenio, 1988; Smetana, 2006). We 
used two story contexts from Cushman et al. (2013). 
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‘Push stories’ - Attempted help: one boy attempts to push somebody over when he trips on 
a rock and misses. Accidental help: one boy is running when he trips on a rock and 
accidentally pushes somebody over. 
 ‘Ball stories’ - Attempted help: one boy attempts to break the mirror with the ball, but the 
ball lands in the bin where it belongs. Accidental help: one boy accidentally breaks the mirror 
when he throws a ball towards the bin where it belongs. 
Each child received one ‘push story’ and one ‘ball story’, which varied in terms of 
whether they describe an accident or a failed attempt. While Cushman et al. (2013) read two 
stories drawn from the same context, we read two stories drawn from two different contexts, 
and we did so to avoid confounding problems associated with judging and comparing similar 
stories. 
After each story, children were asked two comprehension probes about the intention and 
the outcome of the story, and two test questions: “According to you, in the story I just told 
you, is [character name] a bad boy or not?”, and “According to you, in the story I just told 
you, does [character name] deserve to be punished, or not?” After both stories, we introduced 
one last procedural change, that is, a choice task with which children were invited to tell 
which character they think was ‘more bad’. We introduced this change to have a further 
measure of the children’s sensitivity to intention. 
Results. 
Responses to the stories for which a child did not pass both control questions were 
excluded (age 4 = 10% of responses; age 5 = 3%). 
Preliminary analyses on story order effects. 
The effect of age on disapproval judgments of accidents or attempts did not interact with 
story order (all ps for interactions > .10). Since children’s responses were not affected by 
story order, we will consider responses to both stories for the following analyses. 
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Testing the occurrence of an outcome-to-intent shift. 
As in the results section of Experiment 1, here we focus our analyses on each child’s first 
response in order to eliminate questions order effects. 
The choice measure (‘more bad question’). We carried out a logistic regression analysis 
on children’s answers to the question concerning which character was ‘more bad’, using age 
group as predictor. We found an age-related increase in pointing to the character who 
attempted to harm, β = .74, 95% CI [.53, .95], z = 7.01, p < .001 (see Figure 1b). 
Similarities between choice measure in Experiment 1 and 2. In order to test whether the 
likelihood to choose who attempted to harm in the choice task was different from the 
likelihood to choose who attempted to help (Experiment 1), we conducted separate McNemar 
tests for each age group, and we found no evidence of a difference in the preference for 
intent-based judgments for help and harm (all ps > .38). 
Development of badness and punishability judgments. Children’s badness and 
punishability judgments on both types of stories are illustrated in Figure 2b. Conducting a 
series of logistic regression analyses, using age group as predictor, we found an age-related 
increase in badness attribution to attempted harm, β = .59, 95% CI [.33, .84], z = 4.54, p < 
.001, and a decrease in badness attribution to accidental harm, β = .89, 95% CI [.45, 1.33], z = 
3.94, p < .001. There were no age-related changes in punishability attribution neither to 
attempted nor to accidental harm. Note that 4-year-olds did not attribute badness to attempted 
harm (39%) more or less often than expected by chance (p from binomial test = .256), but 
their attributions of badness to accidental harm (32%) were below chance level (p = .047, 
binomial test). 
Goodness vs. badness and reward vs. punishability. To assess whether children consider 
negative duties as more restrictive than positive duties, or vice versa, we compared the results 
from both experiments. Children aged 4 to 6 attributed goodness to attempted help more 
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often than they attributed badness to attempted harm, age 4: χ2(1, N = 76) = 9.05; age 5: χ2(1, 
N = 81) = 8.25; age 6: χ2(1, N = 80) = 14.05; all ps < .004. This suggests that younger 
children’s responses in the attempted stories are more intent-based when facing helping 
actions rather than harming actions. Conversely, children’s attributions of goodness to 
accidental help were no more or less frequent than children’s attributions of badness to 
accidental harm. Also the likelihood to attribute deserved reward did not significantly differ 
from the likelihood to attribute punishability, neither in attempted nor in accidental cases. 
Attempted vs. accidental harm. Children aged 5 to 8 judged attempted harm more bad 
than accidental harm, age 5 and 6: all ps from binomial tests < .001; age 7: McNemar χ2(1, N 
= 39) = 29.26; age 8: McNemar χ2(1, N = 36) = 30.03; all ps < .001. 
Attributions of badness vs. punishment. Cushman et al. (2013) found that the criteria to 
attribute badness and punishability start to dissociate at 5-6 years. We found that attempted 
harm was judged more bad than punishable only at 7 years, χ2(1, N = 78) = 13.24, p < .001, 
and approached significance at 8 years, χ2(1, N = 72) = 5.14, p = .023 (p value must be < .01 
following the Bonferroni correction). Instead, in each age group, accidental harm was judged 
less bad than punishable, age 4: χ2(1, N = 76) = 7.62; age 5: χ2(1, N = 83) = 27.73; age 6: 
χ2(1, N = 84) = 14.91; age 7: χ2(1, N = 78) = 27.19; age 8: χ2(1, N = 72) = 29.65; all ps < .006. 
Testing the constraint hypothesis. 
Analysis of mediation effects. Similarly to the case of approvals, we found only a positive 
correlation between age and badness judgment of attempted harm r = .39, p < .001, and a 
negative correlation between age and badness judgment of accidental harm r = -.27, p < .001. 
Thus, we failed to replicate Cushman et al. (2013)’s results on mediation effects.  
Test question order effects. To facilitate the comparison with Cushman et al. (2013)’s 
results, the analyses compared three age groups (4, 5, and 6 to 8). Order of questions did not 
affect younger children’s punishability or badness judgments of accidental harm (all ps > 
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.068). By contrast, both older children’s (6-8) badness and punishability judgments of 
accidental harm were affected by questions order (Figure 3b). Badness judgments affected 
punishability judgments, χ2(1, N = 234) = 4.99, p = .026, and these latter affected badness 
judgments, χ2(1, N = 234) = 7.95, p = .005. Children who made badness judgment first were 
less likely to judge the character to be punishable compared with those who made 
punishability judgment first. The reverse was also true: children who made punishability 
judgment first were more likely to judge the character to be bad compared with those who 
made badness judgment first. Thus, each kind of judgment had a constraining effect on the 
following other judgment, whereas in Cushman et al. (2013), by age 5, badness judgments 
constrained punishment judgments, but not vice versa. 
Discussion. 
The results of Experiment 2 confirmed that an outcome-to-intent shift occurs in 
children’s moral evaluation of harming actions. First, when asked to choose the character 
who is ‘more bad’, older children pointed to the character who attempted to harm more often 
than younger ones. Second, with age, the likelihood to attribute badness to the character who 
attempted to help increased, and the likelihood to attribute badness to the character who 
harmed accidentally decreased. Third, by age 5, children judged attempted harm as worse 
than accidental harm. 
Cushman et al. (2013) suggested that the shift occurs during preschool years; the criteria 
to attribute badness and punishability start to dissociate at 5-6 years, when children judge 
accidental harm less bad than punishable; badness judgment becomes intent-based and 
punishability judgment remains more outcome-based compared to badness judgment. We 
found evidence of a shift (see Table 2), and however there are some noteworthy differences 
in the two pattern of results. In the present study, children judged accidental harm less bad 
than punishable even at 4 years, but they started to judge attempted harm more bad than 
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punishable only at 7 years. Also, while the previous study found an outcome-to-intent shift in 
accidental harm stories only, we found such a shift both in accidental harm and failed 
attempts stories (see Figure 2b). Moreover, unlike Killen et al. (2011), we did not find any 
developmental change concerning judgments of punishability. However, we replicated one 
important aspect of Cushman et al. (2013): older children’s punishment attribution was more 
outcome-based than badness attribution. 
Two pieces of evidence supported the hypothesis of a conceptual change in the previous 
work. First, the intent-based badness judgment mediated the effect of age on punishment 
judgment. Second, as the shift occurs, children’s badness judgment of accidental harm 
constrained the subsequent judgment of punishment, but not vice versa; children endorsed the 
criterion ‘the character was (not) bad, therefore she deserves (not) to be punished’. We failed 
to replicate both of these results: 1) we did not find any correlation between age and 
punishment judgment, and 2) contrary to our expectations, older children’s badness and 
punishability judgments constrained each other. Instead of finding that the new emerging and 
now central intent-based badness judgment constrains punishability judgment – i.e., a 
unidirectional constraint – we found that the constraining effect was bidirectional. In sum, 
while we replicated the previous evidence of an outcome-to-intent shift on badness 
judgments, and extended such evidence to goodness judgments, we failed to find any support 
for the predictions derived by the constraint hypothesis. 
Procedural and sample differences between studies might be in part responsible for the 
differences between previous findings and ours. Centrally, our stories were enriched by the 
description of the harmed (or not harmed) character’s emotional reaction. This procedural 
change was introduced in order to make more salient the harm produced by the main 
character and it may explain why punishability judgments in the present study and deserved 
reward in Experiment 1 did not show any developmental change. Here we address the 
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unexpected result that neither judgments of punishability (Exp. 2) not judgments of deserved 
reward (Exp. 1) changed with age. Although this is a striking result, we should stress the fact 
that using a similar experimental procedure in the two experiments lead us to find similar 
patterns in punishment and deserved reward attribution. However, we need to explain why 
this pattern of results differs from previous findings (Cushman et al., 2013; Killen et al., 
2011).  
For instance, studying children between 4 and 8 years, it has been reported an age-related 
decrease in judging punishable the character who accidentally harmed (Cushman et al., 
2013). Also Killen et al. (2011), studying children between 3 and 8 years, reported that 
younger preschoolers judged acceptable to punish an accidental transgressor, but with age 
they increasingly judge not acceptable to punish him. In both these studies, children were 
presented with stories in which the victim’s emotional reaction to the accidental harm was not 
described. Unlike these studies, we told children the emotional state of the character whom is 
being accidentally harmed (he is ‘sad’) or helped (he is ‘happy’).  
We argue that the introduction of this slight procedural change might have inhibited 
older children’s intent-based processing and thus increased the likelihood to attribute 
punishability for accidental harming actions and deserved reward for accidental helping 
actions. While younger preschoolers’ judgments of punishability or deserved reward might be 
more outcome-based than older children’s judgments, the salience of the emotional 
information might have caused a shift in older children’s attention from intentions to 
consequences, leading them to attribute punishment or deserved reward to an equal rate 
compared to younger children. Therefore, with respect to previous work, the description of 
the emotional reaction of the victim or the beneficiary might have biased the responses of 
older children, that is, the group of participants who would have shown an intent-based 
judgment of punishability or deserved reward. This shift in attention may be also facilitated 
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by the common tendency of parents and educational figures to rely on consequences to foster 
obedience and a quick and stable success in teaching moral rules and social conventional 
norms (Nucci, 2001; Tindall & Ratliff, 1974).  
Two remarks are in order for future research on this issue. First, procedural aspects 
should be taken very seriously into account when studying children’s moral reasoning, since 
minimal changes threaten the generalizability of the results. Then, further work is needed to 
clarify under which conditions it is useful to describe the characters’ emotional reactions in 
moral judgment tasks, and to investigate how the evaluation of single actions differs from the 
evaluation of the agents. Second, future research should be devoted directly to investigate 
whether the assessment of the emotional state of the character being harmed or helped 
consistently produced in children a shift from an intent-based to an outcome-based moral 
judgment. This future work is potentially of great theoretical interest, given the importance 
that some theories, both in psychology (e.g., Greene, Sommerville, Nystrom, Darley, & 
Cohen, 2001; Hoffman, 1991) and in philosophy (e.g., Hume, 1740/1978; Smith, 1759/1948), 
attribute to the role of empathy in the development and processing of moral judgments. 
General Discussion 
In Experiment 1, we investigated the outcome-to-intent shift in children’s evaluation of 
helping behavior, analyzing separately attributions of goodness and deserved reward. We 
reported evidence of a shift occurring in goodness judgment, but we found no evidence for 
the constraint hypothesis regarding approvals development. In Experiment 2, we replicated 
previous evidence of an outcome-to-intent shift in badness judgment of harming behavior, 
but we failed to replicate evidence supporting a conceptual change in the concept of badness 
(see Table 2 for a summary of these results). 
Outcome-to-intent shift in the evaluations of helping and harming agents. 
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There are three main similarities in the development of our children’s judgments of 
harming and helping actions. First, when asked to choose the character who is ‘more good’ 
(Exp. 1) or ‘more bad’ (Exp. 2), children increasingly showed an intent-based choice, 
pointing to whom attempted to help or harm, rather than to the agent who accidentally helped 
or harmed. Second, the likelihood to attribute goodness or badness in failed attempt cases 
increased with age, and decreased in accidental cases. This pattern of results again highlights 
an increased sensitivity to intent cues when judging both character’s goodness and badness. 
Third, the outcome-to-intent shift concerned selectively goodness and badness judgments, 
since neither deserved reward nor punishability judgments showed any developmental 
change. Although deserved reward and punishability attributions did not show any 
developmental change, we replicated previous finding by Cushman et al. (2013) consistent 
with a dual-process theory of moral judgment by reporting that in older children both 
deserved reward and punishability attributions were more outcome-based than goodness and 
badness attribution respectively.  
There were also some important differences between the development of goodness and 
badness judgments. In judging the character whose action outcome is accidentally caused, 
whereas 4-year-olds’ attributions of goodness were not yet dissociated from deserved reward 
attributions, younger children’s attributions of badness were already dissociated from 
punishability attributions (see Figure 2, right panels). Although this difference may support 
the conclusion that the intent-based badness judgment develops prior to the intent-based 
goodness judgment when children’s evaluation is assessed in accidental cases, focusing on 5- 
to 8-year-olds’ responses to accidents allow us to see that the developments of goodness and 
badness judgments follow very similar pathways after age 5. In fact, in any age group, no 
difference was found between the likelihood to attribute goodness to accidental help and the 
likelihood to attribute badness to accidental harm. 
84          DEVELOPMENTAL ASPECTS OF MORAL EVALUATION  
 
 
 
By contrast, a much more marked difference is revealed by a comparison between the 
development of intent-based goodness and badness judgments, when children are asked to 
evaluate cases of failed attempts. In judging those cases, 4-year-olds attributed goodness 
more often than expected by chance, and 5-year-old group was already at ceiling on the 
goodness attribution measure. As shown in Figure 2 (left panels), children’s intent-based 
badness judgment develops two years later compared to intent-based goodness judgment. 
Four-year-olds did not attribute badness more often than expected by chance, and only by the 
age of seven children reached an intent-based badness judgment. Moreover, whereas the 
intent-based criterion to attribute goodness dissociated from the one the child uses to attribute 
deserved reward already in the youngest age group, the criteria to attribute badness and 
punishability started to dissociate only by 7 years of age. In sum, our results suggest that, 
when we focus on children’s evaluations of attempted help and harm, the intent-based 
badness judgment appears to develop somewhat later than the intent-based goodness 
judgment. 
In the introduction, we asked whether the intent-based goodness judgment would 
develop prior to, later or simultaneously with the intent-based badness judgment. Our study 
tentatively suggests that intent-based goodness judgment develops first. When younger 
children (4-6) heard a story in which someone had a good intention to help or, vice versa, a 
bad intention to harm, they found relatively easy to attribute goodness to the agents that 
wanted to help, but for some years they remained unsure in their attribution of badness to 
somebody who wanted to harm. This suggests that attributing goodness is easier for children 
than attributing badness. This conclusion is at odds with past research suggesting that the 
child would learn the notion of what is good somewhat later than the notion of bad (Piaget, 
1932; Hill & Hill, 1977; Karniol, 1978; Rhine, Hill, & Wanderuff, 1967; see also Lyn, 
Franks, & Savage-Rumbaugh, 2008 for a more recent study on language-competent apes). 
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Our conclusion is also contrary to the prediction that children consider negative duties as 
more restrictive than positive duties. However, this conclusion may be also seen as consistent 
with the fact that positive duties are not obligatory, and thus someone who wants to help may 
be deemed particularly morally good because he could have easily avoided providing help.  
One different possibility is that young children show a bias in goodness evaluations due 
to a default positive assumption: an agent is evaluated positively, as a good agent, unless 
contradicting evidence is available from his or her actions. This bias will make the generation 
of responses easier in the case of attempted help as opposed to attempted harm, because only 
in the latter case the child needs to change her initial response. In evaluating the badness of 
attempted harm, children have to grow to start taking into account the negative intention, then 
younger children do not recognize the negative intention as evidence of the character’s 
badness. By contrast, in evaluating cases of attempted help, younger children may be 
facilitated in showing what appears to be an adult-like intent-based judgment simply by the 
default assumption that the character is good. An interesting goal for future research will be 
to investigate the possibility of a ‘default positive assumption’ in children moral judgments, 
and to explain why preschoolers find it easier to evaluate helping rather than harming actions. 
In sum, for the first time we reported evidence of an outcome-to-intent shift in judging 
the morality of helping agents. Future research could benefit from analyses that directly 
compare harming and helping moral evaluations.  
Continuity vs. constraint hypothesis. 
A secondary aim of our study was to address the problem of continuity in development. 
Our findings are less consistent with the view that posits conceptual change than with the 
alternative view that posits conceptual continuity. The former view predicts that by the time 
the outcome-to-intent shift would occur, the new emerging intent-based judgment should start 
to constrain the other type of judgment to be also based on intention assessment. The 
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evidence we collected in Experiment 1 and 2 does not support this view, and rather it is more 
consistent with the rival view. First, we did not find that the intent-based goodness (or 
badness) judgment mediates the effect of age on deserved reward (or punishment) judgment. 
Second, once the shift occurred, children’s responses about goodness and deserved reward (or 
badness and punishability) constrained each other; that is, we did not find a unidirectional 
order effect. Then, we did not find that goodness or badness intent-based judgment 
constrained the development of deserved reward or punishment, and we found instead a 
growing context-sensitivity in judging accidental harm and help cases (Turiel, 1983; Jambon 
& Smetana, 2013). 
On the one hand, preschoolers’ goodness judgments of accidental help were constrained 
by deserved reward judgments. How should we account for these order effects found in 
young children? Apparently, children endorsed a ‘realist’ criterion “the agent deserved a 
reward, therefore she must be good”, but their judgments of accidental harm were not 
affected by questions order. By age 5, however, the developmental pathways in attributing 
goodness and badness to accidents were similar and similar order effects were found in older 
children’s responses to accidental harm and help. 
In sum, the present evidence provides no support for the constraint hypothesis, and 
suggests that the outcome-to-intent shifts may not reflect changes in the concepts of moral 
goodness or badness. Such concepts are both outcome- and intent-based from start, and 
changes in executive function or theory of mind explain the increasing sensitivity to intent 
cues. In order to provide more direct support for this conclusion, future research should study 
how the development of intent-based moral judgments is linked to changes in children’s 
performance on theory of mind and executive functions tasks. 
Preschoolers vs. infants’ early evaluations.  
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Our conclusion is consistent with recent evidence that comes from infant studies. Using 
recently developed paradigms to investigate infants’ expectations and representations, 
scholars found evidence not only of an early ability to attribute false beliefs (Baillargeon, 
Scott, & He, 2010; Low & Perner, 2012), but also of an early intent-based value judgment 
(e.g., Dunfield & Kuhlmeier, 2010; Hamlin, 2013; Lee, Yun, Kim, & Song, 2015). Some 
studies used the ‘unwilling versus unable’ paradigm to demonstrate that infants decide to help 
based on the assessment of the moral value of the previous intention of those who ask for 
help. Children are typically presented with actors showing to be either unwilling or unable to 
please them. In the second year of life, infants prefer to help those who were unable rather 
than those who were unwilling, but they also show no preference between actors who were 
able to please them and actors who were unable (Dunfield & Kuhlmeier, 2010). The results 
pattern from Hamlin (2013) is even more striking. In this latter study, infants’ evaluations 
were tested with the preferential-reaching method. Infants in the first year of life were 
presented with puppets who attempted but failed or succeeded to either help or hinder a 
second puppet goal-directed action. Eight-month-olds showed to prefer those who help rather 
than those who hinder, but relevantly here, they did not showed any preference between those 
who succeed in their intention and those who simply attempted to produce their intended 
outcomes. Experiment 3 from Lee et al. (2015) recently expanded on previous research by 
showing that 12-month-olds already use intention information when inferring others’ socio-
moral preferences. These results show that even infants’ early evaluations are driven by an 
assessment of agents’ intentions. 
Future research should be open to a theoretical and empirical work in order to explain the 
puzzle of why and how a shift from outcome-to-intent occurs in moral reasoning while even 
infants in their first year of life based their socio-moral evaluations on intention. Positing a 
conceptual change during preschool years would imply that an already existent intent-based 
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concept of goodness or badness changes in an outcome-based concept, only to change again 
during the later preschool years. By contrast, a view that insists on the role of changes 
occurring outside the moral domain could outline a more parsimonious description of how 
the moral evaluation develops (Margoni & Surian, 2016a). While an intent-based concept of 
goodness and badness is already present early in life, and even infants can generate an intent-
based implicit evaluation, preschoolers would show a partially outcome-based explicit 
judgment because of their immature domain-general abilities.  
More work could also be done in order to clarify what role and weight culture and social 
exposure have in the development of an intent-based moral judgment. In the present work, as 
well as in the vast majority of the studies on the outcome-to-intent shift, only children from 
large-scale industrialized societies were examined. However, given the emerging evidence of 
a substantial cross-cultural variation regarding the role of intention in moral judgment in 
small-scale societies (Clark-Barrett et al., 2016), it would be extremely interesting to test the 
generalizability of the present results to these societies. In fact, in some small-scale societies 
(e.g., Hazda from Africa or Yasawa from Pacific Islands), people weigh less the intention and 
more the outcomes when judging a moral transgression, compared to people from large-scale 
societies.  
This evidence suggests that culture can play a pivotal role in shaping the development of 
our moral judgment. Both the education explicitly given to children by their parents and the 
interactions with peers could shape the way children evaluate moral situations. Future 
research should examine the relative weight of a) culture and social exposure; b) the innate 
ability to evaluate others’ moral behaviors based on an intention assessment (Hamlin, 2013); 
c) and the development of general abilities that allows the child to generate explicit and 
controlled evaluations accordingly to his or her implicit conceptual repertoire.  
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With respect to the latter point, more research is also needed to clarify which particular 
aspects of executive functioning are central for the development of an intent-based moral 
judgment. We hypothesize that the development of inhibitory control, occurring during the 
early years of life, can be deemed responsible for the shift (Margoni & Surian, 2016a). For 
younger preschoolers that are tested by using elicited-response tasks, to suppress ‘wrong’ 
responses based on salient cues such as outcomes, and to select (or set shift to, see Diamond, 
2013) ‘right’ responses based on intention may be too demanding.    
Relevance of the present research for clinical psychology and education practices. 
Researching on the developmental aspects of intent-based moral judgment promises to 
lead to important insights for both clinical psychology and pedagogy. First, understanding the 
developmental shift from outcome-to-intent in moral reasoning can be used to further and 
better assess the extent of the theory of mind impairment in clinical population such as 
autistic children. Research on autism has shown that the ability to distinguish between moral 
and conventional transgressions is spared (Blair, 1996; Zalla, Barlassina, Buon, & Leboyer, 
2011), along with a basic moral judgment, that is, the ability to correctly attribute badness or 
goodness to actions that caused outcomes consistent with agents’ intentions (Grant, Boucher, 
Riggs, & Grayson, 2005; Leslie, Mallon, & DiCorcia, 2006). However, when asked to 
evaluate cases of accidental harm or attempted but failed harm, adults with high-functioning 
autism failed to integrate mental state information in their moral reasoning and did not judge 
accidental harm more permissible than attempted harm (Moran et al., 2011; for a review see 
Margoni & Surian, 2016b).  
Adults with high-functioning autism can pass standard tests for theory of mind (Bowler, 
1992; Frith, Morton, & Leslie, 1991) and children with autism can represent intention 
(Carpenter, Pennington, & Rogers, 2001). However, moral judgment tasks represent a 
particularly strong test for theory of mind reasoning, above all those that imply the evaluation 
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of accidental and attempted harming or helping actions. By showing the developmental 
changes occurring in typical population, scholars will be able to further assess theory of mind 
reasoning impairments in autistic individuals. Therefore, future research should study also the 
moral evaluation of cases of accidental or attempted harming/helping actions children with 
autism. 
Second, the current research may have practical implications for educational school 
programs or parents’ caring choices (Nucci, 2001). In fact, knowing at which age children’s 
moral reasoning starts to rely consistently on intention is crucial to improve existing 
programs of moral or civic education, and to guide parents in a better understanding of when 
and why their children can fully appreciate the content and the meaning of their moral 
teaching. In particular, it would be valuable for parents to understand whether their children 
can understand and benefit from an education that relies on the adults pointing out to the 
children the mental state quality of the actions instead of the material consequences.  
In this respect, it would be of the utmost importance for future research to deepen our 
understanding of the relationship between the development of the child’s moral judgment and 
the development of his or her moral behavioral tendencies. Little systematic attention has 
been paid to this complex endeavour (but see Sheskin, Chevallier, Lambert, & Baumard, 
2014), that nevertheless has great theoretical and practical importance. 
Limitations. 
Some limitations of the present study should be pointed out. First, in Experiment 1, 
children evaluated only helping behaviors. Future research should focus on judgments of 
different types of positive moral behaviors, such as, for example, the respect for natural 
entities (i.e., the ecological morality). A related problem was that children evaluated the 
goodness or the badness (in Exp. 2) of the character by mean of the evaluation of a single 
action. Many perspectives, such as the social domain theory (Turiel, 1983), center on the 
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relevance of context for the moral evaluation. Contextual elements, such as the presence of 
negligence in accidents (see Nobes et al., 2009), may be likely to be inferred when a single 
action is taken as a proxy for the character evaluation. More relevant for the present study, it 
can be argued that attributing goodness or badness by evaluating a single action is 
substantially different than relying on a global evaluation of the individual. In particular, the 
global evaluation of the character may not relate to the subsequent decision whether the 
character deserved to be punished or to be rewarded in the same way a narrow evaluation of 
the single action would do. Therefore, we could predict different questions order effects 
depending on the evaluation we ask the child to produce. 
However, it should also be noticed that stressing the nature of the questions used in our 
study is not helpful in explaining the discrepancies with the previous work that addressed the 
issue whether the outcome-to-intent shift reflects a conceptual change or changes occurring 
outside the moral domain, and that found an age-related change in punishability judgments. 
In fact, also Cushman et al. (2013) led children to produce a global evaluation of the 
characters by asking them whether the main character was a naughty/bad boy and not 
whether the character’s action was bad or ok. 
Future research should study the evaluation of the character as a product of a broad set of 
actions (e.g., Feltz & Cokely, 2012), that is, the evaluation of virtue, a supposedly stable 
quality of the character (Swanton, 2003). For instance, it would be interesting to investigate 
how children integrate the evaluation of actions belonging to distinct moral categories (such 
as harm and purity; see Graham, Nosek, Haidt, Iyer, Koleva, & Ditto, 2011) in the global 
judgment of the character. 
Second, although we made an effort to match positive stories from Experiment 1 with 
negative stories from Experiment 2 along several dimensions, such as the outcomes severity, 
the wording count, and the general structure of the story (e.g., if the helping story version 
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tells about a character that ‘stumbles in the carpet and by accident opens the door for his 
brother’, then the harming version tells about a character that ‘trips on a rock and accidentally 
pushes his brother over’), future studies may want to use even more similar versions to 
facilitate the comparison between moral goodness and badness attributions. In particular, one 
aspect of the story set may arise some skepticism about the validity of the comparison we 
made between children’s responses to harming and helping cases. It can be pointed out that 
helping story contexts (‘Tree’ and ‘Door’) depicted both a case of instrumental helping, but 
harming story contexts were instead more differentiated. A first harming story context 
depicted a physical harming action toward a person (‘Push’ – pushing the brother to the floor) 
while a second story context depicted a property destruction (‘Ball’ – breaking the mother’s 
mirror). However, we argue that despite their differences, the two harming contexts are 
similar in a fundamental way. In fact, both contexts involve the presence of a victim and 
some consequences for his or her right and welfare. By describing the emotional reaction of 
the victim (in the ‘Ball story’ experimenter told that ‘the mother is now sad because her 
favorite mirror got broken’), we helped the recognition of the victim and the moral 
transgression that occurred. Therefore, we judged the comparison between children’s 
responses to harming and helping actions to be appropriate, and not undermined by the 
particular nature of our story contexts. 
A third limitation is that the evidence we reported against a conceptual change is not 
conclusive. The premise of the main argument for the modular nature of morality was that 
non-moral elements of children’s developing psychology should not affect selectively the 
moral concepts of badness/goodness. We found this premise intuitively plausible, but one can 
challenge it or refute it. Our aim was to assess the extent to which the pattern of results 
previously reported to constrain theoretical accounts of the locus of the outcome-to-intent 
shift mirrors a pattern of results concerning children’s approvals. We found a selective 
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change for goodness and badness judgments, but we did not find the emergence of an intent-
based judgment that constrains selectively an outcome-based judgment. Future research 
should measure children’s ToM and executive function skills, and should directly assess the 
impact of the development of these skills on children’s moral reasoning (Buon, Seara-
Cardoso, & Viding, 2016; Gvozdic, Moutier, Dupoux, & Buon, 2016; Killen et al., 2011). 
A final limitation of this study is that we did not ask children to motivate their 
judgments and choices. A fascinating goal for future research would be to include also new 
effective tasks to elicit moral justifications in young children. 
Conclusions. 
The present study reports, for the first time, an outcome-to-intent shift in the attributions 
of moral goodness to characters that attempted to help, but failed, or accidentally helped 
another person. During preschool years, the likelihood to attribute goodness to the character 
that attempted to help increased, reaching rapidly adults’ levels. Also, the absence of good 
intention is gradually weighted more than the presence of a desirable outcome in evaluating a 
case of accidental help. The results do not support a conceptual change account of the 
outcome-to-intent shift: contrary to the conceptual change view, older children’s goodness 
and deserved reward judgments constrained each other. This pattern of results is more 
consistent with an account that emphasizes conceptual continuity in the development of 
moral judgment. 
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CHAPTER 3 
Biocentric Moral Reasoning in Preschool Children 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This chapter is based on the following original article: 
Margoni, F., & Surian, L. (2016). Biocentric moral reasoning in preschool children. 
Manuscript under review. 
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Abstract 
We assessed, for the first time, 4-to-5-year-old children’s choices between two contrasting 
ways of extending ethics to natural entities: anthropocentrism (nature has to be preserved 
because it helps humans’ interests) and biocentrism (nature has to be preserved because of its 
intrinsic value). Children evaluated the rightness or wrongness of a decision taken by a 
character acting with either a biocentric or an anthropocentric intention. Children were also 
asked whether the character deserved a reward or a punishment for having caused, as a side-
effect of his actions, an ecological damage or benefit. Preschoolers judged the character who 
caused accidentally an ecological benefit more worthy of a reward when he had a biocentric 
intention than when he had an anthropocentric intention, thus showing an emerging 
preference for biocentrism. 
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Biocentric Moral Reasoning in Preschool Children 
When judging whether an act is morally right or wrong, preschoolers tend to focus on 
actions’ outcome whereas older children increasingly rely on mental state attribution. Since 
the seminal work of Piaget (1932), researchers showed that children shift from judging moral 
actions based on outcome to judge them on the basis of intention (e.g., Armsby, 1971; Baird 
& Astington, 2004; Costanzo, Coie, Grumet, & Farnill, 1973; Killen, Mulvey, Richardson, 
Jampol & Woodward, 2011; Moran & O’Brien, 1983; Nobes, Panagiotaki, & Pawson, 2009; 
Yuill, 1984). According to recent evidence, children’s verbal moral judgment starts to be 
based mainly on intention rather than action outcome around the age of five (Cushman, 
Sheketoff, Wharton & Carey, 2013; Margoni & Surian, 2017). However, whether and how 
intentions that are associated with different moral views affect preschool children’s moral 
judgment remains unclear. 
It is now widely acknowledged that a fundamental part of morality concerns ecological 
issues. Should we integrate also the well-being of natural entities (such as non-human 
animals or other living beings) in our moral scope? If yes, in which way should we pursue 
this goal and on what grounds? Nowadays, these are pressing questions. Moral psychologists 
have recently begun to study people’s moral reasoning about ecological issues in adults (e.g., 
Clayton, 1998; Corraliza, Collado, & Berthelmy, 2013; Gagnon Thompson & Barton, 1994; 
Kaiser, Ranney, Hartig, & Bowler, 1999; Kortenkamp & Moore, 2001) as well as in children 
(e.g., Howe, Kahn, & Friedman, 1996; Hussar & Horvath, 2011; Kahn, 1997; Kahn & 
Friedman, 1995; Kahn & Lourenco, 2002; Kellert, 1985). Overall, the studies revealed that 
even first-graders value the relationship with the natural environment and consider 
environmental harm a violation of a moral obligation.  
In the environmental psychological literature, biocentrism is distinguished from 
anthropocentrism as a different way of reasoning about the extension of ethics to nature 
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(Kahn & Friedman, 1995). According to the anthropocentric view, nature is valued because 
how it is treated affects humans’ interests. By contrast, for biocentrism nature has to be 
valued because of its intrinsic value. By relying on the distinction between these two ethical 
orientations, we differentiate between two intentions with which an agent can act toward a 
natural entity: an anthropocentric and a biocentric intention. A well-known example of the 
anthropocentric view can be found in the Genesis book, where we read that God created the 
natural world with all its animal inhabitants for men’s benefit and rule (see White, 1967). In 
the Book of Job, where the human being has a decentered position within creation, or in St. 
Francis’ Canticle of the Creatures, one may instead find early examples of the biocentric 
view. 
The Development of Biocentric Reasoning in School-ages Children  
A number of studies investigated anthropocentric and biocentric reasoning, both in adults 
(e.g., Casey & Scott, 2006; Gagnon Thompson & Barton, 1994; Kortenkamp & Moore, 2001; 
Milfont & Duckitt, 2010; Schultz, 2000; Snelgar, 2006; Stern & Dietz, 1994) and in children 
(e.g., Hussar & Horvath, 2011; Kahn & Friedman, 1995; Kahn & Lourenco, 2002; 
Kortenkamp & Moore, 2009). Overall, the studies revealed that 6-year-olds already assume a 
moral obligation towards natural entities, but the biocentric reasoning does not develop until 
late childhood (Kahn, 1997; Kahn & Friedman, 1995; but see also Hussar & Horvath, 2011). 
School-aged children use the anthropocentric reasoning more often than the biocentric 
reasoning, which is indeed more commonly found in older children, not before the fifth 
grade.  
Kortenkamp and Moore (2009) investigated age-related changes in the use of intention 
information (anthropocentric vs. biocentric helping intention) in shaping school-aged children 
and adolescents’ moral judgments of ecological damage. Children and adolescents judged an 
agent that caused an ecological damage to be less blameworthy if the intention was described 
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as biocentric rather than anthropocentric. That is, having a biocentric intention lessen the 
condemnation. The study also reported some evidence that younger participants (fifth-
graders) do not judge differently agents with biocentric intention and agents with 
anthropocentric intention when interviewed about a moral scenario that did not involve 
concerns about animals, but this was not true when children were interviewed about actions 
concerning animal welfare.  
Other studies investigated the understanding and use of biocentric reasoning from 6 to 10 
years mainly reporting than children’s reasoning focuses on anthropocentric concerns (Kahn 
& Friedman, 1995). However, no research to our knowledge investigated whether 
preschoolers understand and use biocentric reasoning. By using a new version of the 
Kortenkamp & Moore (2009)’s task, we aimed to assess whether children younger than 6 
years show a preference for the biocentric over the anthropocentric reasoning.   
The Current Study 
For the first time, we investigated whether preschoolers hold a preference for biocentric 
over anthropocentric intention information in judging the rightness or wrongness and the 
deserved reward or punishment of both ecological damage and ecological benefit. Our study 
introduced some novelties: it is the first (a) to examine children younger than 6 years and (b) 
to focus on children’s evaluation of both ecological damage and ecological improvements. 
It is worth asking whether some developmental changes in preferring biocentric to 
anthropocentric intentions occur prior to the primary school period. Studies on the outcome-
to-intent shift in moral judgment found that children at the age of five start to rely on mental 
state information when judging moral cases (e.g., Cushman et al., 2013; Margoni & Surian, 
2017). Given that 5-year-olds judge moral cases based on intentions, we asked whether their 
judgments rely also on different types of intentions. 
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We presented children with moral scenarios in which a character took an altruistic 
decision with either an anthropocentric or a biocentric intention that, however, as a side-
effect, caused an ecological damage or benefit. If children prefer biocentric to 
anthropocentric intentions, we should find that their judgments of ecological damage are 
harsher and their judgments of ecological benefit are more favorable when the character’s 
intention is biocentric rather than anthropocentric. 
Although the vast majority of studies on moral judgment focused on how children and 
adults evaluate transgressions, here we were also interested in how children judge actions that 
brought about a desirable outcome. So, for the first time, we investigated whether there is an 
effect of intention type (biocentric vs. anthropocentric) on preschoolers’ evaluation of 
decisions resulting in a benefit for the natural environment. 
Following Kortenkamp and Moore (2009; see also Coleman & Temple, 1996), children 
were presented with scenarios involving damages or benefits to non-human animals (birds). 
Past studies provided some evidence that children understand better the moral difference 
between biocentric and anthropocentric intentions when they evaluate scenarios involving 
non-human animals rather than plants or other aspects of nature (e.g., a shoreline or a park) 
(Kahn & Lourenco, 2002; Kortenkamp & Moore, 2009). Therefore, we presented children 
with a scenario used by Kortenkamp and Moore (2009), which originally involved a cat 
owner who decided to let his cats out of his farmhouse with an anthropocentric intention (the 
cats will wreck house furniture) or a biocentric intention (the cats need to have fun outside) 
and, as a results, the cats killed some birds.  
Method 
Participants. Participants were 38 preschoolers ranging in age from four to five years 
(M = 65 months, SD = 5 months, 19 girls). Another three children were excluded because 
they were distracted during the experiment. Children were recruited in three nursery schools 
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nearby Trento, in Italy. All children were Italian native speakers and no one presented 
sensory or cognitive impairments. All the parents gave their informed consent on behalf of 
their children, and the University Ethics Committee approved the experimental procedure. 
Materials and procedure. All children were presented individually with four illustrated 
stories in a within-subjects experimental design. Each story depicted a character acting with a 
specific intention, either biocentric or anthropocentric, and his action resulted in an outcome 
that either helped or harmed a natural entity. The stories were drawn from a single story 
context, while intention (biocentric vs. anthropocentric) and outcome (help vs. harm) were 
orthogonally manipulated. The scenario we used is reported below (the manipulation of 
intentions and outcomes are in brackets): 
Fred spends a holiday in a friend’s farmhouse. Fred has two very active cats. During the 
day, Fred lets the cats out of the house so they [can have fun in the meadows and he thinks it 
makes them happy to be outside / do not wreck his friend’s house furniture and he is also 
happy if the house remains tidy]. Around the farm, some birds nested in the trees. Since Fred 
moved to the farm, his cats [have saved the lives of some little birds that lived there by 
scaring a big naughty bird that wanted to kill the little birds / have killed some little birds that 
lived there]. 
Stories were read out loud to the children and the reading was accompanied with 
illustrations (see Fig. 1 for an example). Illustrations were used to alleviate memory 
constraints and were placed in front of the child one by one at the appropriate time during the 
reading. The last illustration of each story remained in front of the child for reference during 
the moral evaluation task. 
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Figure 1. Illustrations depicting a character with a biocentric or anthropocentric intention 
(deducible only from the story text) which decision determined a positive side-effect. Each 
illustration was accompanied with a text: (a) Fred spends a holiday in a friend’s farmhouse, 
and he has two very active cats. (b) During the day, Fred lets the cats out of the house so they 
[can have fun in the meadows and he thinks it makes them happy to be outside/ do not wreck 
his friend’s house furniture and he is also happy if the house remains tidy]. (c) Around the 
farm, some birds nested in the trees. Since Fred moved to the farm, his cats have saved the 
lives of some little birds that lived there by scaring a big naughty bird that wanted to kill 
them. 
 
After each story, children were asked two yes-no control questions, on whether the 
character wanted to let the cats out of the house and on whether the cats caused the outcome 
described in the story. With these questions, we assessed children’s comprehension of the 
story content and we focus children’s attention on the relevant information (intention and 
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outcome). Children were then asked two questions: (a) “According to you, was it right or 
wrong that Fred let the cats out?” – “How much was it [right/wrong]? A little or very 
much?”; (b) “According to you, does Fred deserve a reward or a punishment for having let 
the cats out?” – “How much should we [reward/punish] him? A little or very much?” To help 
children answering, we presented them with a response scale containing images (smiley o sad 
faces) as anchors (Reynolds-Keefer, Johnson, Dickenson, & McFadden, 2009). Therefore, 
each response can be processed on a four-point scale anchored at 0 with very 
wrong/punishable, at 1 with a little wrong/punishable, at 2 with a little right/rewardable, and 
at 3 with very right/rewardable. Stories presentation was randomized using one of the 
resulting four Latin-square orders, and the order of control and test questions was 
counterbalanced. 
The story context we used was modeled on the ‘free-ranging domestic cat owner’s 
dilemma’, which has been used in previous works (Coleman & Temple, 1996; Kortenkamp & 
Moore, 2009). However, we modified it in two relevant ways: (a) in our study, some versions 
included a positive side-effect (birds been helped) rather than a negative side-effect (birds 
been harmed); (b) the cat owner was not the house owner, so that his anthropocentric 
intention to avoid wrecking the furniture cannot be clearly ascribed to egoistic motives. Since 
the original scenario was affected by the problem that the anthropocentric intention could 
also be construed as an egoistic intention (the cat owner was also the house owner), we 
modified the story and children were told that the cat owner was a guest at a friend’s house. 
Results 
The responses to the stories where the child failed at least one comprehension probe 
(2.6% of the responses) or the experimenter made an error in assessing the child’s judgments 
(3.9%) were excluded from analyses. Preliminary analyses revealed no significant effects of 
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children’s sex or questions’ order on moral judgments, Fs > 1. The data were therefore 
collapsed across these factors in the subsequent analyses.  
An ANOVA with intention (biocentric, anthropocentric) and outcome (positive, 
negative) as within-subjects factors revealed only a significant main effect of outcome (birds 
saved vs. birds killed) on both rightness or wrongness, F(1, 31) = 128.29, p < .001, η² = .81, 
and deserved reward or punishment judgments, F(1, 31) = 106.95, p < .001, η² = .75. As 
expected, when the outcome was positive children judged the character’s decision more right 
and the character more worthy of a reward than when the outcome was negative. 
Judgments of rightness and deserved reward of positive scenarios were more extreme (M 
= 2.7, SD = .63; i.e., near Likert point scale 3 = very much right/rewardable) compared to 
judgments of wrongness and punishability of negative scenarios (M = .77, SD = .96; i.e., near 
Likert point scale 1 = a little wrong/punishable). It may be suggested that positive scenarios 
were better understood relative to their valence component than negative scenarios. In fact, 
6.7% positive scenarios evaluations were negative (Likert point scale 0 or 1), but 18.6% 
negative scenarios evaluations were positive (Likert point scale 2 or 3). 
Further planned analyses revealed an intention (biocentric, anthropocentric) effect on 
deserved reward judgments, F(1, 36) = 4.93, p = .033, η² = .12 (Table 1 and Fig. 2). When the 
side-effect of the action was positive, children judged the character with the biocentric 
intention to be more worthy of a reward than the character with the anthropocentric intention. 
However, children did not judge the decision taken with biocentric intention more or less 
right than the decision taken with anthropocentric intention. Also, we did not find any effect 
of intention on wrongness and punishability judgments, all ps > .74.  
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 INTENTION        
 Scenarios: 
 
POSITIVE 
        Biocentric  Anthropocentric 
 df  F  P  η²  M  SD  M  SD 
 Rightness  1, 36  0  1  0  2.70  .66  2.71  .65 
 Reward  1, 36  4.93  .033  .12  2.78  .53  2.61  .68 
NEGATIVE                 
 Wrongness  1, 32  .11  .74  .004  .67  .99  .74  .90 
 Punishment  1, 32  .03  .86  .001  .82  .95  .85  1.02 
Table 1. Effects of intention on rightness or wrongness judgments and deserved reward or 
punishment judgments. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Children’s moral judgments of decision rightness or wrongness and decision 
maker’s deserved reward or punishment for positive (a) and negative scenarios (b), on a scale 
anchored at 0 with very wrong/punishable, at 1 with a little wrong/punishable, at 2 with a 
little right/rewardable, and at 3 with very right/rewardable. Error bars show the magnitude of 
the standard error. * p < .05. 
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Discussion 
For the first time, we investigated whether preschoolers evaluate differently biocentric 
and anthropocentric motives when they have to judge actions that brought about, as a side-
effect, either an ecological damage or an environmental improvement. We asked whether 
children’s judgments about the rightness or wrongness of an agent’s action and his deserved 
reward, or punishment, are differentially affected by the agent’s biocentric and 
anthropocentric intentions. This evidence may help to address the issue of whether 
preschoolers endorse a biocentric or an anthropocentric reasoning about the inclusion of 
natural entities within the ‘moral circle’ (Singer, 2011). 
 Overall, the results of the current study suggest that preschoolers show a weak but 
significant preference for biocentric intentions. In fact, children’s judgments of deserved 
reward of the character that caused a side-effect ecological benefit were affected by the 
intention type: they judged the decision maker more worthy of a reward when he acted with a 
biocentric intention rather than an anthropocentric intention. 
Although a number of studies already suggested that at 5 years preschoolers’ verbal 
moral judgments start to rely on mental state information (e.g., Cushman et al., 2013; 
Margoni & Surian, 2017), here we reported that they show an emerging preference between 
two types of intentions (biocentric vs. anthropocentric) that are relevant to adults’ reasoning 
about ecological issues. This preference emerged in the evaluation of actions that produced 
an ecological improvement, but was not found in the judgments of actions that generated an 
ecological damage. This result is consistent with past studies showing that biocentric moral 
reasoning does not fully develop until later childhood, and a full understanding of the moral 
difference between biocentric and anthropocentric intentions is achieved only during or even 
after the primary school years (Kahn & Friedman, 1995; Kellert, 1985; Kortenkamp & 
Moore, 2009).  
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The finding that the manipulation of intention affects selectively deserved reward 
judgments is consistent with a recent result in the study of children’s intention-based moral 
judgments of helping actions (Margoni & Surian, 2017). It may be suggested that at this age, 
when evaluating (accidental) helping outcomes, children’s attribution of deserved reward is a 
more reliable index of their moral approvals than judgment of goodness or rightness (Piaget, 
1932; Kohlberg, 1969). This, in turn, can help explaining why here we found a preference for 
biocentric motives in children’s attributions of deserved reward but not in children’s 
judgments of action rightness. 
It is not clear why we detected an effect of intention manipulation in the positive 
scenarios evaluations but not in the negative scenarios evaluations. One possibility is that 
while in the positive scenario the outcome (help) was matched for valence with the decision 
maker’s intention (to help or to respect), in the negative scenario the outcome (harm) was not 
matched for valence with the (neutral) intention. Since the intention was neutral but the 
outcome was negative, children’s computational processing in the negative case may have 
been more demanding compared to the processing underpinning children’s evaluations of 
positive scenarios. Thus, in turn, processing demands may have hindered children’s ability to 
show verbally their preference for biocentrism in their judgments of punishability. 
Limitations and conclusion.  
A limitation of the current study is that we presented children with only one scenario 
context that is a modified version of the ‘cat scenario’ (Coleman & Temple, 1996; 
Kortenkamp & Moore, 2009). Although we ameliorated the scenario in order to avoid the 
overlapping between egoistic and anthropocentric motives, and we chose a scenario involving 
animals, which is the best salient ecological situation for children at this age, besides having 
assessed children’s judgments of ecological benefits along with damages, a problem of 
generalizability to different scenario contexts still affects our results. Future studies should 
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investigate children’s judgments with tasks employing different and new moral scenario 
contexts. Currently, a priority for the research on ecological moral judgment is the proper 
design of the stimuli, which is a methodological but, at the same time, a conceptual 
challenge. 
Another promising direction for future research might be to investigate whether children 
raised in different, rural or non-Western cultures endorse a more biocentric moral reasoning 
than Western children do. We showed that preschoolers do not fully weight the difference 
between biocentrism and anthropocentrism in their moral judgments, although past research 
have showed that older children do it (Kortenkamp & Moore, 2009). By contrast, cultures or 
groups that offer to their members a close interaction between man and natural environment 
may foster very early in life the development of a biocentric moral reasoning.  
In conclusion, for the first time, the present study investigated preschoolers’ moral 
preference between two main types of ecological reasoning, namely anthropocentrism and 
biocentrism. We studied 4- and 5-year-olds’ judgments, and we reported evidence that 
children at this age show an emerging preference for biocentric intentions. 
Nowadays, ecological problems are increasingly central for the survival of our and other 
species. It should then be regarded as useful and right to educate the new generations toward 
the development of a morality the scope of which includes also the well-being of non-human 
living entities. Children are likely to have a spontaneous tendency to reason accordingly with 
a biocentric view, and very early they may be willing to reason about nature according to the 
principle “Even if there’s no rules you should respect ... (and) be good to the environment.” 
(Hussar & Horvath, 2011). However, education may play a crucial role in consolidating, 
refining or inhibiting this tendency. A fundamental step in the development of educational 
interventions will be to clarify what younger children can understand, what heuristics biases 
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inform their moral reasoning, and which mechanisms underpin the development of their 
reasoning about natural entities. 
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CHAPTER 4 
Explaining the U-shaped Development of Intent-based Moral 
Judgments 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This chapter is based on the following original article: 
Margoni, F., & Surian, L. (2016). Explaining the U-shaped development of intent-based 
moral judgments. Frontiers in Psychology, 7:219. Doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2016.00219  
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Abstract 
When preschoolers evaluate actions and agents, they typically neglect agents’ intentions and 
focus on action outcomes instead. By contrast, intentions count much more than outcomes for 
older children and adults. This phenomenon has traditionally been seen as evidence of a 
developmental change in children’s concept of what is morally good and bad. However, a 
growing number of studies shows that infants are able to reason about agents’ intentions and 
take them into account in their spontaneous socio-moral evaluations. Here we argue that this 
puzzling U-shaped trajectory in children’s judgments is best accounted for by a model that 
posits developmental continuity in moral competence and emphasizes the effect of immature 
executive function skills on preschoolers’ performance. 
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Explaining the U-shaped Development of Intent-based Moral Judgments 
Mental state reasoning is required in several tasks, from inferential communication and 
the interpretation of social situations to the socio-moral evaluation of actions and agents. 
Children at an early age start to accuse peers by crying loudly “you did it on purpose!”, and 
legal systems typically distinguish harmful acts that are performed intentionally from acts 
that accidentally produce personal harm. A large body of developmental research investigated 
when and how children acquire the ability to attend to agents’ intentions and action outcomes 
in their socio-moral judgments, but the conclusions one can draw from infant studies seem at 
odds with the conclusions one can draw from studies on older children. Infants seem to 
possess abilities that young preschoolers’ responses do not reveal. In the present work, we 
address this puzzle by first reviewing relevant results on socio-moral reasoning in infants and 
children. Then, we evaluate different proposals put forward to explain the reported 
developmental changes and the apparent contradiction between infants and preschool 
children’s responses. 
The Outcome-to-Intent Shift in Preschoolers’ Moral Reasoning 
Since Piaget’s (1932) seminal work, a large body of studies has shown that a crucial 
developmental change from an outcome- to an intent-based moral evaluation occurs in the 
late preschool years. A typical Piagetian task would consist of evaluating which of two 
characters is more naughty and deserves to be punished. Piaget presented children with a 
story in which a supposedly well-intentioned character accidentally caused serious material 
damage (e.g., he broke 15 cups), and another story in which a bad-intentioned character 
caused, also by accident, less serious damage (e.g., he broke one cup). Younger children 
(aged 6-7) judged the character that produced serious material damage to be more naughty 
and punishable, whereas older children judged the bad-intentioned one to be more naughty 
and punishable. These and other similar findings were taken as evidence of a shift from an 
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initial outcome-based (‘objective’) moral judgment to a later intent-based (‘subjective’) moral 
judgment. 
Subsequent research overcame several methodological limitations of Piaget’s work 
(Farnill, 1974; Karniol, 1978; King, 1971; Nelson, 1980), but confirmed the occurrence of an 
outcome-to-intent shift. During the 1970’s and 1980’s, many different tasks were developed 
to investigate this phenomenon. By reducing the cognitive processing necessary to answer 
experimenters’ questions, scholars found that even preschoolers, at age 3, can attend to 
agents’ intentions in their moral evaluations (e.g., Armsby, 1971; Farnill, 1974; Yuill, 1984; 
Yuill & Perner, 1988). Nevertheless, Piaget’s main claim concerning the outcome-to-intent 
shift found further support, since children older than 4-5 years relied more on intention and 
less on outcome, whereas younger children showed the opposite pattern (e.g., Baird & 
Astington, 2004; Costanzo, Coie, Grumet, & Farnill, 1973; Cushman, Sheketoff, Warton, & 
Carey, 2013; Imamoglu, 1975; Keasey, 1978; Moran & O’Brien, 1983; Nobes, Panagiotaki, 
& Pawson, 2009; Wainryb, Brehl, & Matwin, 2005). 
When intentions and outcomes lead to conflicting responses, as in the cases of failed 
attempts to harm and accidental harm, young preschoolers attend to outcome more than older 
children, relying mostly on outcome (e.g., Helwig, Hildebrandt, & Turiel, 1995), or equally 
on intention and outcomes (e.g., Cushman et al., 2013; Killen, Mulvey, Richardson, Jampol, 
& Woodward, 2011). With age, the condemnation of attempted but failed harm increases 
(Helwig et al., 1995), whereas the condemnation of accidental harm decreases (Cushman et 
al., 2013; see also Killen et al., 2011 on the development of an intent-based punishability 
evaluation). 
While intentions dominate adults’ attribution of moral goodness and badness, adults 
often rely on both intent and outcomes to evaluate the punishability of agents (Cushman, 
2008). A recent dual-process model explains why this is so: adults’ moral reasoning is 
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generated by the work of two independent and sometimes conflicting processes, one that 
attributes value to actions and assesses agents’ mental states, and the other that evaluates the 
causal responsibility for action outcomes (Cushman, 2013; Cushman, 2015). This proposal 
contradicts the Piagetian view, which posited a full replacement of the outcome-based 
judgment by an intent-based judgment. 
Infants’ Intent-based Socio-Moral Evaluations 
Extrapolating the developmental trajectory found in preschoolers, one may predict that 
infants and toddlers would rely mostly on action outcome rather than agents’ intention, 
assuming that they can produce a moral judgment. However, recent evidence shows that this 
is not the case. Several studies suggest that, in the first year, infants are able to distinguish 
between intentions and outcomes, they evaluate helping, harming and distributive actions, 
and they rely, for these evaluations, on intentions rather than outcomes. 
Experimental studies used both elicited-response tasks and spontaneous-response tasks in 
the violation-of-expectation paradigm. Both research strategies found that, by the end of the 
first year, infants are able to attend to agents’ intentions and understand successful as well as 
failed actions (e.g., Brandone & Wellman, 2009; Gergely & Csibra, 2003; Woodward, 1998). 
This early understanding of failed attempts generalizes to first- as well as third-party socio-
moral evaluations (Behne, Carpenter, Call, & Tomasello, 2005; Dunfield & Kuhlmeier, 2010; 
Hamlin, 2013; Lee, Yun, Kim, & Song, 2015).  
In studies on first-party evaluations, infants were engaged in interactions with an 
experimenter and were presented with actors that were either unwilling or unable to please 
them (e.g., Behne et al., 2005; Dunfield & Kuhlmeier, 2010; Marsh, Stavropoulos, Nienhuis, 
& Legerstee, 2010). While the outcomes were identical in both conditions, intentions were 
different (negative for ‘unwilling agents’, positive for ‘unable agents’). Infants responded 
differently to these two cases, showing that they used intention cues to guide their first-party 
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evaluations and preferences. Nine-month-olds’ spontaneous signals of impatience (such as 
reaching and banging or looking and turning away) revealed that they become more agitated 
when they interact with actors unwilling to provide them with a toy (Behne et al., 2005). 
Moreover, using a manual choice measure (infants have to choose between two contrasted 
individuals), some studies found that by the second year of life, infants choose to help an 
unable over an unwilling actor, when asked to help someone. By contrast, infants were 
equally likely to help able agents, who displayed positive intentions and successful actions, 
and unable agents, who displayed positive intentions and unsuccessful actions (Dunfield & 
Kuhlmeier, 2010). Overall, these studies show that infants process information about 
intention and use it to evaluate others’ behaviour. 
Further studies on infants’ representations of harm and help examined third-party socio-
moral evaluations (e.g., Hamlin, Ullman, Tenenbaum, Goodman, & Baker, 2013; Hamlin & 
Wynn, 2011; Hamlin, Wynn, & Bloom, 2007; Kuhlmeier, Wynn, & Bloom, 2003; Meristo & 
Surian, 2014). Infants observed events in which an agent either helps or hinders the goal-
directed action of another agent. Their evaluations of prosocial and antisocial actors were 
typically tested using a manual preference task. Early in their first year of life, infants 
consistently prefer the helper over the hinderer (Hamlin et al., 2007; Wynn, 2008). Also, at 
16 months they prefer agents performing fair over unfair distributive actions (e.g., Geraci & 
Surian, 2011). When evaluating an agent’s behavior, infants are able to take into account not 
only a person’s intention, but also other relevant mental states such as informational states 
and beliefs (Choi & Luo, 2015; Hamlin et al., 2013; Meristo & Surian, 2013; for a review: 
Baillargeon, Scott, He, Sloane, Setoh, Jin, Wu, & Bian, 2015). 
Hamlin (2013; see also Hamlin et al., 2013) played a puppet show in which puppets 
either try but fail or succeed to help (or hinder) someone’s goal-directed action. Eight-month-
olds preferred a helper (failed or successful) over a hinderer, but, most importantly here, 
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infants did not prefer the successful helper (displaying both intention and relevant outcome) 
over the puppet that attempted to help, but failed (showing a good intention, but no relevant 
outcome). This suggests that infants’ preferences were guided by agents’ intentions rather 
than outcomes. Moreover, studying expectations by measuring spontaneous looking behavior, 
scholars recently found that by the end of the first year, infants infer agents’ socio-moral 
preferences by taking into account the agents’ information about others’ prosocial and 
antisocial intentions (Lee et al., 2015). They expect that an agent would prefer to approach a 
second agent who has previously shown a good intention, no matter what the consequences 
of the second agent’s action were. 
How can we reconcile the classic results of preschoolers’ outcome-to-intent shift with 
these recent results of infants’ intent-based expectations and evaluations? A lesson may be 
learned from the literature on theory of mind. 
How to Account for Seemingly Conflicting Results: The Case of False Beliefs Tasks 
The description of the intent-based judgment development sketched above, that is, an 
initial intent-based evaluation developing from an outcome-based evaluation that in turn 
shifts again towards an intent-based evaluation, resembles the ‘puzzle about belief’ (Perner & 
Roessler, 2012), that is, the puzzle regarding the development of Theory of Mind. Using 
traditional elicited-response tasks to study children’s attributions of false beliefs, researchers 
initially concluded that the ability to attribute false beliefs does not emerge until about the 
fourth birthday (e.g., Baron-Cohen, Leslie, & Frith, 1985; Wellman, Cross, & Watson, 2001; 
Wimmer & Perner, 1983). However, using violation-of-expectation and anticipatory-looking 
spontaneous-response tasks, researchers began to study also infants’ mentalizing abilities. 
Using these and others tasks, scholars demonstrated that babies at least in their second year of 
life are able to attribute reality congruent and incongruent mental representations across 
several situations (Baillargeon, Scott, & He, 2010; Buttelmann, Carpenter, & Tomasello, 
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2009; Low & Perner, 2012; Luo, 2011; Southgate, Senju, & Csibra, 2007; Surian, Caldi, & 
Sperber, 2007; Surian & Geraci, 2012). 
Why do 3-year-olds fail to attribute false beliefs when their abilities are tested on 
elicited-response tasks? There are two possible answers to this question. First, one may posit 
continuity during development and argue that preschoolers fail because they do not have the 
necessary executive function skills to pass an elicited-response task. Second, one may posit a 
conceptual change during development and argue that the representations and processes 
involved in resolving spontaneous-response tasks are fundamentally different from the ones 
involved in resolving elicited-response tasks. 
Young preschoolers may succeed in representing the agent’s false belief, as infants do, 
but fail to select the right response and inhibit the wrong response when they are questioned 
via an elicited-response task (Baillargeon et al., 2010; Leslie & Polizzi, 1998). An innate 
modular account posits that from an early age babies are able to represent and use others’ 
mental states to understand social situations (Kovács, Téglás, & Endress, 2010; Leslie, 
German, & Polizzi, 2005; Surian et al., 2007). What really develops is the set of cognitive 
abilities that children need to exploit their representational skills. At 3 years, executive 
function skills are not sufficiently developed to meet the processing demands of the elicited-
response tasks (Thoermer, Sodian, Vuori, Perst, & Kristen, 2012). The continuity account is 
receiving growing experimental support, but it is still controversial. Many argue for a 
conceptual shift account according to which infants that pass a spontaneous-response task 
show a qualitatively different level of understanding compared to children who pass an 
elicited-response task (e.g., Wellman, 2014). 
Reconciling Results on Infants and Children at the Processing Level 
As in the literature on false-belief understanding, we can draw a distinction between two 
main positions. First, an emergence view posits that during preschool years a conceptual 
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change occurs in moral competence. The construction of a novel conceptual competence 
explains why school-aged children’s judgments differ from preschoolers. This view does not 
deny the role of executive function skills, as these are certainly involved in theory 
construction and revision processes (Cushman et al., 2013). Second, an expression view 
posits conceptual continuity during development and sees the role of executive function in a 
very different way. It claims that developmental differences result solely from changes in 
executive function, or theory of mind, that are external to the moral competence (Chandler, 
Sokol, & Hallett, 2001; Killen et al., 2011; Zelazo, Helwig, & Lau, 1996). We argue that the 
studies on infants’ spontaneous socio-moral evaluations we briefly reviewed above favor the 
latter view and challenge the former, assuming that a “rich interpretation” (Aslin, 2000) of 
the infant studies is the correct one. Studies on infants’ evaluations suggest that infants can 
employ an intent-based concept of moral goodness and badness in their socio-moral 
evaluations. Therefore, the development of intent-based moral judgment is unlikely to derive 
from a conceptual change occurring in the preschool years. 
If infants already possess an intent-based concept of moral badness and goodness, can 
executive limitations account for preschoolers’ outcome-based judgments? The expression 
view claims that young preschoolers fail at weighting intentions more than outcomes because 
of processing demands of the task. The additional processing demands of the elicited-
response tasks compared to the spontaneous-response task used in the infant literature, lead 
kindergartners to produce outcome-based evaluations. With the acquisition of sufficient 
executive function (roughly at 4), children’s responses on elicited-response tasks can 
gradually match infants’ spontaneous ones, and become mostly intent-based. When judging 
an action or an agent in elicited-response tasks, for preschoolers it is difficult to suppress cues 
concerning action outcomes, while older children may have the sufficient executive function 
abilities to inhibit an outcome-based judgment and select an intent-based response (or set 
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shift to an intent-based response, see Diamond, 2013; Miyake, Friedman, Emerson, Witzki, 
Howerter, & Wager, 2000). 
Highlighting how different tasks tap different forms of evaluation, and distinguishing 
between elicited and spontaneous responses may provide the key to solving the puzzle about 
intent-based moral judgment, and avoiding two conclusions that appear highly implausible 
(Hamlin, 2013). First, it would be implausible that an early tendency to privilege intentions 
over outcomes emerges during infancy only to be replaced during preschool years by the 
opposite tendency to privilege outcomes over intentions, or to weight these cues equally, and 
eventually be again replaced with a final tendency to privilege intentions. Second, it would be 
also very odd to posit that infants’ evaluation system is not related to the later evaluation 
system, so that we would have two intent-based moral evaluations mutually independent. 
Conversely, it is likely that if an evaluation system emerges, it will not be replaced later in 
the development by a new system that serves the exact same function. In order to test directly 
the expression account, future research should also investigate young preschoolers’ 
generation of intent-based moral evaluations in spontaneous-response tasks. 
Additional Factors That May Affect the Outcome-to-Intent Shift 
In an expression view, several internal and external factors may promote the emergence 
of an intent-based elicited response. Among the internal factors, we can include the frontal 
lobe maturation underlying the acquisition of executive functions (Benes, 2001; Huttenlocher 
& Dabholkar, 1997; Miller & Cohen, 2001; Moriguchi, 2014; Moriguchi & Hiraki, 2009; 
Moriguchi & Hiraki, 2011; but see also Knight & Stuss, 2002; Lepsien & Nobre, 2006). 
Among the plausible external factors, one could include interactions with adults and peers 
(e.g, Tomasello, Carpenter, Call, Behne, & Moll, 2005). Preschoolers start to be considered 
somewhat responsible for their actions by their parents, and parents correct their behaviors by 
pointing to actions outcomes (Piaget, 1932) or negligence (Nobes et al., 2009). However, this 
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may not be true for infants and older school-aged children. While infants’ actions outcomes 
are limited in their valence and severity, and parents do not deem their children fully 
responsible for what they cause, older children develop a more controlled behavior, and 
parents or peers now privilege a comprehensive evaluation of children’s intentions and 
outcomes. 
Now, moving from an explanation concerning proximal causes (the processing level 
discussed in the previous section), to an explanation concerning distal causes (the 
evolutionary level), one promising perspective is offered by the life-history theory. Life-
history theory is an approach in evolutionary biology that seeks to explain the timing of the 
organism’s ontogenesis by linking it to relevant evolutionary pressures (Kaplan & Gangestad, 
2005). The emergence of a trait in the phenotype has both costs and benefits for the organism 
with regards to its reproductive fitness. The timing of such emergence would optimize the 
costs/benefits trade-off by on-setting a certain trait at a particular age, rather than earlier or 
later. Originally, this perspective was employed to explain the timing of morphological and 
physiological traits, such as sexual maturation, but recently it has been argued that it may also 
explain children’s delay in acting accordingly to fairness principles (Sheskin, Chevallier, 
Lambert, & Baumard, 2014). In fact, while infants appear to evaluate others following an 
implicit understanding of fairness and harm, only some years later they consistently apply 
those moral principles during their social interactions (Siegal, 1982).  
How can one apply life-history theory to the development of intent-based moral 
reasoning? Advocates of life-history theory may want to claim that the elicited intent-based 
moral reasoning emerges roughly at 5-6 years because at this time-point children increasingly 
engage in social interactions with peers. To understand and properly evaluate others’ 
intentions is fundamental in forming and maintaining such relationships. Attending to agents’ 
intentions, rather than actions outcomes, in the evaluations of agents, may become crucial just 
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at the age in which children, in the evolutionary past, could not rely anymore on ‘free’ 
resources provided by parents and had to rely on their interactions with peers, avoiding 
potentially dangerous conflicts (Marlowe, 2005). Therefore, life-history theory may explain 
both the growing concern for fairness and the growing reliance on agents’ intention in 
preschoolers. The defendants of this position may then conclude that the human mind is 
wired with an innate ability to understand and evaluate others’ intentions, but it is only during 
the late preschool years that this ability is systematically recruited by children in a variety of 
social interactions. 
Conclusions 
In sum, we have seen that young preschoolers’ outcome-based judgment is preceded 
by an early capacity to evaluate intentions that is revealed in spontaneous-response tasks. 
Drawing a parallel with the literature on the acquisition of mental state reasoning, we argued 
that the outcome-to-intent shift is best explained by an expression account that posits an early 
emerging infant socio-moral competence and explains preschoolers’ outcome-based 
judgments as due to immature domain-general executive function. Current evidence is more 
consistent with a view that assumes developmental continuity than with the opposite view 
based on conceptual changes. 
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CHAPTER 5 
Mental State Understanding and Moral Judgment in Children 
with Autistic Spectrum Disorder 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This chapter is based on the following original article: 
Margoni, F., & Surian, L. (2016). Mental state understanding and moral judgment in 
children with autistic spectrum disorder. Frontiers in Psychology, 7, 1478. 
doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2016.01478 
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Mental State Understanding and Moral Judgment in Children with ASD 
Do children with autistic spectrum disorder (ASD) develop the ability to take into 
account an agent’s mental states when they are judging the morality of his or her actions? The 
present article aims to answer this question by reviewing recent evidence on moral reasoning 
on children with autism and typical development. A basic moral judgment (e.g., judgments of 
violations in which negative intentions are followed by negative consequences) and the 
ability to distinguish between conventional and moral violations appear to be spared in 
autism (Leslie et al., 2006). However, a closer look at the data reveals that these capacities 
can be explained by the tendency of ASD individuals to rely heavily on actions consequences 
and other external factors rather than agents’ mental states. By contrast, studies that presented 
typically developing (TD) children with accidental and failed attempts actions have shown 
that even preschoolers can display an intent-based moral judgment (e.g., Cushman et al., 
2013; Margoni & Surian, 2016a). The tendency to rely on outcome in ASD children is further 
confirmed by those studies that direcly show that ASD individuals fail to attend to the agents' 
intentions when the cases are more complex or ambiguous, like in accidentally harmful 
actions or failed attempts to harm. We propose that the impairment in understanding others’ 
mind hinders the development of an intent-based moral judgment in children with ASD. 
Mental State Reasoning in the Moral Judgment Tasks 
In our social life, we often engange in the evaluation of others’ actions and intentions, 
and we are very sensitive to harmful acts and violations of rights. For example, we maintain 
friedships on the basis on an assessment of our friends’ moral behaviors towards us. The 
production and the justification of a moral judgment is a complex socio-cognitive task that 
often requires the use of mental state reasoning abilities (Moran et al., 2011; Young et al., 
2007). In particular when people are asked to evaluate accidental harming (or helping) 
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actions or failed attempts to harm (or help), they need to weigh the agents’ intention, that 
requires a mental state analysis, against the external consequences of the action. Several 
neuroscientific studies confirm the association between moral judgment and theory of mind 
(Young et al., 2010; Young et al., 2007; Young & Saxe, 2009).  
Then, to what extent individuals with ASD, who present deficits in theory of mind 
abilities (Abell et al., 2000; Baron-Cohen et al., 1985; Baron-Cohen et al., 2000; Bowler, 
1992; Castelli et al., 2002; Surian & Leslie, 1999), meet with difficulties in the acquisition of 
an intent-based moral judgment? Individuals with ASD are characterized by impaired social 
interactions and communication abilities, and a set of restricted and repetitive behaviors. Here 
we focus on their impairment in mentalizing, that has been shown to be a main factor 
affecting their socio-moral abilities. Studies on the moral judgment of ASD children have 
traditionally focused on a) the capacity to distinguish between moral and social-conventional 
transgressions and b) the ways in which individuals with autism judge the moral rightness or 
wrongness of an action. 
Moral and Conventional Transgressions 
One fundamental aspect of the moral competence has been identified by social domain 
theorists in the capacity to distinguish between moral and social-conventional violations. 
While the former involve a victim and are to be blamed regardless of the social context, the 
latter do not need to involve a victim and are contingent over a specific group consensus or 
authority mandate (Killen & Smetana, 2015; Nucci, 1981; Turiel, 1978). By the age of three, 
children judge moral violations, like hit someone, more harshly and less authority-dependent 
than social-conventional, like wearing pajamas at school (Nucci, 1985; Smetana & Braeges, 
1990). 
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The capacity to distinguish between these two types of violation is intact in ASD 
individuals (Blair, 1996; Rogers et al., 2006; Shulman et al., 2012; Zalla et al., 2011). 
However, ASD individuals produce poorer justifications compared to TD individuals, and 
they do not evaluate moral violations as more serious than non-moral but disgusting actions, 
such as drinking tomato soup out of the bowl at a dinner party. Moreover, contrary to TD 
children, school-aged children with ASD are swayed by the victims’ emotion and judge 
wrong actions that caused the crying of the victim more harshly than wrong actions that did 
not cause any crying (Weisberg & Leslie, 2012). ASD children usually succeed in tasks 
devised to investigate the moral-conventional distinction, but they rely mainly on external 
factors that could depend on irrelevant variables such as the particular emotional level of the 
agents.    
The Relative Weight of Intention and Outcome in the Judgments of ASD Individuals 
A working hypothesis here is that ASD children respond as TD children do when they 
are presented with simple, unambiguous moral cases (i.e., a negative/positive outcome 
produced by an intentional action with the same valence). In those cases, the difficulties 
encountered in integrating the mental state understanding in the moral reasoning can be 
overcome by the children’s reliance on action outcomes and victims’ emotional reactions. For 
this reason, ASD children appear to develop a basic moral judgment. 
ASD school-aged children evaluate actions that are motivated by positive or negative 
intentions and are followed by congruent outcomes as TD children do (Leslie et al., 2006; Li 
et al., 2014). Moreover, they are able to judge an agent that caused intentionally a bad 
outcome more harshly than an agent that caused it accidentally, although they do not produce 
verbal justifications that refer to the agent’s intention (Grant et al., 2005). However, Steele et 
al. (2003) found that children with ASD aged 4 to 14 failed to distinguish between intentional 
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and accidental bad acts (e.g., failing to come to a planned meeting as a result of cancelling the 
plan without telling or as a result of the bus breaking). Studies on ASD adults also showed 
that they judge an accidental harm both more punishable and more intentional compared to 
TD adults, suggesting a partial impairment in the ability to rely on intentions (Buon et al., 
2013; see also Rogé & Mullet, 2011; Salvano-Pardieu et al., 2015; Zalla & Leboyer, 2011). 
However, ASD school-aged children distinguish between a distressed victim and an 
individual in distress that however is not a victim (Leslie et al., 2006). So, their judgments do 
not completely rely on the external outcomes assessment. 
However, what about the judgments of more complex cases such as the failed attempts to 
help or harm, that require a more substantial contribution of mental state reasoning? In fact, 
in judging an ambiguous case such as a failed attempt to harm, it is not possible to rely solely 
on action outcomes and still produce a moral condemnation of the agent. 
A first evidence of an outcome-bias in the judgment in ASD individuals comes from 
those studies that reported a ‘heteronomous’ (i.e., rules are understood as handed down by 
authority, and violations are wrong because they produce bad outcomes, namely they lead to 
punishment) rather than an ‘autonomous’ (i.e., rules are based on socially agreed-on 
principles, and violations are wrong because of the agent’s beliefs and motivations) moral 
reasoning in ASD school-aged children (Grant et al., 2005; Takeda et al., 2007; see also 
Fadda et al., 2016). ASD children attributed moral wrongness and badness to actions that 
caused bad outcomes. A second and more direct evidence comes from a study that presented 
ASD individuals with accidental and failed attempted harms. Moran et al. (2011) found that 
they failed to distinguish between the two scenarios, and they judged the accidental harm 
significantly more harshly than TD individuals. Moreover, there is evidence of an activation 
of the right temporo-parietal junction (RTPJ) – an area associated with mental state reasoning 
– in TD individuals during the evaluation of intentional versus accidental harm, but such 
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result has not been found in adults with ASD (Koster-Hale et al., 2013). These results clearly 
suggest that ASD individuals fail to integrate the agent’s mental states in their moral 
reasoning when judging situations in which intentions and  outcomes present different 
valences (see Figure 1). 
 
Figure 1. Main results concerning the mental state understanding in ASD individuals’ moral 
reasoning. 
 
Theoretical Implications of the Studies on Mental Reasoning in ASD Individuals’ Moral 
Judgments 
Three main theoretical implications relevant for the current understanding of the 
relationship between theory of mind and moral reasoning could be inferred from the results 
we briefly discussed. First, the evidence that ASD individuals, who are characterized by an 
impaired mental state understanding, show an atypical moral judgment, further confirms that 
theory of mind is fundamental for the development of a mature moral reasoning.  
Second, the study of moral judgment in ASD individuals could prove useful in assessing 
the role of cognitive empathy in the production of a moral evaluation. ASD individuals show 
a spared capacity for emotional empathy (e.g., Blair, 1999; Rogers et al., 2007), that is, the 
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proper emotional response to others’ emotions, but an impaired capacity for cognitive 
empathy, that is, the proper knowing how others may feel. While emotional empathy skills 
help ASD children developing a basic moral judgment by relying on the emotional and 
external aspects of the moral case such as the victims’s emotional reactions or the actions 
outcomes (Hobson et al., 2009; Leslie et al., 2006; Weisberg & Leslie, 2012), the poor 
understanding of the cognitive aspects hinders the development of an intent-based moral 
judgment. Further studies confirm this interpretation by reporting that aspects related to 
cognitive empathy impairment affect the moral evaluations of ASD individuals (Channon et 
al., 2010; Gleichgerrcht et al., 2013; Patil et al., 2016).  
A third relevant theoretical implication concerns whether the action understanding 
required in moral evaluation is mentalistic. A mentalistic understanding represents and 
explains others’ actions by ascribing mental states such as beliefs, desires and internal 
representations to the agents (Baillargeon et al., 2010; Baron-Cohen et al., 1985; Leslie, 
1987; Surian et al., 2007). By contrast, a non-mentalistic or teleological understanding 
represents others’ actions without ascribing mental states, by linking directly the agent’s 
actions, the goal-states and the situational constraints through the principle of rational actions 
(i.e., agents act to achieve certain goals choosing the most efficient means; Gergely & Csibra, 
2003; Schlottmann et al., 2009). According to the proponents of teleological accounts of 
action understanding, humans first develop very early in life a non-mentalistic understanding, 
and only later they acquire a mentalistic understanding. While it could be argued that ASD 
individuals possess the ability to interpret actions in a non-mentalistic way already during 
preschool years (Hamilton, 2009; Vivanti et al., 2011), we have seen that they do not develop 
a mature intent-based moral judgment. Therefore, the literature on ASD individuals suggests 
that a non-mentalistic understanding is not sufficient for the development of a full-blown 
intent-based moral reasoning. 
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Conclusions 
The ability to produce moral evaluations often requires the understanding of others’ 
mental states and it is central for living in human social groups. While much more research is 
needed to acquire a full understanding of the development of moral judgment in ASD 
individuals, the current state of the literature suggests that this clinical population encounters 
some difficulties in developing a mature intent-based moral judgment because of the well-
known impairment in mental state understanding. Nevertheless, ASD individuals show the 
ability to produce a basic moral judgment by relying on external cues such as the action 
outcomes and the victims’ emotional reactions. 
Can these results turn out to be useful in guiding programs designed to improve moral 
judgment in children with ASD? Since a main result of the literature we reviewed is that 
individuals with ASD show difficulties in integrating mental states information in their 
judgments, clinical treatments and educational programs aimed at improving their theory of 
mind abilities are likely to have, as a side-effect, a positive impact also on their moral 
reasoning abilities. Further research is needed to point out whether such a desiderable effect 
is achieved equally by any effective training on mentalizing skills (e.g., Silver & Oakes, 
2001; Fisher & Happé, 2005; Begeer et al., 2011), or it is best achieved by a program that 
requires both mental state attribution and the generation of moral judgments. 
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CHAPTER 6 
How Intentions, Negligence and Outcomes Affect Moral 
Judgments 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This chapter is based on the following original article: 
Margoni, F., & Surian, L. (2016). How intentions, negligence and outcomes affect moral 
judgments. Manuscript submitted for publication. 
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Abstract 
Current models of moral judgment assign a crucial role to intentions and actions outcomes in 
moral judgment, but they diverge on the role of negligence. In this study, a group of adults 
evaluated the moral rightness (or wrongness) and the deserved reward (or punishment) of a 
set of actions. Actions were embedded in vignettes in which agents’ intentions and 
negligence, and actions outcomes were orthogonally manipulated. Across two experiments, 
we found that intention played the most important role in moral judgment. Action 
consequences affected more deserved reward and punishability than rightness or wrongness, 
and negligence played a significant but marginal role. Furthermore, we discuss the current 
findings in light of the pressing need to integrate existing processing models of moral 
judgment to account for moral approvals. 
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How Intentions, Negligence and Outcomes Affect Moral Judgments 
When we judge the morality of an agent that helps or harms, we may rely on the 
agent’s intention, the consequences brought about by his or her action, and the degree of his 
or her negligence. Very early in life, humans’ socio-moral expectations are sensitive to 
agents’ intentions (Dunfield & Kuhlmeier, 2010; Hamlin, 2013; Lee, Yun, Kim, & Song, 
2015), and during preschool years our moral judgments start to rely mainly on intention, 
when assessed by verbal tasks (Cushman, Sheketoff, Wharton, & Carey, 2013; Karniol, 1978; 
Killen, Mulvey, Richardson, Jampol, & Woodward, 2011; Margoni & Surian, 2016a; Piaget, 
1932). Moreover, both in moral philosophy (Abelard, 1971; Kant, 1785/1959) and 
jurisprudence (Williams, 1953), the role of intention in judging someone responsible and 
morally bad or good has been highly emphasized. However, the condemnation of cases like 
accidental harm highlights that other factors, such as action outcomes and agent’s negligence, 
may affect our moral evaluations (Williams, 1981).  
Contrasting models of moral judgment processing have been proposed in order to 
account for the relative weight of intention, outcome, and negligence. A seminal model, that 
was proposed by attribution theorists (Heider, 1958), posited that people first analyze causal 
responsibility for action outcomes, and subsequently analyze internal factors such as agent’s 
intention (Darley & Shultz, 1990; Fincham & Roberts, 1985; Shaver, 1985; Weiner, 1995). 
According to this model, both outcome and intention are needed to attribute responsibility, 
moral blame, and punishability, but causal and intentional information are integrated by a 
single cognitive process. For example, the punishment judgments have been described as the 
outcome of a process that first assesses the causal responsibility of an agent and then 
attributes moral responsibility to him or her (Shultz, Schleifer, & Altman, 1981; Shultz, 
Wright, & Schleifer, 1986).  
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A recent model, proposed by Cushman (2008, 2015; see also Young, Cushman, Hauser, 
& Saxe, 2007), maintains that both outcome and intention are assessed by the individual, but 
posits two distinct and independent cognitive processes underlying moral judgment. One 
process focuses on causal responsibility for harming outcomes, and another focuses on 
agent’s mental states such as intention. This two-process model predicts conflict between 
processes, for example in those cases in which the agent accidentally harms someone (bad 
outcome without negative intention) or intends to harm someone but fails (bad intention 
without negative outcome). According to the model, wrongness or badness judgments rely 
mainly on the intent-based process, whereas punishment judgments rely both on outcome- 
and intent-based process. A first evidence for the independence of the two processes can be 
found in people judging morally bad instances of failed attempts to harm somebody, despite 
the fact that the agent did not cause any negative consequence (Cushman, 2008). 
However, when we evaluate an accidental harming action, we may also focus on 
whether the agent acted with negligence. That is, we may also want to assess the manner in 
which the agent acted and, more specifically, decide whether he acted with or without care. 
We can define ‘negligence’ as a lack of due care in acting (e.g., Abelard, 1971; D’Arcy, 
1963; Hart, 1968). Few studies examined the role of negligence in moral judgments 
compared to the large number of studies on intention and outcome. Some studies found that 
moral judgments rely on intention, but this information interacts with negligence and with the 
particular case being judged (e.g., Finkel & Groscup, 1997), and information about 
consequences affects moral judgments especially when people attribute negligence to the 
agent (Enzle & Hawking, 1992).  
Thus, negligence could be an important factor to be accounted for by a model of moral 
judgment (for extensive discussion see Malle, Guglielmo, & Monroe, 2014; Weiner, 1995). 
Preschoolers distinguish between innocent accidental harm and accidental harm caused by 
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the agent’s lack of due care (Schleifer, Shultz, & Lefebvre-Pinard, 1983; Siegal & Peterson, 
1998). Children use negligence information to assign moral responsibility (Shultz, Wright, & 
Schleifer, 1986), and it has been proposed that preschoolers’ judgments appear to be often 
outcome-based because children assume that accidental harm resulted from agent’s 
negligence (Nobes, Panagiotaki, & Pawson, 2009). 
Moreover, while negligence may not be particularly relevant in the attribution of 
goodness and deserved reward to agents that caused a positive outcome (e.g., help), it may 
instead be central in the attribution of badness and punishability for negative outcomes (e.g., 
harm). That is, deserved reward may be assigned only if the action was planned 
(intentionally), but punishment may be assigned because the action was carried out with 
negligence, despite the lack of any bad intention (Shultz & Wright, 1985). Therefore, 
particularly for harming actions, an agent can be blamed when he showed no relevant 
intention, and this is because he is judged a negligent agent. Adding to this, people often 
assume that while negative outcomes deserved a punishment, agents that caused positive 
outcomes are morally approvable, but they do not necessarily deserve to be rewarded. 
Consistently, it has been suggested that judgments of moral disapprovals rely more on 
attribution of causal responsibility than judgments of moral approvals (Bostyn & Roets, 
2016; see also Bohner, Bless, Schwarz, & Strack, 1988). 
The current research 
The aim of the current study was twofold. First, we asked whether Cushman (2008, 
2013)’s model has to be modified to allow for a role played by agents’ negligence (Finkel & 
Groscup, 1997; Nobes et al., 2009; Shultz & Wright, 1985). Cushman (2008) investigated 
people’s moral judgments using scenarios that might have been interpreted as involving some 
degree of negligence. However, here we make negligence information clearer as we wanted 
to study directly its weight in people’s moral judgments. Second, we investigated whether 
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Cushman (2008)’s model can be generalized to judgments of moral rightness and deserved 
reward. Note that the computational models recently proposed to account for moral judgment 
have been tested mainly on the evaluation of moral transgressions. Little is currently known 
about how people produce judgments of goodness, praise, or deserved reward, and whether 
the same cognitive processes involved in judging negative cases are involved in judging 
positive ones. As a clear example of this bias, consider the recent claim that interpersonal 
harm is the “fundamental template unifying moral judgment” (Gray, Young, & Waytz, 2012). 
In Experiment 1, participants evaluated the moral rightness or wrongness and the 
deserved reward or punishability of a set of different actions. We generated several scenarios 
by varying the valence and the presence of agent’s intention, action outcome and agent’s 
negligence, in order to assess the contribution of each type of information on the elicited 
moral judgment. 
If Cushman (2008; 2013)’s model is generalizable to the evaluations of positive cases 
(such as helping behaviors), we should find that moral rightness and deserved reward 
judgments rely mainly on intention, but deserved reward judgments are also substantially 
affected by outcomes. However, given the recent evidence suggesting that judgments of 
praise rely less on causal attribution for outcomes than judgments of blame (Bostyn & Roets, 
2016), we predicted that deserved reward judgment would be less outcome-based than 
punishment judgment. Moreover, we predicted that judgments of positive cases would be 
more intent-based than judgments of negative cases. Finally, if negligence plays a role in 
processing accidental cases, it should affect more decisions concerning agents’ punishability 
than their deserved reward (Shultz & Wright, 1985). 
Experiment 2 further investigated the role of negligence in judging the wrongness and 
punishability of accidental harming actions. We studied the effect of negligence (that is, the 
lack of care in performing an action) on participants’ judgments, controlling for the 
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knowledge state of the agent (whether the agent was/was not aware that his behavior was 
dangerous), an aspect that was not always made explicit in Experiment 1 stories. 
Experiment 1 
Method. 
Participants. Participants were 120 adults (70 female), with a mean age of 26.54 (SD = 
4.66). Participants were recruited among students enrolled in psychology courses at the 
University of Trento or from the urban middle-class area surrounding the campus. All 
participants provided written and informed consent. The experimental procedure was 
approved by the local University Ethics Committee. 
Materials and procedure. Participants were tested in a quiet room, at their house or in 
the laboratory. Each participant was invited to complete a paper-and-pen questionnaire, 
which took approximately twenty-five minutes. We adopted a 2 × 2 × 2 × 2 design, thus 
generating 16 possible and different combinations out of four factors: intention (present or 
absent), negligence (present or absent), consequence (present or absent), and valence of 
intention and outcome (positive or negative). We created four different scenario contexts, 
labeled “justice”, “benevolence”, “temperance”, and “help/harm”. Therefore, we created 64 
different scenarios: eight combinations × four contexts (= 32 scenarios) describing positive 
events, and 8 × 4 = 32 scenarios describing negative events. 
The contexts were inspired by three classical virtues of the Latin and Greek conceptual 
world and literature (e.g., see Marcus Aurelius, II century AD/2006), namely justice (iustitia), 
where the agent acts in a fairly/unfairly way, benevolence (benevolentia – also inspired by 
Cushman, unpublished data), where the agent is kind/unkind towards others, and temperance 
(temperantia), where the agent controls his anger or does not. We included a fourth context 
(help/harm) from the recent literature on moral psychology (Doris, 2010), where the agent 
specifically helps/harms another person. For each context, we generated eight positive and 
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eight negative different scenarios (e.g., eight temperance and eight intemperance scenarios). 
Below we report a single scenario context parametric variation of factors (relative to 
benevolence, positive scenarios only): 
 
Background = James is seated on a subway train, when he sees a very old man standing in 
the corridor.   
Positive intention present = James wants to be kind towards the man by giving him his own 
sits. 
Positive intention absent = James does not have any particular intention. He simply wants to 
stand up in order to stretch out his legs.  
Negligence present = James stands up without caring too much to be seen leaving his seat. 
Negligence absent = James stands up caring to be seen leaving his seat. 
Positive outcome present = James frees the seat; the man sees it and sits down. 
Positive outcome absent = James frees the seat; however, the man does not see it and does 
not sit. 
 
Each participant evaluated two positive and two negative scenarios for each context. 
Thus, participants evaluated 16 scenarios, eight positive and eight negative, presented in a 
randomized order. For the positive scenarios, we asked to evaluate “How morally right is 
[Anthony]’s behavior?” and “How much does [Anthony] deserve to be rewarded?” For the 
negative scenarios, participants evaluated “How morally wrong is [Anthony]’s behavior?” 
and “How much does [Anthony] deserve to be punished?” Each question was followed by a 
seven-point scale anchored at 1 with none, at 4 with some, and at 7 with very much. The 
questions order was counterbalanced between subjects. 
Results and discussion. 
We analyzed our data treating the mean judgment of a single scenario as the unit of 
analysis (as in previous and similar studies: e.g., Cushman, Young, & Hauser, 2006; 
Cushman, 2008). Data were averaged across the 30 participants’ trials for each combination 
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of context and factors (30 because each one of the 120 participants evaluated only ¼ of the 
scenarios, that is, 16 scenario combinations out of 64). 
A three-way repeated-measures ANOVA was performed, treating each context as the 
unit of analysis, and controlling for the questions order effect by adding to the model this 
variable as a between-subject factor. The repeated measures for each case were the variations 
in intention, negligence, and consequence. Thus, we ran our analysis on eight cases, since we 
had four different scenarios but two different questions orders, and we analyzed separately 
the judgments of negative scenarios and the judgments of positive scenarios. 
The weight of intention, negligence and consequence. 
Figure 1 displays the effect size of intention, negligence and consequence factors for 
judgments of rightness, deserved reward, wrongness, and punishment. Collapsing judgments 
of moral rightness across contexts, the proportion of the total variability accounted for the 
intention factor (effect size, η²) was 72%, F(1, 7) = 29.07, p = .002, partial η² = .83, for the 
negligence was 3%, F(1, 7) = 8.14, p = .029, partial η² = .58, and for the consequence was 
lower than 1%, F(1, 7) = 2.14, p = .19, partial η² = .26. Intention and negligence factors 
contributed significantly to the model, but not consequence. Error and interactions 
components accounted for the remaining 24%. Interactions accounted for less than 1% of the 
total variability, with none of them reaching statistical significance at p < .05. 
With respect to the deserved reward judgments, the proportion of the total variability 
accounted for intention was 52%, F(1, 7) = 25.03, p = .002, partial η² = .81, for consequence 
was 6%, F(1, 7) = 6.24, p = .047, partial η² = .51 and for negligence was 3%, F(1, 7) = 10.60, 
p = .017, partial η² = .64. Intention, negligence, and consequence factors contributed 
significantly to the model. Interactions accounted for 4% of the total variability, but none of 
them reached statistical significance at p < .05.  
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Thus, the intention was by far the most important factor affecting approvals, with 
consequence playing a minor role in determining judgments of deserved reward (6% of the 
total variability compared to less than 1% for rightness attribution). 
For the judgments of wrongness, the proportion of the total variability accounted for 
intention was 54%, F(1, 7) = 38.45, p < .001, partial η² = .86, for negligence was 3%, F(1, 7) 
= 19.99, p = .004, partial η² = .77, and for consequence was also 3%, F(1, 7) = 15.71, p = 
.007, partial η² = .72. Intention, negligence, and consequence factors contributed significantly 
to the model. Interactions accounted for 4% of the total variability. The interaction between 
negligence and consequence reached statistical significance, but accounted for only 0.1% of 
the total variability, p = .037; surprisingly, participants judged more wrong an action carried 
out without negligence than an action carried out with negligence, especially when the action 
caused a negative outcome. 
With respect to the punishment judgments, the proportion of the total variability 
accounted for intention was 39%, F(1, 7) = 37.92, p < .001, partial η² = .86, for negligence 
was 3%, F(1, 7) = 18.74, p = .005, partial η² = .76, and for consequence was 10%, F(1, 7) = 
11.48, p = .015, partial η² = .66. Intention, negligence, and consequence factors contributed 
significantly to the model. Interactions accounted for 4% of the total variability. The 
interaction between intention and negligence reached statistical significance, and accounted 
for 2% of the total variability, p = .007; participants judged the agent without intention less 
punishable than the agent with a negative intention, but surprisingly this was true especially 
when the agent acted without the due care. In a next result section (‘Accidental actions 
carried out with or without negligence’), we will discuss the counterintuitive interactions 
between intention and negligence for punishment attribution, and between negligence and 
consequence for wrongness attribution. 
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In sum, the intention was the key factor affecting disapprovals, although consequence 
plays also a significant role in determining punishability judgments. 
 
 
Figure 1. Proportion of the total variability explained by each factor (η²) for the rightness and 
the deserved reward judgments (left), and the wrongness and the punishment judgments 
(right). 
 
Moral rightness/wrongness vs. deserved reward/punishment. 
In order to analyze the differences between how the factors contributed to the model for 
different judgments (rightness vs. deserved reward), we conducted a four-way repeated 
measures ANOVA, combining data sets and adding to the model a within-context factor of 
judgment (rightness or deserved reward). We found a significant main effect for judgment 
type factor (rightness vs. deserved reward), F(1, 7) = 27.95, p < .001, partial η² = .80. Also, 
the interaction between judgment type and intention was almost significant, F(1, 7) = 5.47, p 
= .052, partial η² = .44, but the interaction between judgment type and consequence did not 
reach statistical significance at p < .05. 
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Analyzing how factors contributed to the model for wrongness versus punishability 
judgment, we found a tendency toward a significant main effect for judgment type factor 
(wrongness vs. punishability), F(1, 7) = 5.53, p = .051, partial η² = .44. The interaction 
between judgment type and intention reached statistical significance, F(1, 7) = 5.73, p = .048, 
partial η² = .45, and the interaction between judgment type and consequence was almost 
significant, F(1, 7) = 4.72, p = .066, partial η² = .40. 
Thus, our participants used intention information differently when judging rightness 
and deserved reward. Intention factor variability explained 72% of the total variability for 
rightness judgment compared to 52% for deserved reward judgment. Participants also used 
information about intention and, partly, consequence, differently when judging wrongness 
and punishability. Intention explained 54% of the total variability for wrongness judgment 
compared to 39% for punishability judgment, and consequence explained 3% of the total 
variability for wrongness judgment compared to 10% for punishability judgment. Performing 
a repeated-measures ANOVA that treated each participant as the unit of analysis yielded 
similar results. 
Overall, the findings we reported above suggest that both approvals and disapprovals 
rely mainly on intention information. Consequence information was assessed especially in 
judging punishment and deserved reward. Negligence played a significant (p < .05) but 
marginal role in determining the moral judgments of participants. The current results are thus 
consistent with the prediction from Cushman (2008)’s model and do not fully support the 
request of adding negligence to the processing model of moral judgment (but see Experiment 
2). 
Figure 2 reports the mean judgments of rightness and deserved reward (left chart) and 
wrongness and deserved punishment (right chart), grouped by factor combinations of 
intention, negligence, and consequence. It can be easily noticed that means for deserved 
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reward judgment are lower or equal than means for rightness judgment, and means for 
deserved punishment are lower or equal than means for wrongness judgment. We asked 
whether varying a factor value level determines a change in one judgment type (e.g., 
rightness) that is different from the change determined in the other judgment type (e.g., 
deserved reward). We performed several two-way repeated-measures ANOVA with 
judgment type (rightness vs. deserved reward or wrongness vs. deserved punishment) and 
information (intention present vs. absent or negligence present vs. absent or consequence 
present vs. absent) as factors. 
Positive cases. We found a significant condition-by-intention interaction, F(1, 7) = 
16.27, p = .005, partial η² = .70; when the agent caused a positive outcome without 
negligence, rightness judgment average decreased significantly more than deserved reward 
did by the fact that the agent had no positive intention while acting. We also found a 
significant condition-by-negligence interaction, F(1, 7) = 9.55, p = .018, partial η² = .58;  
when there was no positive intention or outcome occurring, rightness judgment average 
decreased significantly more than deserved reward did by the fact that the agent was 
negligent. These data suggest that moral rightness judgments rely more on intention and 
negligence than deserved reward judgments. Finally, we found a significant condition-by-
consequence interaction, F(1, 7) = 7.44, p = .029, partial η² = .51; when there was no 
intention or negligence, deserved reward judgment average increased significantly more than 
rightness judgment average did by the fact that the agent accidentally caused a positive 
outcome. Consistently with a generalization from Cushman (2008)’s model, the last 
interaction further suggests that judgments of deserved reward are more outcome-based than 
judgments of moral rightness. 
Negative cases. When the agent acted with due care and did not cause any negative 
outcome, wrongness judgment increased significantly more than deserved punishment 
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judgment as a result of including information about the agent’s negative intention, F(1, 7) = 
5.26, p = .056, partial η² = .43. Moreover, when the agent had a negative intention and acted 
negligently, deserved punishment judgment average decreased significantly more than 
wrongness judgment average did by the fact that the agent did not cause the negative 
outcome, F(1, 7) = 8.38, p = .023, partial η² = .70. Taken together, these interactions replicate 
previous results from Cushman (2008) and show that judgments of moral wrongness rely 
more on intention compared to judgments of punishability that are more outcome-based. 
 
 
Figure 2. Mean judgment of rightness and deserved reward concerning positive actions (e.g., 
help; left) or wrongness and punishment concerning negative actions (e.g., harm; right) as a 
function of agents’ intention and negligence, and actions consequence. Negligence: N+ = 
careless agent; N- = careful agent; Action consequence: C+ = information about the positive 
(left) or negative (right) outcome included; C- = scenarios made explicit that the actions had 
neither positive nor negative outcomes. Error bars show the magnitude of the standard error. 
 
Accidental actions carried out with or without negligence. 
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One result concerning the processing of negligence information in cases of accidental 
harm is particularly striking. We found that a caring action that causes accidentally a bad 
outcome was judged more wrong, t(119) = 4.23, p < .001, and punishable, t(119) = 4.07, p < 
.001, than a careless action that brings accidentally a bad outcome. This is a counterintuitive 
result, since we ordinarily think that a careless driver that kills accidentally someone is more 
responsible than a careful driver that kills accidentally.  
A first possibility is that we attend to negligence information only in those cases where 
the outcome is a severe harm to someone or something (e.g., the road accident). To test this 
hypothesis, we analyzed separately scenarios with a severe harm (temperance and help/harm) 
and scenarios with a minor harm (justice and benevolence). If people attend to negligence 
only when evaluating severe accidental outcomes, we should find that an accidental outcome 
is deemed more wrong and punishable than a negligent accidental outcome only when the 
harm is minor. However, this was not the case. We found the same pattern described above 
both when participants evaluated minor and severe harm. An accidental minor outcome was 
deemed more wrong, t(59) = 3.60, p < .001, and punishable, t(59) = 3.60, p < .001, than a 
negligent accidental minor outcome; and an accidental severe outcome was deemed more 
wrong, t(59) = 2.43, p = .018, and punishable, t(59) = 2.20, p = .032, than a negligent 
accidental severe outcome (Fig. 3). 
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Figure 3. Mean judgment across scenario contexts with minor harm (justice and 
benevolence, left), or severe harm (temperance and help/harm, right) grouped by two 
combinations of intention, negligence, and consequence (I
-
N
+
C
+
 = negligent accidental harm; 
I
-
N
-
C
+
 = accidental harm). Error bars show the magnitude of the standard error. 
 
A second possible explanation for the results displayed in Figure 3 could be that 
participants inferred a negative intention from the fact that the action was performed 
carefully, and perhaps they inferred from the fact that the character acted carelessly that he 
did not have any clear intention to harm. Then, acting with care may have been perceived as a 
clue of a hidden and relevant bad intention, whereas acting without care may have conveyed 
more clearly to our participants the absence of any evil intention. Since intention matters the 
most in evaluating our scenarios (see Fig. 1), negligent accident harm (less intention inferred) 
was judged less harshly than accidental harm (more intention inferred). 
If this hypothesis is true, we should integrate Cushman (2008; 2015)’s model positing 
that people evaluate intention as the source of control over the following action. Negligence 
information could be added in the model as a signal of a weak or strong control link between 
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intention and action. Inferring a weak control link will eventually result in attributing less 
(negative) intention to the agent who harmed, and will lead to a lenient moral evaluation. By 
contrast, inferring a strong control link may result in attributing a negative intention and 
evaluating the agent harshly because of his alleged evil intention. 
Experiment 2 
The results of Experiment 1, showing that accidental harm caused by a careful agent is 
condemned more than a negligent accidental harm, may be due, at least in part, to processing 
demands of the task, which required the evaluation of 16 different scenarios. In this 
demanding context, it is possible that information about agents’ negligence have been 
misused by participants as a cue to infer agents’ ‘true intentions’. To test this hypothesis, we 
conducted a second experiment in which participants evaluated a minor number of scenarios 
(n = 4). Moreover, we noticed that in Exp. 1 stories, the carefulness with which the agent 
acted (that is, the negligence) and the agent’s knowledge state (that is, whether the agent was 
aware of the dangerousness of the action) were sometimes confounded. Because the strength 
of the control link between intention and action may be inferred by both the carefulness with 
which the agent acted and the agent’s knowledge state, in Experiment 2 we investigated the 
role of negligence (lack of due care in acting) in judging accidental harm cases controlling for 
the agent’s knowledge state information. Participants rated with a 7-point-scale the moral 
wrongness and the punishability of a minor number of accidental harming actions that are 
carried out by the agent either with or without care and relevant knowledge.  
Method. 
Participants. Participants were 48 adults (36 female, Mean age = 21.67, SD = 1.65), 
recruited through their courses at the Department of Psychology, University of X. All 
participants provided written and informed consent. 
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Materials and procedure. Participants were tested in groups with the supervision of 
one experimenter. Each participant was invited to complete a brief paper-and-pen 
questionnaire. We adopted a 2 × 2 design, with two story contexts. We generated eight 
accidental harm stories in total. The two factors were care (the agent acted with/without the 
due care) and knowledge state (the agent was/was not aware of the dangerousness of her 
action). For each context, we generated four stories: two stories were the agent was informed 
and either acted with or without negligence; and two stories were the agent was not informed 
and acted with or without due care. A first context was about a waitress that accidentally 
tramples on a cradle containing a baby; whether she acted carefully and knew the baby’s 
position varied. A second context was about a man that took his child to a mountain hike and 
accidentally knocks him into a ravine; whether he moved carefully and heard the weather 
forecast varied. 
Each participant judged two scenarios taken from the ‘waitress’ context and two from 
the ‘mountain’ context. Participants evaluated with a seven-point scale (1 = none; 4 = some; 
7 = very much) “How morally wrong is [character’s name]’s behavior?”, “How much does 
[character’s name] deserve to be punish?”, and “How much responsibility does [character’s 
name] have for what happened?”. We added a responsibility question in order to control 
whether any difference in the evaluation of wrongness or punishability between cases could 
be related to a difference in the attribution of responsibility for the outcome. Scenarios and 
questions orders were counterbalanced between participants using a Latin Square. 
Results and discussion. 
We performed a two-way MANOVA, with care and knowledge state as independent 
variables and wrongness, punishability, and responsibility judgment as dependent variables. 
We found a main effect of care, F(1, 186) = 11.47, p < .001, Wilks’ Ʌ = .84, and a main 
effect of knowledge, F(1, 186) = 10.96, p < .001, Wilks’ Ʌ = .85, but no significant 
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interaction between them. For wrongness, punishability, and responsibility judgments there 
were an effect of care (wrongness, F(1, 191) = 16.55, p < .001, partial η² = .08; punishability, 
F(1, 191) = 12.16, p < .001, partial η² = .06; responsibility, F(1, 191) = 31.98, p < .001, 
partial η² = .15) and an effect of knowledge state (wrongness, F(1, 191) = 6.23, p = .013, 
partial η² = .03; punishability, F(1, 191) = 8.98, p = .003, partial η² = .05; responsibility, F(1, 
191) = 33.06, p < .001, partial η² = .15). 
With a series of t-test, we further analyzed the results pattern. When comparing the 
accidental harm caused by an agent acting with care and informed (C
+
K
+
) with the accidental 
harm caused by a careless but informed agent (C
-
K
+
), all comparisons were significant and 
C
+
K
+
 was judged always leniently (Fig. 4). C
+
K
+
 was judged less wrong (M = 2.15, SD = 1.5) 
compared to C
-
K
+
 (M = 3.13, SD = 1.87), t(94) = 2.83, p = .006. Participants attributed less 
responsibility for C
+
K
+
 (M = 3.85, SD = 1.77) compared to C
-
K
+
 (M = 5.21; SD = 1.17), t(94) 
= 4.44, p < .001. They also judged C
+
K
+
 less punishable (M = 2.31, SD = 1.34) compared to 
C
-
K
+
 (M = 3.27, SD = 1.65), t(94) = 3.13, p = .002. Also when the agent was ignorant, 
comparing the caring case (C
+
K
-
) with the careless one (C
-
K
-
) led to similar results. 
Participants blamed more the agent acting without due care. 
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Figure 4. Mean wrongness and punishability judgments of the accidental harm stories in 
which the agent was informed (left) or uniformed (right), from Experiment 2. Error bars show 
the magnitude of the standard error. 
 
In sum, we found that in some cases negligence information is taken into account, and 
that, in this cases, people judge accidental actions carried out with negligence more wrong 
and punishable than accidental actions carried out without negligence. Results from 
Experiment 2 suggest that the underestimation of negligence information and the 
counterintuitive result of Experiment 1 about the use of negligence in judging accidental 
harm cases may be linked with the task processing demands and the less explicit information 
about the agents’ knowledge state. When people have to evaluate 16 scenarios, and 
information about negligence may be taken as a cue to agents’ intentions, then the 
participants’ attention is likely to shift towards intentions and outcomes. 
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General Discussion 
In Experiment 1, we investigated the relative weight of intention, negligence and 
outcome information in moral approvals (judgments of rightness and deserved reward) and 
moral disapprovals (judgments of wrongness and punishability). We found that moral 
judgments rely mainly on intention, and that deserved reward and punishment judgments are 
respectively more outcome-based than judgments of moral rightness or wrongness. We also 
found that negligence information play a marginal role in determining the moral judgments. 
In Experiment 2, we further investigated the role of negligence in judging the moral 
wrongness and punishability of accidental harming actions. In these cases, negligent agents 
were blamed reliably more than careful ones. 
The major role of intention. 
The results from Experiment 1 showed that people rely mainly on intention when 
approving or disapproving others’ actions: “Ethically, intention is everything” (Piaget, 1932; 
p. 328). Furthermore, our results showed that moral judgments are scarcely affected by the 
assessment of the agent’s negligence. Therefore, the current study provides evidence for a 
processing model of moral judgment that relies mainly on intention and outcome (e.g., 
Cushman, 2008; 2013). However, the results of Experiment 2, together with previous 
findings (e.g., Finkel & Groscup, 1997; Nobes et al., 2009; Shultz & Wright, 1985), invite a 
minor revision of the model in order to account for people’s ability to attend to agents’ 
negligence at least when judging accidental harm. In this sense, negligence information may 
not be difficult to evaluate, as Experiment 2 showed, but sometimes people may have 
difficulties to detect negligence information, as Experiment 1 suggested. 
This conclusion is consistent with the results from Nobes et al. (2009) showing that 
preschoolers already rely on negligence information in judging moral cases. While it is true 
that our results suggest that negligence play a marginal role in determining people’s moral 
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judgments, in Experiment 2 we find that when judging accidental harm cases (that is, the 
cases judged by children in Nobes et al.) people rely also on negligence information. 
However, Nobes et al. (2009) also argued that older children rely less on negligence 
compared to younger children. Therefore, while negligence may be relevant in explaining the 
outcome-based judgment of younger preschoolers (they condemn accidental wrongdoers by 
assuming they were negligent), it may still be marginal in describing the adults’ intent-based 
moral judgments, except when adults judge accidental harming actions. 
Indeed, by claiming that intention is everything, we usually imply that mental states 
overall are fundamental to assess the morality of an action, and negligence too can be 
conceptualized as a part of the agent’s mental states. Although intention may be often 
conflated with negligence in real-life cases, in our experiments we manipulated this 
information in order to assess their relative weight. What our data made clear is that intention 
is probably the more relevant cue to assess morality among the mental states cues, and 
negligence is taken into account especially in judging accidental cases.  
The generalizability from disapprovals to approvals. 
For the first time, we asked whether the model proposed by Cushman (2008) could be 
generalized also to the moral approvals of positive actions such as helping. In addition to 
having replicated previous findings showing that moral wrongness judgments are intent-
based and punishment judgments are more outcome-based compared to wrongness judgments 
(Cushman, 2008; Young et al., 2007), here we reported evidence of the model 
generalizability to approval judgments. First, as predicted, both judgments of moral rightness 
and deserved reward relied mainly on intention information. Second, we found the predicted 
difference between judgments of rightness and judgments of deserved reward, that is, moral 
rightness judgments were more intent-based than deserved reward judgments, and the latter 
were more outcome-based than the former. 
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However, our study also detected some differences between approvals and disapprovals 
that needed to be taken into account while revising the model proposed by Cushman (2008). 
Our study provides only a first glance on these differences, and further studies should directly 
address them by using positive and negative scenarios that could be directly compared. As 
predicted by previous results reporting asymmetries between praise and blame (Bostyn & 
Roets, 2016), we found that deserved reward judgments were less outcome-based than 
punishment judgments. Consistently with Shultz & Wright (1985) but somehow at odds with 
results suggesting that harmful side effects are judged as intentionally caused more often than 
helpful side effects are (e.g., Knobe, 2003; but see Haupt & Uske, 2012), our results suggest 
that intention is particularly central in assessing the moral rightness and the deserved reward 
rather than the moral wrongness and the punishability. By contrast, action outcomes and, 
sometimes, agent’s negligence may be used more in assessing moral wrongness and 
punishability. 
Future studies should be devoted to further address the issue of whether existing 
processing models of moral judgment could be generalized to account also for approvals of 
actions and agents. Moreover, within this future line of research, particular attention could be 
devoted to test whether intention, outcome and negligence play a different role in the 
evaluation of actions that simply fulfill existing norms or duties versus supererogatory actions 
that go beyond the call of duty. 
Concluding remarks. 
In sum, we reported evidence consistent with current models predicting that moral 
judgments are mainly intent-based, that attributions of punishment and deserved reward are 
outcome-based, and that negligence information is taken into account especially when 
judging accidental cases, but overall it plays a marginal role. Moreover, we started to clarify 
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in which way current models may be integrated to account also for the moral judgments of 
positive situations. 
While negligence appears to play a marginal role in people’s moral judgments, it has a 
crucial and widespread role in causing serious damages, for example on the road or in work 
environments (e.g., Poama, 2012; Reamer & Racette, 2015). The results of the current study 
suggest that such a role is likely to be underestimated by common sense. Therefore, our 
findings have potential far-reaching practical implications. In fact, they highlight the need to 
take these aspects of moral judgment into account when planning and carrying out effective 
intervention programs aimed at reducing risk in daily life activities. 
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CHAPTER 7 
Moral Judgment in Old Age: Evidence of an Intent-to-Outcome 
Shift 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This chapter is based on the following original article: 
Margoni, F., Geipel, J., Surian, L., & Hadjichristidis, K. (2016). Moral Judgment in old age: 
Evidence for an intent-to-outcome shift. Manuscript submitted for publication. 
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Abstract 
We examined whether aging influences the extent to which people weigh an agent’s intention 
and the outcomes of his or her action in moral evaluations. We presented older (63–90 years) 
and younger adults (21–39 years) with a series of scenarios illustrating either harmful or 
helpful actions. Each scenario described the intention of an agent (neutral vs. 
harmful/helpful) and the outcome of his or her action (neutral vs. harmful/helpful). 
Participants had to rate how morally good or bad was the agent’s action. We found that older, 
as opposed to younger, participants relied less on intentions and more on outcomes, but 
mainly in the evaluation of harmful actions. Importantly, this age-related difference was 
associated with older adults’ decline in theory of mind abilities. We discuss theoretical and 
practical implications. 
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Moral Judgment in Old Age: Evidence of an Intent-to-Outcome Shift 
The United Nations considers as older adults individuals aged 60 years or over 
(United Nation, 2012). In 2015, the percentage of older adults was 12% and this figure is 
expected to double by 2050 (World Health Organization, WHO, 2016). As the world 
population is aging, many people extend their careers into their golden years. For example, 
about 12% of 1,200 sitting federal district and circuit judges in the US are 80 years or older 
(Goldstein, 2011), while the average age of members in the US Senate is 61 (Manning, 
2015). Thus, many highly consequential decisions that involve moral issues are taken by 
older adults. However, existing theories of adults’ moral judgment and decision making are 
based on research utilizing predominantly university students (e.g., Henrich, Heine, & 
Norenzayan, 2010). The main aim of the present article is to examine whether and how aging 
affects moral judgment. If it does, we would need to re-examine our moral judgment theories. 
One crucial component of moral judgment involves the consideration of mental state 
information such as intentions, beliefs, and desires (for a review see Young & Tsoi, 2013). 
For example, people typically judge intentionally harmful acts (e.g., intentionally poisoning 
someone) as morally worse than accidentally harmful acts (e.g., accidentally poisoning 
someone), although both actions may result in the same outcome. This is known as intent-
based moral judgment and develops by the age of 5 to 6 (e.g., Cushman, Sheketoff, Wharton, 
& Carey, 2013; Killen, Mulvey, Richardson, Jampol, & Woodward, 2011; Margoni & Surian, 
2017). Prior to that age, moral judgment elicited through verbal descriptions is predominantly 
outcome-based. This outcome-to-intent-shift is associated with changes in theory of mind 
abilities and executive functioning skills (Chandler, Sokol, & Hallett, 2001; Killen et al., 
2011; Zelazo, Helwig, & Lau, 1996). 
Lifespan research, on the other hand, suggests that aging correlates with a decrease in 
theory of mind skills (for a meta-analysis see Henry, Phillips, Ruffman, & Bailey, 2013) and 
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general cognitive abilities, such as executive functions, working memory capacity, and 
processing speed (e.g., Amieva, Phillips, & Della Sala, 2003; Maylor, Moulson, Muncer, & 
Taylor, 2002; Moran, 2013; Salthouse, 2004; Sullivan & Ruffman, 2004, for a review see 
Reuter-Lorenz & Sylvester, 2005). Merging evidence from moral judgment and life-span 
research, we predicted that older adults, as opposed to younger adults, will be less likely to 
make intent-based and more likely to make outcome-based moral judgments. Furthermore, 
we predicted that these age differences would be related to older adults comparatively 
diminished theory of mind abilities and executive functioning skills.  
Indirect support for our claim comes from a longitudinal study which found that moral 
reasoning stage (Kohlberg, 1969, 1984) increases sequentially throughout early development 
but decreases during old adulthood (Armon & Dawson, 1997; but see also Pratt, Diessner, 
Pratt, Hunsberger, & Pancer, 1996). Direct support for our claim comes from the work by 
Moran and colleagues (Moran, Jolly, & Mitchell, 2012). Moran et al. (2012) asked 14 older 
participants and 27 younger participants to make a series of moral judgments concerning 
harmful actions. Specifically, they presented participants with moral scenarios containing 
information about an agent’s intention (neutral vs. harmful) and the outcome of his or her 
action (neutral vs. harmful). Participants performed the moral judgment task inside an MRI 
scanner and under time pressure. The authors found that older, as compared to younger, 
participants relied relatively less on the agent’s intentions than on the actions outcomes when 
judging the permissibility of harmful acts. Using functional magnetic resonance imaging 
(fMRI), the authors further found that this effect was associated with age-related impairments 
in the dorsal sub-region of the medial-prefrontal cortex (MPFC), a brain region related to 
social cognition such as mental state reasoning. In light of their findings, Moran et al. (2012) 
suggested that aging effects in moral judgment may be related to an impairment of theory of 
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mind abilities but also to a more general cognitive decline (e.g., executive functioning). Here, 
we tested these possibilities empirically.  
The aim of the present study was to consolidate and extend the behavioural findings of 
Moran et al. (2012), as well as to examine the underpinning mechanisms of aging effects on 
moral reasoning. To this end, we tested a greater number of older and younger adults than 
these authors did, in a more naturalistic context, and without imposing time constrains. In 
terms of materials, along with scenarios involving harmful actions we also tested scenarios 
involving helpful actions. To examine the underlying mechanisms of eventual aging effects 
on moral judgment, we included a theory of mind, a general cognitive ability, and an 
executive function tasks. We also included an empathic concern task because empathic 
concern has been shown to influence moral judgment (e.g., Choe & Min, 2011; Crockett et 
al., 2010; Decety, & Cowell, 2014; Gleichgerrcht, & Young, 2013; Kahane, Everett, Earp, 
Farias, Savulescu, 2015; Patil & Silani, 2014) and to increase with age (e.g., Sze, Gyurak, 
Goodkind, & Levenson, 2012). 
Methods 
Participants. 
Thirty younger adults (20 female, Mage = 29.4, age range: 21—39 years)
1
 were recruited 
through flyers posted at the campus of the University of Trento. Thirty older adults (24 
female, Mage = 77.5, age range: 63—90 years) were recruited through a local Association for 
older adults. All participants took part in the study on a voluntary basis. On average 
participants indicated that they had 11.72 years of school education (Molder adults = 8.80 years, 
Myounger adults = 14.63 years). The University of Trento Ethics Committee approved the 
research protocol of the present study. 
Materials and Procedure. 
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The experiment was conducted in a single session that lasted about 60 minutes. 
Participants were asked to complete a moral judgment task followed by a battery of tasks 
measuring individual differences.  
Moral judgment task. Each participant received eight scenarios (adapted from Young, 
Scholz, & Saxe, 2011). Four scenarios involved ultimately harmful actions (harm scenarios) 
and four ultimately helpful actions (help scenarios). Within each type of scenario, we varied 
orthogonally the nature of the agent’s intention (neutral vs. valenced) and the outcome of his 
or her action (neutral vs. valenced), resulting in four different trials for harm scenarios and 
four for help scenarios: neutral-intention/neutral-outcome, neutral-intention/valenced-
outcome, valenced-intention/neutral-outcome, and valenced-intention/valenced-outcome. 
Table 1 presents the four trials of a harm scenario and those of a help scenario. Notice that for 
harm scenarios 'valenced' refers to 'negative' or 'harmful', whereas for help scenarios 
'valenced' refers to 'helpful' or 'positive'.  
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Table 1.  
Schematic Representation of the Four Different Versions of a Harm and a Help Scenario.   
Background 
Harm scenario Help scenario 
Simon is grocery shopping for his grandmother 
who adores spinach. Recently there had been 
bacterial contamination of bagged spinach. At the 
market, Simon sees some bagged spinach on sale. 
Anne is doing some shopping at the mall, when 
she sees many lovely bracelets to choose from. 
One of the bracelets has very beautiful pink 
stones. 
Negative Intention–Negative Outcome Positive Intention–Positive Outcome 
He thinks that bagged spinach may still be 
contaminated because of an incident just that day 
in his town. Simon buys, even though he thinks it 
may be dangerous, his grandmother the spinach, 
and she cooks it ending up in the hospital, 
violently ill.  
Browsing the counter, Anne thinks that the 
proceeds from the sale of the pink bracelet will 
contribute to breast cancer research. The sales 
profits from this bracelet will go directly to the 
cancer clinic in the city to fund breast cancer 
research. Anne buys the bracelet. Anne’s money 
is used to fund breast cancer research. 
Negative Intention–Neutral Outcome Positive Intention–Neutral Outcome 
He thinks that bagged spinach may still be 
contaminated because of an incident just that day 
in his town. However, contrarily to what Simon 
thinks it is safe to eat spinach because it is no 
longer contaminated, in fact bagged spinach has 
been restocked at many markets. Simon buys 
even though he thinks it may be dangerous his 
grandmother the spinach, and she cooks it. 
However, the meal is healthy and delicious. 
Browsing the counter, Anne thinks that the 
proceeds from the sale of the pink bracelet will 
contribute to breast cancer research. The sales 
profits from this bracelet will go directly to the 
jewelry company to fund a new advertising 
campaign. Anne buys the bracelet. Anne’s money 
is used by the jewelry company to fund 
advertising. 
Neutral Intention–Negative Outcome Neutral Intention–Positive Outcome 
He thinks that it’s perfectly safe now because 
someone told him so. Bagged spinach has been 
restocked at many markets, but some inspections 
aren’t thorough and contaminated batches are 
missed. Simon thinking that it is not dangerous 
buys his grandmother the spinach, and she cooks 
it, ending up in the hospital, violently ill.  
Browsing the counter, Anne thinks that the 
proceeds from the sale of the pink bracelet will 
contribute to a company profits. However, 
without her knowledge, the sales profits from this 
bracelet will go directly to the cancer clinic in the 
city to fund breast cancer research. Anne buys the 
bracelet. Anne’s money is used to fund breast 
cancer research. 
Neutral Intention–Neutral Outcome Neutral Intention–Neutral Outcome 
He thinks that it’s perfectly safe now because 
someone told him so. It is safe to eat spinach 
because it is no longer contaminated, in fact 
bagged spinach has been restocked at many 
markets. Simon buys his grandmother the 
spinach, and she cooks it. The meal is healthy and 
delicious. 
Browsing the counter, Anne thinks that the 
proceeds from the sale of the pink bracelet will 
contribute to a company profits. The sales profits 
from this bracelet will go directly to the jewelry 
company to fund a new advertising campaign. 
Anne buys the bracelet. Anne’s money is used by 
the jewelry company to fund advertising. 
Note. For all four versions of a given scenario, the background information was the same.  
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Following each scenario, participants were asked to judge the moral badness (for harm 
scenarios) or the moral goodness (for help scenarios) of the described action (“How morally 
bad/good was the [agent’s action]?”) on a scale ranging from 0 (not at all) to 10 (very much). 
Next, participants were asked “How much punishment/reward does the [agent’s action] 
deserve?” and answered on a scale that ranged from 0 (not at all) to 10 (very much). For the 
sake of brevity, we omit the results of the punishment/reward judgments in this paper. Note 
that the pattern of the results was similar to that of the badness/goodness judgments (for 
details see Supplemental Material at the end of this chapter). The order of scenarios (harm 
first vs. help first) and test questions (bad/good first vs. punishment/reward first) were 
counterbalanced across participants. 
Individual differences tasks. Following the moral judgment task, participants 
completed four tasks: theory of mind, empathic concern, cognitive ability level, and 
executive function.   
Theory of mind. Participants received the Reading the Mind in the Eyes test (RME, 
Baron-Cohen, Jolliffe, Mortimore, & Robertson, 1997; Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Hill, 
Raste, & Plumb, 2001; Serafin & Surian, 2004). In RME, participants have to choose which 
one among four words best describes the mental or emotional state of a person on the basis of 
a picture of his or her eye-gaze. Participants were presented with 36 different pictures, and 
subsequently made 36 choices. 
Empathic concern. Participants were presented with the empathic concern subscale 
of the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI-EC; Davis, 1980). This subscale consists of seven 
items that are rated on a 5-point scale, which ranges from 1 (does not describe me well) to 5 
(describes me well). This subscale assesses participants’ self-reported feelings of sympathy 
and concern for unfortunate others. 
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Cognitive ability. We asked participants to complete the Digit Symbol Substitution 
Test (DSST of the WAIS; Wechsler, 1981). Participants were asked to complete as many 
items as possible within 90 seconds. This test consists of a code table displaying nine 
different pairs of digits and symbols. The rows of the table consist of 94 double boxes with a 
digit and a white space next to it. Participants are asked to fill the white space next to each 
digit with the appropriate symbol based on the code table. We used the DSST as a measure of 
general cognitive ability. 
Executive functions. Participants also received the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test 
(WCST; Heaton, 1995). This test measures participants’ executive functioning skills. 
Participants are asked to sort cards containing colored geometric forms of different shapes 
and numbers to 4 target cards. Participants are informed whether each sort is correct or 
incorrect. Once a participant has reached a certain number of correct sorts, the rules are 
changed and the participant must apply the new rule. There are a number of different test 
scores which can be computed. In the subsequent analyses, we focused on the number of 
perseverative responses. That is the number of incorrect responses that would have been 
correct for the preceding rule.  
Results 
We first examined whether any of our older participants suffered from dementia by 
scrutinizing their scores on the Mini-Mental Status Examination (MMSE, Folstein et al., 
1975). MMSE scores between 30–24 reveal no impairment, 24–20 suspected impairment, 
19–17 mild impairment, 16–10 moderate impairment, and 9–0 severe impairment/dementia. 
None of the older participants showed a significant age-related decrement in cognitive 
performance (MMSE scores were higher than 20), although three participants showed a 
suspected impairment (MMSE scores between 24–20). Excluding these participants from the 
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data analyses had no effect on the main pattern of the results. Below we report the analyses 
on the full sample.  
Moral Judgments. 
Based on previous literature that supports an intent-to-outcome shift in older adults, we 
predicted two interactive effects: one between age and intention, and another between age 
and outcome. Specifically, we predicted that older versus younger participants would weigh 
less intentions and more outcomes in their moral evaluations. We analyzed moral judgment 
with a 2 (Age: Old vs. Young) × 2 (Intention: Neutral vs. Valenced) × 2 (Outcome: Neutral 
vs. Valenced) × 2 (Context: Harmful vs. Helpful) mixed-factor analysis of variance 
(ANOVA), with age as a between-participants factor and all other factors as repeated 
measures. The analysis revealed a main effect of intention, F(1, 54) = 171.55, p < .001, f = 
1.78, which was qualified by a significant Age × Intention interaction, F(1, 54) = 23.85, p < 
.001, f = .66.
 
As expected, the judgments of older participants were less affected by agent's 
intention than those of younger participants (see Figure 1). 
 
 
Figure 1. Moral judgment ratings by age (older vs. younger) and intentions (neutral vs. 
valenced). Older versus younger participants were less affected by intention status. Error bars 
indicate standard error of the mean.  
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The Age × Intention interaction, in turn, was qualified by a three-way Age × Intention × 
Context interaction, F(1, 54) = 9.94, p = .003, f = .42. We scrutinized this interaction with 
two separate 2 (Age) × 2 (Intention) × 2 (Outcome) analyses of variance, one for each 
context. The analysis for harmful contexts revealed a significant Age × Intention interaction, 
F(1, 56) = 58.08, p < .001, f = .87, with older participants being less affected than younger 
participants by the agent’s (harmful) intention (see Figure 2). A similar analysis for helpful 
contexts revealed no significant Age × Intention interaction, F(1, 56) = 2.88, p = .098, f = .23. 
In sum, older participants were less sensitive than younger participants to intentions, but only 
in harmful contexts. 
 
Figure 2. Moral judgment ratings by age (old vs. young) and intentions (neutral vs. 
valenced). Figure 2a shows moral badness ratings, and Figure 2b moral goodness ratings. 
Older participants’ moral badness ratings were less affected by intentions, there was no age 
effect for moral goodness ratings. Error bars indicate standard error of the mean.  
 
The analyses also revealed a main effect of outcome, F(1, 54) = 58.08, p < .001, f = 
1.03; scenarios involving valenced outcomes received more extreme ratings than ones 
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involving neutral outcomes. As was the case with intention, and in line with our prediction, 
this effect was qualified by a significant Age × Outcome interaction, F(1, 54) = 10.49, p = 
.002, f = .44. Older participants were more influenced by whether an outcome was neutral or 
valenced than younger participants (see Figure 3). However, unlike the results with 
intentions, the Age × Outcome interaction was not qualified by a Age × Outcome × Context 
interaction, F(1, 54) = 23.19, p = .083, f = .24.  
Furthermore, we found an Intention × Outcome interaction, F(1, 54) = 11.05, p = .002, f 
= .45. Intentions exerted a stronger influence for actions that resulted in neutral outcomes, 
than for actions that resulted in (similarly) valenced outcomes. This is to be expected because 
intent-based moral evaluations require higher adjustment when the intention conflicts with 
the outcome (one is neutral while the other is valenced), than when it doesn’t (both are 
neutral, or both are similarly valenced). Finally, the analysis revealed a main effect of 
context, F(1, 54) = 4.80, p = .033, f = .30. Helpful actions induced more extreme moral 
judgments (higher ratings) than harmful actions. No other effects were significant.  
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Figure 3. Moral judgment ratings by age (older vs. younger) and outcomes (neutral vs. 
valenced). Older versus younger participants were more affected by outcome status. Error 
bars indicate standard error of the mean. 
 
In sum, as expected, older participants weighed less intentions (but mainly for harmful 
scenarios) and more outcomes  than younger participants. 
 
Correlations Between Age, Moral Judgment, Theory of Mind, Empathy, Cognitive 
Ability, and Executive Function. 
Table 2 shows correlations between age, moral judgment, theory of mind, empathy, 
cognitive ability, and executive function. Age was used as a continuous variable. Age was 
negatively correlated with moral judgment, theory of mind, cognitive ability, and executive 
function. Specifically, the higher the age, the less extreme the moral judgments, and the lower 
the performance in the other tasks. However, age was positively correlated with empathy. 
That is, older adults scored higher on empathy than younger adults. Moreover, performance 
in theory of mind, cognitive ability, and executive functions tasks were positively related 
with one another. 
Table 2 
Correlations Between Age, Moral Badness, Theory of Mind, Empathy, Cognitive Ability, and 
Executive Function. 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
1. Age --      
2. Moral judgment –.49** --     
3. Theory of Mind –.54** .44** --    
4. Empathy .35* –.21 –.13 --   
5. Cognitive ability –.90** .52** .52** –.32* --  
6. Executive function –.60*** .32* .32* –.23 .60*** -- 
Note. Age is a continuous variable. * = p < .05, ** = p <.01, *** = p < .001.  
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Relationship Between Age, Moral Judgment, Theory of Mind, Empathy, Cognitive 
Ability, and Executive Function. 
We next examined whether age differences in theory of mind, empathy, cognitive 
ability, and executive function, statistically contribute to age differences in moral judgment. 
We used 5,000 bootstrapping resamples (Preacher & Hayes, 2008). We created a score to 
represent the import that intention information has on moral judgments. Specifically, we 
subtracted the mean moral judgment score assigned to scenarios with neutral intentions from 
that of scenarios with valenced intentions. Higher scores indicate more intent-based moral 
judgment. This score was used as the outcome variable in the subsequent analysis. Age was 
entered as a binary variable (0 = Younger participants, 1 = Older participants). The 
relationship between age and moral judgment, b = –3.13, t(48) = –4.12, p < .001, 95% CI [–
4.650, –1.600,], was reduced after taking into account theory of mind, empathy, cognitive 
ability, and executive functions, b = –1.17, t(48) = –1.01, p = .317, 95% CI [–3.512, 1.162]. 
However, only the decline in theory of mind ability significantly reduced the relationship 
between age and moral judgment, 95% CI [–1.607, –0.073]. 
Discussion 
The present study found that older adults’ moral judgment relies less on intentions and 
more on outcomes than younger adults’ moral judgment. The age effect on intentions was 
more pronounced for harmful than helpful actions, while the age effect on outcomes was 
unaffected by type of action. Furthermore, in line with previous research, older adulthood 
was associated with an increase in empathic concern, but a decline in theory of mind, 
cognitive, and executive function abilities. Importantly, from all these factors, the effect of 
age on moral judgment was reduced only once we controlled for theory of mind abilities. 
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This finding lends empirical support to Moran et al.’s (2012) claim that aging differences in 
this type of moral evaluations are linked to theory of mind.  
Why was the age effect on intent-based moral evaluations more pronounced for harmful 
than for helpful actions? Both neuroimaging and behavioral research suggest that young 
adults rely more on mental state information when they evaluate harmful rather than helpful 
actions (e.g., Knobe, 2005; Pizarro, Uhlman, & Salovery, 2003; Young, Scholz, & Saxe, 
2011; Young, Nichols, & Saxe, 2010). Similarly, it has been found that young adults weigh 
more intentions when assigning blame than when assigning praise (Pizzaro et al., 2003). In 
addition, converging evidence comes from the so-called side-effect effect: Actions with 
unintended negative side-effects are judged as more intentional than actions with unintended 
positive side-effects (Knobe, 2005). In line with these results, the young adults in our study 
placed relatively more weight on intentions when evaluating harmful rather than helpful 
actions (compare the steepness of the lines representing young adults’ moral judgments in 
Figures 2a and 2b). Returning to the opening question, the reason the aging effect was absent 
with helpful actions may be because, for such actions, even young adults do not weigh much 
intentions in their evaluations. 
The present findings suggest that older adults’ lower reliance on intentions is related to 
a diminishment in their theory of mind skills. This finding is in line with a number of studies 
showing that normal aging is associated with theory of mind impairments (for a meta-
analysis, see Henry et al., 2013). Although we found no direct evidence for the claim that 
executive control contributes to the age-related effect on moral judgment, this is likely to be 
the case. Indeed, many theorists consider executive control to be a critical component of 
theory of mind skills (e.g.,  Buon, Seara-Cardoso, Viding, 2016; Henry et al., 2013; Leslie, 
Friedman & German, 2004). Future studies could investigate further this link by using a 
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different task to measure executive control and/or by introducing tasks that are known to 
affect executive functions and examine how these influence moral judgments. 
The present results carry implications for everyday judgment and decision making. As 
stated in the introduction, many important decisions concerning moral issues are made by 
older adults from the role of judges, politicians, CEOs, and doctors. Consider, for example, 
an older adult who serves in a jury and should follow the principle of “innocent until proven 
guilty.” A critical component for assigning criminal liability is mens rea, that is, that the 
accused acted with a guilty mind. The present results suggest that older adults may be less 
concerned with the intentions of the accused and more with the outcomes of their actions, 
which in the context of criminal trials are dire. Put simply, older adults may find difficult to 
apply mens rea and thus be more likely to convict. This is precisely what a recent study found 
using data from more than 700 felony trials in Florida (Anwar, Bayer, & Hjalmarsson, 2014). 
This has tremendous implications for many judicial systems. For example, England and 
Wales allow people up to the age of 70 to sit in a jury and this limit is set to raise to 75 years. 
In the US, Federal courts in more than half of the states disallow age-exemptions from jury 
service. 
Limitations  
The present study, like all studies, has several limitations. One limitation concerns the 
materials we used. Research suggests that age-related cognitive declines in social tasks can be 
improved by using more naturalistic materials (see Light, 1991), such as movies, or materials 
whose content captures the interest of older adults. Thus, future studies could use movies to 
convey moral scenarios and/or materials which older adults find interesting. The prediction is 
that the aging gap may reduce with such materials. However, note that in the current study we 
purposefully chose scenarios that are likely to capture the interest of our older participants 
(see for example the harm scenario in Table 1). 
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A second limitation of the present study relates to its cross-sectional design. The 
observed differences in moral evaluations may be driven not by age per se but by some other 
factor that is related to age. For example, they may reflect a cohort effect. It could be that our 
older participants belonged to a more utilitarian, outcome-focused generation than our 
younger participants. This would explain why older adults focused relatively more on 
outcomes and less on intentions. However, in a recent study examining aging effects with 
sacrificial and non-sacrificial dilemmas, McNair and colleagues (McNair, Okan, 
Hadjichristidis, & Bruine de Bruin, 2016; see also Arutyunova, Alexandrov, & Hauser, 2016) 
found that older adults are less utilitarian than younger adults. For example, in relation to the 
famous footbridge dilemma (Thomson, 1985), older adults were less willing to shove the 
person off the footbridge to save five other individuals. 
Conclusion 
The present study shows that older versus younger adults weigh more outcomes and 
less intentions in their moral evaluations. Importantly, this age-related difference was 
associated with theory of mind skills: once we controlled for such skills, the association 
between age and moral evaluation diminished. In a seminal paper, Henrich et al. (2010) noted 
that most theories in psychology are founded on studies using WEIRD participants, which 
stands for Western, Educated people from Industrialized, Rich, and Democratic countries. 
The results from such WEIRD samples, they argued, may not generalize to the world 
population. The present findings highlight another peculiarity of WEIRD people: they are 
young adults. Of course, this is nothing new to developmental researchers. Yet, 
developmental research has predominantly focused on young participants. Perhaps, 
ironically, aging research on judgment and decision making is still in its infancy. The present 
findings can inform psychological theories of moral judgment but also public policy for 
issues such as jury selection. 
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Footnotes 
1
 The sample size was determined by conducting an a-priori power analysis using 
G*Power (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007) for a repeated-measure analysis of 
variance including within-between interaction. We used the following estimates: effect size f 
= .25 (medium effect, based on Moran et al. 2013), α = .05, power = .95, number of groups = 
2, number of measurements = 4,  r = .30 (estimated), nonsphericity correction e = 1. This 
analysis revealed a minimum sample size of N = 50 participants. We recruited more 
participants as the a-priori power analysis indicated as a precaution of possible drop outs. No 
interim or stopping rules were applied.  
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Supplemental Material of Chapter 7 
 
Punishment and Reward Judgments 
We analyzed the judgments of punishment and reward. We analyzed these judgments 
with a 2 (Age: Old vs. Young) × 2 (Intention: Neutral vs. Valenced) × 2 (Outcome: Neutral 
vs. Valenced) × 2 (Context: Harmful vs. Helpful) mixed-factor ANOVA. Due to space 
restrictions, we present the full set of results in the supplementary materials. Here we focus 
on the two main predictions: an interaction between age and intention, and an interaction 
between age and outcome. The analysis revealed a significant Age × Intention interaction, 
F(1, 54) = 18.56, p < .001, f = .66.
 
As expected, older as opposed to younger participants 
were less influenced by whether an intention was neutral or valenced. The analysis also 
revealed a significant Age × Outcome interaction, F(1, 54) = 9.70, p = .003, f = .42. As 
expected, older as opposed to younger participants were more influenced by whether an 
outcome was neutral or valenced. Neither of these effects was further qualified by context, 
that is, we did not find a significant Age × Intention × Context or Age × Outcome × Context 
interactions.   
Relationship Between Age, Punishment/Reward Judgment, Theory of Mind, Empathy, 
Cognitive Ability, and Executive Function 
We then examined whether age differences in theory of mind, empathy, cognitive 
ability, and executive function, statistically contribute to age differences in 
punishment/reward judgment. We used 5,000 bootstrapping resamples (Preacher & Hayes, 
2008). We created a total punishment/reward score in the same way as the total moral score 
described above. Age was entered as a binary variable (0 = Younger participants, 1 = Older 
participants). The relationship between age and punishment/reward judgment, b = –3.19, 
t(48) = –4.17, p < .001, 95% CI [–4.738, –1.650], was reduced after taking into account 
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theory of mind, empathy, cognitive ability, and executive functions, b = –0.48, t(48) = –0.41, 
p = .685, 95% CI [–2.834, 1.880]. However, only the decline in cognitive ability significantly 
reduced the relationship between age and punishment/reward judgment, 95% CI [–4.122, –
0.278]. 
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GENERAL DISCUSSION AND PERSPECTIVES 
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General Discussion and Perspectives 
1. Main Findings 
The present work focused on infants’ expectations of obedience and the development of 
a mature moral judgment mainly based on the agent’s intention assessment. As argued in the 
general introduction, both the respect for authority or leadership and the evaluation of the 
intention beyond the action are crucial aspects of our morality. The conformity to a certain set 
of rules and the obedience to the authority reside at the very core of human morality; as the 
child grows, he or she begins to fully appreciate the complexity of his or her fellows’ 
morality. The child evaluates not only whether others actually respected the rules, but also 
whether they intended to respect the rules. Compared to action consequences, intention is 
arguably a much more informative cue to predict the outcome of future interactions and to 
maintain the cooperation within a group. 
 
1.1 Expectations of Obedience 
In Part 1 I presented a research that addressed the question whether in the second year 
of life infants already possess the ability to represent the leader-followers relationship and 
whether they expect a leader’s instruction but not a bully’s instruction to be obeyed by a 
group of subordinates. For the first time, we reported evidence that 21-month-olds are able to 
discriminate between two distinct types of dominance, leadership or authority and physical 
dominance or bullying. This distinction is crucial for the understanding of human morality, 
and it may represent a basis for the representation of our complex social words that mainly 
consists in a set of hierarchical social structures evolved in order to establish and maintain 
order, mutual respect and cooperation between individuals.  
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While a leader can be defined as an individual whose source of power is deemed 
rightful or it is spontaneously accepted by the subordinates, a bully, at least in the present 
context, is an individual that tends to prevail in conflicting situations, primarily by means of 
physical coercion or intimidation. Following these definitions, we see that leaders could have 
a moral authority, but bullies just exercise a coercive power when their forces or skills permit 
them to overhang subordinates. Our data suggested that infants seem to understand these 
complex dynamics. They expected subordinates to obey to an absent leader, but not to an 
absent bully—the bully’s influence is indeed constrained by the fact that he used physical 
force to gain the subordinates’ initial compliance, and infants subsequently expected that 
subordinates would not be influenced by the bully’s command when he is not present to 
control. With a further experiment, we also excluded that infants’ expectations of obedience 
in leader condition was due to a general positive interaction between characters and not to 
leadership. Our findings add an important building block to the understanding of the early 
mechanisms for representing socio-moral situations and, as I will argue in the perspective 
session, they may be considered an initial piece of evidence for an early-developing ‘naïve 
politics’. 
 
1.2 Intent-based Moral Reasoning in Children 
Part 2 is focused on the children’s developing intent-based moral judgment. In 
particular, in Chapter 2, we aimed to investigate at what age children produce an intent-based 
goodness judgment of agents that either attempted but failed or accidentally helped someone. 
We reported that, when presented with a verbal moral task asking to evaluate the goodness or 
badness of some agents, children aged 5-6, but not 4 year-olds, attend to agents’ intentions 
more than to actions outcomes. This developmental shift, also known as ‘the outcome-to-
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intent shift’, is a major one in the moral development (e.g., Cushman et al., 2013; Killen et 
al., 2011; Margoni & Surian, 2017; Nobes et al., 2009; Piaget, 1932). The child acquires a 
full-blown capacity to express a moral judgment that is integrated with the understanding of 
others’ mental state. A further and related question we addressed was whether this shift 
reflects a conceptual change (in the concept of moral goodness) or ancillary changes 
occurring outside the moral domain, for instance in theory of mind abilities or executive 
functioning. Our results do not support the hypothesis of a conceptual change in the moral 
domain, and overall are more consistent with the hypothesis that the shift reflects changes 
occurring outside the moral domain. 
Although future work is needed in order to conclude whether the outcome-to-intent 
shift reflects a conceptual change or not, in Chapter 4 we further argued in favor of a 
continuity hypothesis, that is, a conceptual change is both unlikely and unnecessary to 
explain current findings. Indeed, we know from infant cognition literature that already at the 
end of the first year of life the child shows to be able to attend to intention in his or her socio-
moral expectations and preferences (Dunfield & Kuhlmeier, 2010; Hamlin, 2013; Lee et al., 
2015). Infant development literature uses mainly spontaneous-response tasks or simple 
elicited-response tasks that often decrease the processing demand compared to verbal tasks 
used to investigate moral judgment in preschoolers (Baillargeon et al., 2015). We then argued 
that 4-year-olds show an outcome-based moral judgment not because they do not yet have 
developed an intent-based concept of moral goodness or badness, but because the task with 
which they are typically presented is too demanding in terms of cognitive processing. In 
order to produce an intent-based judgment in a verbal elicited-response task, the child needs 
to suppress the information concerning the action outcomes and subsequently select an intent-
based response. This cognitive processing requires executive functioning skills that at 4 years 
may be not yet fully developed. Therefore, what really develops is the child’ executive 
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functioning ability, and this development—given the nature of the tasks being used in the 
children literature—likely produces the outcome-to-intent shift. 
In Chapter 5, then, we reviewed recent works linking mental state understanding and 
moral judgment in individuals with autistic spectrum disorders. We concluded that this 
clinical population encounters some difficulties in developing a full-blown intent-based 
judgment, likely because of the impairment in the mental state understanding. The research 
on autism, then, proves useful to determine which component is required for the development 
of a mature intent-based moral judgment. Executive functioning skills (Chapter 4) and mental 
state reasoning (Chapter 5) are crucial components that are required to elaborate a moral 
judgment, and could explain a large part of our moral development. A further evidence for 
this line of reasoning was provided in Chapter 7, Part 3. 
Finally, in the third chapter, I presented a study that we conducted in order to expand on 
the issue of the preschoolers’ development of intent-based moral judgment. We asked 
whether the moral evaluations and preferences of children aged 4 to 5 already rely on two 
distinct types of intentions. On the one hand, a biocentric intention is defined as the intention 
to preserve nature because of the nature intrinsic value; on the other hand, an anthropocentric 
intention is the intention to preserve nature because it helps humans’ interests (Kahn & 
Friedman, 1995; White, 1967). Here we investigated not only whether 5-year-olds rely on 
intention when judging the morality of some actions or agents, but we investigated whether 
they are able to show a preference between intentions that reflect two contrasting moral views 
or ways of extending ethics to natural entities. 
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1.3 Intent-based Moral Reasoning in Adults 
In Chapter 6 and 7, I reported two studies that investigated the intent-based moral 
judgment respectively in adults and older adults. Current models of adults’ moral judgment 
do not address or remain unclear on three main issues: first, we still do not have convincing 
evidence for concluding that the cognitive processing mechanisms underlying the attribution 
of moral goodness are the same of those underlying the well-studied attribution of moral 
badness or wrongness; second, current models diverge on the role and weight of negligence 
information; third, little attention has been paid on how older people’ moral judgment works. 
In Chapter 6, we showed that in adults the attribution of both moral rightness and 
wrongness are based mainly on an assessment of the agent’s intention. Moreover, we 
clarified that also negligence plays a significant role, albeit a marginal one if compared to the 
role played by intention. Consequences, instead, affected more deserved reward and 
punishment judgments. We therefore suggest that a current influential dual-process model of 
moral judgment (Cushman, 2008) should be generalized to account also for rightness 
judgment, but needs a minor revision to account for small differences we detected between 
rightness and wrongness judgments, and for the marginal but still significant role played by 
negligence information in shaping our moral evaluations.  
A further integration is needed for the existing modeling of the development of intent-
based moral judgment. In Chapter 7, we presented a study revealing an ‘intent-to-outcome 
shift’ in old age. We reported that older adults’ moral judgments rely more on action 
outcomes and less on agent’s intentions compared to the judgments of younger adults. This 
shift in later years was found to be more pronounced in the evaluation of harming actions 
than in the evaluation of helping actions. Indeed, we found that when judging the moral 
badness, older adults’ judgments undergo a full-blown shift from intention to outcome, while 
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older adults’ moral evaluations of goodness were only more outcome-based and not less 
intent-based compared to younger adults’ evaluations.  
Moreover, we reported that the age-related change in moral judgment was associated 
with the well-known decrease in theory of mind abilities occurring in ‘golden years’. These 
results can also be relevant for the issue we addressed in Part 2 whether the developmental 
shift occurring in moral judgment during childhood reflects ancillary changes occurring 
outside the moral domain or a conceptual change within the moral domain. Our evidence on 
older adults’ moral judgment highlights the importance of ancillary changes in theory of 
mind (and executive functioning skills, indeed a necessary component for theory of mind) in 
shaping the development of intent-based moral judgment throughout our life. A description 
of the development of moral judgment consistent with our data would insist on the changes 
occurring in the executive functioning. These changes may account for the outcome-to-intent 
shift during childhood and for the intent-to-outcome shift during later years. 
 
2. Perspectives 
 
With respect to the research on infants’ understanding of dominance relationships, I 
predict that in the next years the field will move forward at high speed. A few studies have 
been conducted so far, and a lot of exciting questions remained to be investigated. Previous 
research showed that infants are able to use the physical size of characters and the numerical 
size of groups to predict the outcome of a conflict between two characters (Thomsen et al., 
2011; Pun et al., 2016). However, other cues may be relevant to predict the outcome of a 
conflict. A first one is hunger. Typically, hungry people value the resources more than 
satiated individuals, especially when the resources are food and they are scarce. Evidence 
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from animal research have also shown that individuals in need of a particular resource 
spontaneously emerges as leaders and often coordinate foraging (Krause, 1993; Rands, 
Cowlishaw, Pettifor, Rowcliffe, & Johnstone, 2003). Do infants expect hungry individuals to 
prevail over non-hungry individuals? Do they expect hungry individuals to search longer for 
resources than non-hungry individuals?  
Mascaro & Csibra (2012) defined ‘social dominance’ as the tendency to prevail in 
competitive situations. However, finding that a hungry subordinate would actually prevail 
over a dominant because of his or her stronger motivation to fight could constrain the 
definition initially proposed by Mascaro & Csibra (2012). A second cue may be strength. 
Physical size could be less accurate than strength for predicting which individual will prevail. 
Do infants expect individuals with greater strength to prevail? And, do infants rely more on 
size or more on strength to predict the outcome of a conflict? 
Moreover, the line of research regarding infants’ expectations of obedience, that we 
started with the study presented in Chapter 1, could be followed by two main projects. A first 
project could be devoted to the understanding of which cues determine or form the 
representation of leadership during early infancy. Of course, leadership is a social relation, so 
we may want, more specifically, to think about the leader-followers representation. 
Leadership is also a complex phenomenon, and I believe that no single cue can determine 
such a representation. For this reason, a set of cues is likely to be the cause of the leader-
followers mental representation.  
As we argued, leaders serve the function of maintaining the cooperation and cohesion in 
the group; moreover, they facilitate the cultural evolution of the group through a mechanism 
of imitation (e.g., Henrich & Gil-White, 2001; Van Vugt, 2006). Then, a first element that 
may determine the mental representation of leadership could be the fact that subordinates 
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show respect towards the leader and the leader respects and cares for subordinates. So, a 
mutual respect between parties could be an important element of this particular social 
relationship. A second element could be that subordinates tend to imitate the leader. A third 
set of elements could be related to the material features that help identifying a chief, or 
someone that is in charge, such as a higher spatial position and a larger space. Overall, future 
research should identify which of these or other characteristics give rise to the infants’ 
expectations of obedience towards an absent dominant. 
A second project could be proposed in order to investigate whether a leader figure, as 
opposed to a bully figure, has a positive impact on infants’ learning abilities. As we have 
seen, some evolutionary psychologists posited that subordinates might be motivated to follow 
leaders and to allow them some privileges in exchange of the possibility to learn from them 
(e.g., Aidar, 1989; Berger et al., 1972; Henrich & Gil-White, 2001). Indeed, leaders are often 
skilled individuals, and previous research already showed that infants’ imitation is influenced 
by the reliability of the model (Zmyj, Buttelmann, Carpenter, & Daum, 2010). According to 
this line of reasoning, we can hypothesize that leaders attract more attention than bullies. 
Therefore, children’s ability to reproduce a given sequence of instructions (e.g., how to build 
a toy) could be improved if the instructor has the qualities of a leader vs. a bully. 
Finally, the field could be really moved forward by studying what I call here the “naïve 
politics” in early infancy. Seminal work in this eventual new area of research may be done by 
simplifying and opposing two main well-known views of politics (and economy): 
communism and liberalism. A first step would be to investigate infants’ representation of 
(private) ownership. Do infants expect a character that was holding a toy to prevail to a 
character that did not hold the toy when they conflict over it? Do infants expect owners to 
search longer for their objects than non-owners? And what about their implicit evaluations? 
Do infants have preferences that suggest the normative idea that property should be private? 
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Recent works have shown that infants are able to understand transfer-based interactions 
between agents, both taking and giving actions (e.g., Geraci & Surian, 2011; Meristo & 
Surian, 2013; Schöppner, Sodian, & Pauen, 2006; Tatone et al., 2015). However, so far, no 
direct evidence of an early-emerging concept of private property has been reported.  
A second step would be to investigate whether infants prefer fairness over individual 
freedom, or vice versa. Finally, a third step would be to simulate, for instance with a puppet 
show, the dynamics of the workers exploitation. Hypothesizing that infants would watch and 
understand a character playing the role of a master that do not redistribute equitably among 
the workers or slaves the resources derived from their work, would infants also prefer the 
worker over the master? And, would infants expect an equal or unequal distribution of the 
resources derived from the workers’ job? Indeed, it has been shown that children at around 
the age of three are extremely willing to share resources equitably in collaborative activities, 
and in those situations they are more willing to share than in situations in which simply there 
is an abundance of resources or the child worked in parallel with others (Hamann, Warneken, 
Greenberg, & Tomasello, 2011). This important piece of evidence suggests that the child 
possesses a complex sense of justice, which is constrained by some relevant aspects of the 
situation, such as the collaborative nature of the job or activity that has been done. However, 
future investigation should reveal whether this sense of justice with respect to collaborative 
activities is innate or culturally learned. 
Coming now to the research on the development of intent-based moral judgment, two 
main future perspectives are considered here. First, more research is needed to address the 
issue whether developmental changes in moral judgment reflect conceptual change or 
ancillary changes occurring outside the moral domain, such as in theory of mind or executive 
functioning skills. Although in the present dissertation I offered some arguments in favor of 
conceptual continuity during development, current data do not allow any strong conclusion 
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on this important issue. Clever studies that would contribute to the investigation of the role of 
executive function and theory of mind in the development of moral judgment should then be 
in order.  
Second, future studies should explore the possibility to integrate existing processing 
models of moral judgment by adding to them also a process that analyzes whether a given 
action, or intention, respects the authority’s mandate. Indeed, current models neglect the role 
that obedience to authority and conformity could and likely play in our everyday moral 
evaluations. Both Piaget (1932) and the social domain theorists (e.g., Killen & Smetana, 
2015; Smetana, 2006; Turiel, 1983) carefully investigated the authority-dependency of moral 
rules in the child’s judgments. However, so far, scarce work has been done in order to study 
the information processing aspects underlying people’s moral evaluations of moral actions 
and authority’s mandates.   
 
3. Conclusion 
 
The present dissertation collects several works overall aimed at investigating some 
crucial aspects of the development of moral evaluation. I presented experiments on both the 
infants’ capacity to distinguish between leaders and bullies, and the development of the 
mature processing of others’ intentions during the production of a moral judgment. Both 
aspects are crucial for morality, that is, the respect for the rules. On the one hand, respect for 
authority constitutes a first pillar of morality. We showed that 21-month-olds already hold the 
expectation that subordinates obey to leaders, who have the moral authority, but not to 
bullies, who simply use physical force or coercion to dominate and thus are devoid of any 
moral authority. On the other hand, a more complex understanding of others leads children to 
188          DEVELOPMENTAL ASPECTS OF MORAL EVALUATION  
 
 
 
evaluate not only whether the action or its outcomes are violating some rules, but also 
whether the agents’ intentions are consistent with the authority’s mandates and the moral 
rules. We showed that an outcome-to-intent shift in moral reasoning occurs during preschool 
years also when children are presented with helping actions and are asked to evaluate the 
moral goodness of the character. Moreover, we found that older adults return to attend to 
outcome instead of intention when judging the morality of an agent. We argued that both 
shifts likely reflect general changes occurring outside the moral domain. 
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